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The Naked Land: The Dayton Accords,
Property Disputes, and Bosnia’s
Real Constitution
Timothy William Waters ∗

The urge to destroy is a creative urge.

—Michael Bakunin 1

The government of the national revolution regards it as its duty
. . . to keep those elements from influencing the nation which
consciously and intentionally act against its interests. The theory of equality before the law cannot be allowed to lead to the
granting of equality to those who treat the law with contempt
. . . . But the Government will grant equality before the law to
all who, by taking part in the formation of a national front
against this danger, back the national interest and do not fail to
support the Government.
Our legal system must serve to maintain this national community . . . . The nation rather than the individual must be regarded as the centre of legal concern.
—Adolf Hitler 2
Not only may one imagine that what is higher derives always
and only from what is lower; one may imagine that—given the
∗ J.D., Harvard Law School; M.I.A., Columbia University School of Public and International Affairs; B.A., University of California at Los Angeles. The author is a research officer
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Hague. This Article
does not necessarily represent or reflect the views of the Tribunal. The author would like to
thank Professor Henry Steiner of Harvard Law School, and also Rachel Guglielmo of the
Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, for valuable comments and advice on many drafts of
this Article.
1. In George Esenwein & Adrian Schubert, Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931–1939, at 125 (1995).
2. Adolf Hitler, Speech to the Reichstag on the Enabling Law (Mar. 23, 1933) in Alan
Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives 463 (1993). Bullock notes that “[t]he essence of the
Nazi view of law was the distinction between friends and enemies of the national community
as defined by the Nazis.”
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polarity and, more important, the ludicrousness of the world—
everything derives from its opposite: day from night, frailty
from strength, deformity from beauty, fortune from misfortune.
Victory is made up exclusively of beatings.
—Ladislav Klíma 3
I. INTRODUCTION

More than three years have passed since the Dayton Accords
brought the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to an end. 4 That
agreement has been remarkably successful in bringing peace, and
even tentative stability, to the country. 5 Yet the Accords were intended to do more: they were meant to create conditions for the return of the millions of refugees and displaced persons and to restore
political unity among Bosnia’s factions. On these scores, Dayton
has failed completely. Moreover, there remains a wide rift between
the international community’s perceptions of the local parties’ obligations and those parties’ own perceptions and, indeed, their conduct. The international community views Dayton as a blueprint for
a final settlement of the conflict, whereas the parties view Dayton
as a trucial way-station, a means of continuing the struggle for
dominance and control. 6

3. In Bohumil Hrabal, Dancing Lessons for the Advanced in Age before title page (Michael Henry Heim trans., 1995).
4. See generally Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75
[hereinafter GFAP]. The documents negotiated in Dayton, Ohio from November 1 to 21,
1995 were formally signed in Paris in December, but are still commonly referred to as “the
Dayton [Peace] Accord[s],” “Dayton,” “GFA,” or “GFAP.” I have worked from a Dayton, not
a Paris, version of the Agreement, but it is identical in all particulars. Also, I will often refer
in this Article simply to “Bosnia” as shorthand for the official name of the country, Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
5. Zoran Pajić, The Dayton Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina—A Critical Appraisal
of its Human Rights Provisions [hereinafter The Dayton Constitution], in Constitutional
Reform and International Law in Central and Eastern Europe 187 (Rein Müllerson, Malgosia
Fitzmaurice, & Mads Andenas eds., 1998) (noting in late 1996 that “[t]he General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . provided a comprehensive initial
framework for ending the war, and . . . a year of peace in [Bosnia].”); Cf. Charles G. Boyd,
Making Bosnia Work, in 47 Foreign Aff. 42, 43 (Jan.-Feb. 1998) (“It is often stated, incorrectly, that the Dayton Accords stopped the fighting in Bosnia. What it did, with the aid of
60,000 U.S. and coalition troops, was freeze in place an uneasy cease-fire and prevent a
resumption of hostilities.”).
6. See Ante Čuvalo, Historical Dictionary of Bosnia and Herzegovina 48 (1997) (“None
of the three sides is happy with the idea of a multiethnic state and each side considers the
Dayton treaty as a temporary solution”); Boyd, supra note 5 at 43–44, 49 (noting that Dayton’s “dubious objective” was the “creation of a nation where no common sense of national
community existed . . . requir[ing] inclusion of two ethnic groups . . . who did not then and
do not now wish to live as minority peoples in a state dominated by the larger Muslim
group,” and noting expectations that further fighting is expected if NATO withdraws).
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Within this wider context, one of the most complicated aspects of
the Bosnian conflict is the range of disputes over real property.
Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced from their
homes, which have, in many cases, been occupied by others similarly uprooted from elsewhere. 7 Yet the situation is by no means
anarchical. There are legal and quasi-legal structures in place in all
areas of the country that shape the actions of the various parties—if
only to shape the ways in which policies of eviction and ethnic
cleansing can be pursued.
Resolution of the property question in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
closely linked, therefore, to the issue of the return of refugees,
which the Accords were supposed to facilitate. 8 Any eventual return
of displaced persons to their homes will necessitate a resolution of
the conflicts inherent in a situation of multiple occupants and claimants. 9 Even if most people give up their right to return, they will
still seek compensation for their property. Moreover, investment
that is critical to any meaningful reconciliation between the still
hostile and separated groups will remain low as long as title is uncertain. 10 So far, the Dayton mechanisms have proven singularly
incapable of creating any meaningful resolution of outstanding
property issues, let alone the return of individual refugees.

7. See, e.g., United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Sarajevo Office of the Special Envoy [hereinafter UNHCR], Analysis of Compliance/Non-Compliance with Chapter 1
of Annex 7, 1 (undated, appended letters variously dated September and October 1996) (“In
Eastern Herzegovina . . . [t]he homes of displaced Bosniacs from areas such as Nevesinje,
Trebinje, Gacko, Lubinje and Bileća are being occupied by Serbs from the Neretva valley
south of Mostar, [which is] controlled by Croats (HVO) who will not permit Serb returns.”).
Following increasingly common usage, in this Article I refer to the Muslim population as
“Bosniacs.” “HVO” is the Croatian abbreviation for Croatian Defense Council, the title used
by ethnic Croatian military forces during the conflict.
8. “Even if there were no other problems, property alone would present a huge hurdle to
would-be returnees. Refugees live in the houses of other refugees, forming endless chains of
squatters, at least one of whom is bound to balk at going home.” Brotherhood and Disunity,
in Survey of the Balkans: A Ghost of a Chance (special section), Economist, Jan. 24, 1998, at
9. [hereinafter Brotherhood and Disunity]; see also Elena Popović, The Impact of International Human Rights Law on the Property Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Post-War
Protection of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina 141, 154 (Michael O’Flaherty &
Gregory Gisvold eds., 1998) (noting that the Dayton Peace Accords establish, in Annex 7, “a
mechanism to deal solely with one particular right—property[,]” and that “[t]hereby, the GFA
recognizes the importance of property rights in finding durable solutions for uprooted people.”).
9. “The illegal suspension of the property rights of innocent people was one of the major
weapons with which ethnic cleansing was accomplished . . . . Part of the normalization process is property.” The Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees [hereinafter Property Commission], The Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (information sheet issued by the Property Commission) [hereinafter The Commission for Real Property Claims].
10. “If there is no definitive mechanism to resolve ownership, every new or repaired housing unit that is made available becomes a source of further confusion and conflict.” Id.
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In this Article, I examine the modes of resolving property disputes enforced by the various ethnically based governments that
have and/or continue to operate on Bosnian territory: the Serbdominated Republika Srpska (RS), the Muslim-dominated Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RBiH), the Croat Republic of HercegBosna (H-B), and the joint Muslim-Croat government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Fed. BiH, or the Federation). In
so doing, I will illustrate the disparities between the practical operation of these domestic legal regimes and the aspirations for the international mechanisms established at Dayton. Specifically, I examine
the legal and quasi-legal structures that exist for resolving disputes involving the massive amount of abandoned property in the country.
What are the rules that have actually shaped the disposition of
property disputes in Bosnia? What is the relationship between the
international community’s imposed solution—the Dayton Accords—and the systems actually operating in the country? What do
those domestic systems tell us about the essential nature of the regimes operating there: their aspirations, their modes of legitimation,
their purposes for being?
In answering these questions, I will explore the degree to which
the nature and resolution of property disputes in Bosnia today can
be considered evidence, not merely of violations of certain rights,
but of a wholly different constitutional conception of what society
and the polity should be. Bosnia’s domestic regimes, as I shall
show, are fundamentally—constitutionally—at odds with the commitments imposed upon them in the Dayton Accords; they are therefore a great challenge to policymakers and scholars in the West who
have placed their hopes for the restoration and reconstruction of
Bosnia in the Accords.
Examining protection of property rights to illustrate the disparity
between the legal regimes of the para-states now in existence on the
territory of Bosnia and the constitutional order envisioned in the
Dayton Accords seems apt. No other subject is more clearly linked
to the issues over which the war itself was fought than property.
The many terrible human rights abuses committed were not the
purpose of the war, but only one means of prosecuting it. 11 Property
11. They were, of course, an integral part of strategy: the logic of ethnic cleansing was
aimed at least in part at ensuring that no one returned, and thus horrible abuses were deemed
necessary as a way of permanently scaring off members of other ethnic groups. Even in this
context, however, human rights violations are still a means to the end of a territory populated
with and controlled by members of one ethnic group; they were not an end in themselves. See
Tihomir Loža, A Civilization Destroyed, in Balkan War Report: Bulletin of the Institute for
War and Peace Reporting [hereinafter War Report], at 1, cited in Why Bosnia? Writings on
the Balkan War xiv–xv (Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz eds., 1993) [hereinafter Why Bosnia?].

1999 / The Dayton Accords and Bosnian Property Disputes

5

systems, on the other hand, are designed to control resources, and
control of resources and land was the motivation behind the war’s
outbreak and behind the way it was conducted. 12 To the degree a
coherent property system exists, it should reflect the parties’ core
conceptions about how the naked desire for power is channeled into
a system the international community would recognize as “legal.”
This distinction is important for understanding why the international community has largely failed to achieve its stated goals beyond military stabilization. Although it has committed enormous
resources to resolving the conflict, the international community has
adopted a legalistic and rhetorical approach to the domestic political systems that has limited its ultimate effectiveness. The international community has sought to assess the legitimacy of the various
parties by international legal standards and to impose human rights
norms on them without reference to the parties’ internal dynamics
of legitimacy. 13 However salutary such aspirations may be, the
method has proven less than effective. A more textured understand12. This was true not just in Bosnia, but in the whole range of conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia: “Until [the signing of the accord on Eastern Slavonia], the war in the former
Yugoslavia ha[d] been about territorial conquest.” Zoran Daskalović, Dealing for Slavonia,
War Report (formerly Balkan War Report: Bulletin of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting) (Nov.-Dec. 1995), at 11.
13. Consider, for example, this analysis:
The challenge in the evolving Western orthodox model of legitimacy to nonintervention and state dominance of the legitimate use of force as part of the basis of order is indicative of the importance of liberal values and the declining relevance of a
clear division between domestic and international order for those within the consensus.
The domestic-international link, rather than divide, both in the way Yugoslavia lost legitimacy and the effort to legitimize the international response, is indicative of this. . . .
The Western orthodox model was able to make headway into the emerging vacuum of
legitimacy, but only as far as the consensus on the Western model as a viable alternative
to the socialist legitimacy of the Titoist system extended. In the face of alternatives
based on ethno-nationalism and an anti-Western version of Yugoslavia, the Western orthodox model was unable to make much progress.
The international response to Yugoslavia’s collapse seems to show, on the other hand,
how much progress liberal political values have made within their Western heartlands.
In particular, its cosmopolitan aspects have come through more clearly. . . .
Without consensus on the inclusion of liberal values in legitimacy and the absence of
the civic-territorial nationalism it seemed to assume, the EC’s proposals to save Yugoslavia on the basis of a reformed confederation had minimal chance of success. The legitimacy of the EC and the legitimacy of the Serb-led proposals rested on different versions of the legitimacy of liberal political institutions and procedures. That liberalism
has great difficulties with nationalism and the issue of identity made it impossible for
the EC to deal coherently, consistently, and adequately with this challenge to the basis
of their proposals.
John Williams, Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia
167–68 (1998); Cf. generally Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice
266–67 (1989) (“Human rights are ultimately a profoundly national, not international, issue. . . . [E]ven if we do attribute unrealistically pure motives and unbelievable skill and
dedication to external powers, a regime’s ultimate success—its persistence in respecting,
implementing, and enforcing human rights—will depend principally on internal political
factors.”).
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ing of these regimes’ relationship to the rule of law is therefore important because, to the degree that these systems can be characterized as legal and even internally legitimate, it must also be acknowledged that their legitimation is independent of the norms outsiders might seek to impose on them. Indeed, outsiders must even
consider whether their present social and political organization is
compatible at all with the substantive human rights goals the international community seeks to advance. I will argue that in failing
adequately to address these issues when seeking to implement human rights norms in Bosnia, the international community risks either the complete irrelevance of those norms, or a dangerous and
compromising co-optation.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly lays out the background to the conflict and the present environment. Part II analyzes
the civilian provisions of the Dayton Accords, showing how they
form a radical blueprint for the future of Bosnia as an integral society. Parts III and IV lay out the laws and practice of the domestic
regimes regarding property, showing how they stand in sharp contrast to Dayton. Part V then discusses concepts of the “rule of law”
and “constitutionalism” and suggests that the usual definitions of
those concepts seriously limit the ability to develop truly meaningful critiques of societies that violate human rights within what are
internally consistent and legitimate legal systems. Then, applying
this theoretical construction to Bosnia, the section derives the empirical rules concerning the resolution of property disputes there as
evidence of the unwritten, yet effectively existing, constitutions of
the domestic regimes. Part VI then argues that the international
community’s efforts to resolve the conflict in Bosnia suffer from an
irresolvable contradiction: they seek to ensure liberal human rights
on a foundation of illiberal, ethnically exclusive states. In conclusion, I suggest that this contradiction poses a serious conceptual and
moral challenge to scholars and policy makers: ensuring the maintenance of peace in the former Bosnia will likely require partition
and consolidation of ethnic status, but that will in turn subordinate
the very values and commitments that have inspired much of the
human rights community’s hopes for the country’s future.
II. BACKGROUND: THE POST-WAR SITUATION
Explanations for the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia
vary widely, from historically grounded interpretations 14 to models
positing elite manipulation of a very recent provenance. 15
14. See, e.g., Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (1993); cf.
David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West 256 (1996) (noting that
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Kaplan’s book, “which recapitulated the ancient-ethnic-hatreds version of contemporary
Bosnian history[,]” was an important source of information for President Clinton).
15. See, e.g., Philip J. Cohen, The Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals in Genocide in the
1990s, in This Time We Knew: Western Response to Genocide in Bosnia 39 (Thomas Cushman & Stjepan G. Meštrović eds., 1996) [hereinafter This Time We Knew] (“The war against
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s was planned by Serbian intellectuals and authorities long before the first Serbian attacks.”) “The critical fact is that Serbian war crimes
and atrocities were systematized and centrally orchestrated, and they served as an instrument
of state policy.” Id. at 53. “As they did in World War II, a critical mass of Serbian intellectuals have willingly embraced and promoted Nazi-like ideology, exerted political leadership,
and mobilized the masses to a genocidal campaign.” Id. at 56. See generally Thomas Cushman & Stjepan Meštrović, Introduction, in This Time We Knew, supra, at 25–28 (summarizing common perspectives on the origins and conduct of the wars in Croatia, Slovenia, and
Bosnia); see also Wayne Bert, The Reluctant Superpower: United States’ Policy in Bosnia,
1991–95, at 36–43 (1997) (surveying various authors on the origins of the conflict). The
argument in this Article does not rely on any particular view of the conflict’s genesis; rather,
it relies on a recognition that the presently realized ethnic division is highly salient and
unlikely to recede to any meaningful degree.
Although Bosnia has figured in the geographical and political consciousness of southeastern Europe since at least the Middle Ages, its appearance in roughly the form in which it is
presently recognized as a state dates to the late Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian
protectorate established in 1878. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at 2. Although it had no distinct
political character within interwar Royal Yugoslavia, Bosnia appeared as a constituent republic of Communist Yugoslavia following World War II. See id. at 36.
The country’s population has been heavily mixed, including large populations of Orthodox
Christians, Catholics, and Muslims since at least the first century following the Ottoman
conquest in the 1500s. See id. at 10, 15; Peter F. Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman
Rule, 1354–1804, at 54 (1977). Although scholars dispute the origins of particularized national identity in the region, by the 19th century, Bosnia’s Catholics and Orthodox Christians
had become firmly identified with their neighboring co-religionist Croats and Serbs, respectively. Muslim identity, as a national phenomenon in Bosnia, developed more slowly. See
Čuvalo, supra note 6, at 25–26.
Following the extreme fratricidal violence of the Second World War, Yugoslavia’s president, Josip Broz Tito, created a regime that enjoyed considerable legitimacy and achieved a
measure of stability. The relationship of the Communist regime to the ultimate dissolution of
the country, however, remains controversial. Many analysts trace the immediate origins of
Yugoslavia’s dissolution crisis to the political events and economic changes leading to the
promulgation of the 1974 Constitution, which greatly expanded the political and economic
power of the republics and autonomous regions. See Mihailo Crnobrnja, The Roots of Yugoslavia’s Dissolution, in Why Bosnia?, supra note 11, at 269–70; Susan Woodward, Balkan
Tragedy 47 (1995) (tracing international economic changes as the root of Yugoslavia’s dissolution).
The death of Tito in 1981 weakened the central government, which was now headed by a
rotating collective presidency. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxvii, 37–38. The increasing
paralysis of the center and the economic crisis that gripped Yugoslavia in the 1980s increased
the autarkic tendencies of the republics and provinces and led to a reaction by Serbian intellectuals and political leaders, who argued that increasing decentralization threatened Serbs
outside of Serbia proper, most especially in Kosovo, which became a flashpoint for Serbian
grievances. Beginning with the “1986 Declaration” by a group of Serbian intellectuals, see
Cohen, supra, at 39–40, this nationalist reaction broke the surface of political life in Yugoslavia, and rapidly became the dominant political force in Serbia, Montenegro, and Serbia’s two
autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina, whose autonomy was effectively nullified in
1989. Increasingly, federal institutions, such as the army, came to identify their interests, and
that of Yugoslavia as a whole, with those of ethnic Serbs. The other republics, especially
Slovenia, feared that they, too, would be subordinated to Serb interests, and demanded a
looser confederation. When their demands were left unmet, the republics moved towards
independence. In response, in 1991 ethnic Serbs in Croatia demanded their own autonomy or
independence, and were supported by the Yugoslav army. Full-scale war broke out in Slove-
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nia and Croatia in 1991. Slovenia succeeded in gaining control of its territory after a brief
conflict. Croatia also succeeded in establishing itself as an independent state, but large areas
of its territory were held by the Serb minority. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxviii; Mihailo
Crnobrnja, The Destruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina, in Why Bosnia? supra note 11, at 249–
52.
A similar pattern followed in Bosnia later in 1991, when the Muslim and Croat leadership,
increasingly fearful of domination by a Serb government, demanded independence from
Belgrade, and the Serb leadership used these demands to justify its own program of partition.
By early 1992, paramilitary forces working in cooperation with the Yugoslav army were
already developing positions in various parts of the Bosnian countryside; in some areas,
fighting had already broken out. On April 6, 1992, following a referendum that overwhelmingly favored independence but was boycotted by the Serbs, Bosnia declared its independence and was quickly recognized by the European Community (EC) member-states and the
United States. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxx, 41. Fighting broke out on a wide scale, and
Serb forces, backed by the federal army, seized most of eastern and northern Bosnia, while
Muslims retained control of the center of the country and the extreme northwest (the Bihać
pocket), as well as three isolated towns in the east (Srebrenica, Žepa, and Goražde). The
Croats held the southwest and various pockets of land in the center of the country. The Serb
advances, in particular, were marked by large-scale atrocities and wholesale expulsion of the
non-Serb population. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at 42. Many Serbs fled from areas of the
country held by Muslims and Croats, but the scale of violence against them was not comparable.
The Muslims and Croats were ostensibly allied against the Serbs, but their relationship was
tense from the beginning. From the start of the conflict, they were effectively two separate
communities organized on their respective portions of Bosnia’s territory. By 1993, full-scale
war had broken out between Croats and Muslims, and their communities fully separated. See
Woodward, supra, at 268. There was also fighting between one Muslim group in the northwestern Bihać area and the Sarajevo-based Muslim government. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at
xxxiii, 44.
International attempts to resolve the conflict, meanwhile, were generally seen as ineffective, especially during the first two years of the war, when the United Nations (UN) led the
effort. Outside involvement became vigorous only after 1994, when NATO began to intervene militarily.
In June 1991, then-Secretary of State James Baker had reassured the Yugoslav leadership
that the United States supported the territorial integrity of the country, signaling the intention
of the United States to take a secondary role in the conflict. See Bert, supra note 15, at 136,
138. The UN and the EC were therefore initially the most active players. The UN positioned
lightly armed military units, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), between the Croats and
Serbs in Croatia in February 1992. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxix. The Security Council
imposed sanctions against Yugoslavia in May, and in June extended the mandate of UNPROFOR to include securing humanitarian assistance inside Bosnia; in September, the General
Assembly expelled Yugoslavia. See id. at xxx–xxxi. In October, the Security Council imposed a ban on military flights over Bosnia. See id. at xxxi. In April and May 1993, the Security Council declared six “safe areas” in Bosnia, including Sarajevo and Srebrenica. See id. at
xxxii.
The EC was also prominent in the early stages. Following Germany’s earlier lead, a move
often criticized as having enflamed the situation in Bosnia, on January 15, 1992, the EC
recognized Slovenia and Croatia. See Woodward, supra note 15, at 276–78; Bert, supra note
15, at 137. In February, talks were initiated in Lisbon under EC auspices. At the negotiations,
the first of several proposed cantonization plans were put forward, but they were rejected by
the Bosnian government leadership which proceeded to declare independence on March 3,
1992. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxix.
The UN and the EC also cooperated in trying to broker a peace deal. A joint mediation
team presented a second cantonization plan in October (the Vance-Owen plan), but the
United States pushed for changes, and, by January 1993, the Serb leadership rejected it. See
Bertrand de Rossanet, War and Peace in the Former Yugoslavia 126 (1997). In June 1993,
another highly confederal plan (the Owen-Stoltenberg plan) was rejected by the Muslim
government leadership. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxxii; de Rossanet, supra, at 126–27.
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While there remains intense debate about both the origins and the
depth of divisions between the various populations, few dispute that
the ethnic divisions, whatever their provenance, have now attained
an undeniable salience. The course of the war itself, less controversial though more shocking, has been extensively documented, including the extreme depravities committed by the warring parties,
particularly the Serbs and to a lesser degree the Croats and Muslims. 16 Few indeed are the actors or observers who suggest that it is
possible to return to the status quo ante in which ethnic differences
were, depending on one’s view of history, either unimportant, repressed, or ignored.
Of greater importance than arguments about origins is an appreciation of the present situation. The Dayton Accords, signed under
considerable pressure in late 1995, provided for the military stabilization of the country and the progressive disarmament of the main
combatant forces by a heavily armed NATO force, referred to as the
Peace Implementation Force (IFOR; later renamed the Stabilization
Force (SFOR)). It also provided for the political reorganization of
the country into a federal government of “Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH)” composed of two “entities,” the Republika Srpska and the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federation was further
divided into “cantons” roughly corresponding to ethnic enclaves of
Croats and Muslims. A new constitution for the highly decentralized country was promulgated by the agreement, providing for mulBeginning in 1994, the United States and NATO became more involved in pressing for a
resolution. In February 1994, NATO threatened air strikes if the Serbs did not comply with a
heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo, and in the following months engaged in
limited air strikes and attacks on Serb aircraft. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxxiv–xxxv. In
March, the United States brokered a fragile peace between the Croats and Muslims, who
entered into a federation. See id. at xxxiv. Although they remained separate, hostile, and
suspicious, they did succeed in turning their military force against the Serbs. See id. at xxxvii.
In April, the United States, several European states, and Russia formed the Contact Group to
coordinate policy, see id. at xxxv, which proposed a 49-51 split of the territory between Serbs
and a new federation of Croats and Muslims. The Serbs rejected the plan in July. See id. at
xxxvi. In November 1994, the United States stopped enforcing the UN arms embargo, which
had existed since the beginning of the war. See id. at xxxviii; Rieff, supra note 14, at 228.
Beginning in early 1995, the conflict intensified, and the Western states’ policies became
more interventionist. Muslim and Croat forces made significant advances; the Croatian army
retook most of the Croatian territory held by Serbs in two offensives in spring and summer
1995, see Bert, supra note 15, at 46–47, with the tacit approval of the United States. See
Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xlv; Bert, supra note 15, at 223. At the same time, Serb forces overran two Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia, including Srebrenica, killing thousands of captured Muslim men. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xlii–xliii. In the late summer and early fall,
the Croats and Muslims pressed a second round of offensives in Bosnia that resulted in a rout
of the Serbs. See id. at xliv–xlvi. These, in conjunction with a massive bombing campaign by
NATO finally brought the Serbs to agree to a ceasefire in October. See id. at xlvii. Americansponsored negotiations led by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke near Dayton,
Ohio followed in November. See id. at xlviii.
16. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, vols. I & II
(1997).
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tiple levels of governance and administration, and including extensive guarantee for human rights and for the right of refugees and
displaced persons to return to their homes anywhere in the country.
The military provisions of the agreement have been successfully
implemented, but the civilian provisions, though somewhat invigorated by increased international intervention during 1998, have
largely remained unenforced. The federal institutions of government barely function, and federal legal instruments, including the
federal constitution itself, are ignored in all areas of the country; the
internationally recognized government in Sarajevo governs only the
Muslim sector. Local institutions representing ethnically exclusive
constituencies continue to hold power over their respective parts of
the country, which is, essentially, partitioned. The Serbs and Croats
remain practically committed to strategies of obfuscation, partition,
and secession, and while the Muslims favor reunification, all three
parties remain, to varying degrees, hostile to and defiant of the
stated intentions of the international community to effect the return
of refugees. 17 For most of the last three years, the international
community’s attempts to implement the civilian aspects of Dayton
have been almost totally frustrated by the abiding power of the local, ethnic governments that effectively control the country despite
the presence of tens of thousands of NATO and other troops.
Although there have been generally positive developments in
Bosnia in the past year 18 —particularly in the disposition of the Serb
17.
Announced as the year of repatriation, 1998 seems to be over as there is no real strategy,
Zdravko Todorović, president of the Serb Republic Helsinki Committee, said. The authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina want to protect ethnically clean territories, and the failure of the Sarajevo declaration on returns [issued by an international conference of aid
donors and refugee relief organizations on February 3, 1998] as well as the situation in
Drvar [a Croat-controlled municipality in western Bosnia] confirm this Helsinki Committee’s view, Todorović said, adding that there was no serious possibility of exercising
the right to return.
2 July 1998, Bosnia: Official Says Human Rights Violations Continuing in Bosnian Serb
Republic, Sarajevo, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe and Balkans (July 2, 1998). The Office of the High Representative’s
(OHR; see infra page 535) initiative for 1998 to be the “Year of Return” was “launched because the provisions on refugee returns had been among the least respected in terms of the
1995 Dayton peace accords, particularly in the area of minority returns . . . . “ Gabriel Partos,
Return in Slow Motion, 6 Transitions 42 (Mar. 1999).
18. Some of the most important developments since late 1997 include: the active intervention by SFOR forces in the rift between two factions of the ruling party in Republika Srpska,
leading to the election of a new prime minister with the votes of delegates from all three
nationalities and with open Western support; the announced introduction of common license
plates and a common currency; and increased diplomatic pressure on the Muslim government
to allow returns of refugees to Sarajevo. See generally Zoran Pajić, Protectorates Lost, War
Report (Feb.-Mar. 1998), at 26; and Jane M.O. Sharpe, Dayton’s Unfinished Business, War
Report (Feb.-Mar. 1998), at 27–28.
However, these changes have largely come to nothing, or have since been reversed; in the
September 1998 elections, nationalist candidates won sweeping victories. “Bosnian Serb
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government—and a newly assertive posture on the part of the international community, there have not been, as yet, any clear signs of
substantive change in the core issues of refugee returns and political
reintegration. Returns of refugees across ethnic divides remain almost non-existent (less than ten percent of all returns 19 ), and the
much heralded breakthroughs since the 1997 elections have been
either cosmetic or have not been inconsistent with the maintenance
of the present ethnic division:
[A]t one level progress in establishing the institutions of the
joint state has been made. However, real cooperation between
the still dominant nationalist parties has been slight and grudging, while progress on the ground, in terms of the return of
refugees, freedom of movement and the arrest of indicted war
criminals, has been minimal. Not only has there been considerable resistance to reintegration by the RS, but Muslim- and
Croat-controlled areas of the federation also remain effectively

President Biljana Plavšić has acknowledged losing her bid for reelection to ultranationalist
Nikola Poplašen, AP reported on 21 September . . . . Poplašen, leader of the chauvinist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and an ally of indicted war criminal Radovan Karadžić, said he will
follow the Dayton agreement ‘to the letter, nothing more and nothing less.’” Pete
Baumgartner, Plavšić Concedes Election Defeat, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline
(Sept. 22, 1998) <http://www. rferl.org/newsline/1998/09/220998.html>. Even the more
cosmetic changes have met with resistance: one local paper reported that replacement of
license plates and drivers licenses had “hardly begun” in Croat-majority counties with only
five days to go before the deadline for conversion. Jožo Pavković, Ili uzmite moje tablice i
ćirilične vozačke ili autom ne možete u Europu (Either Take My License Plates and Cyrillic
Driver’s License or You Can’t Drive to Europe), VEČERNJI LIST, May 25, 1998, at 2 (author
trans.).
19. Partos, supra note 17, at 43. See also Brotherhood and Disunity, Economist, supra
note 8, at 9 (“So far, minority returns have been negligible. By December 1997, just 35,000
of the 400,000 displaced Bosniacs who returned home had gone to areas where their ethnic
groups constituted a minority. Most of them were old people going back to Muslimcontrolled areas. Hardly any young non-Serbs have returned to the Serb Republic. Without a
breakthrough, Dayton’s promise of the right to return will come to nothing.”) The Sarajevo
Declaration called for the return of 20,000 non-Muslim refugees to Sarajevo during 1998.
International Crisis Group issued a report assessing its progress:
The most glaring shortfall in the implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration are the return figures. Although some 7,100 minority families have registered to return, according
to UNHCR, only 1,292 minority persons (504 Croats, 692 Serbs and 96 “Others”)
moved into Sarajevo in the first seven months of 1998. In comparison, according to
UNHCR figures, several municipalities during this period attracted a greater number of
minorities in relation to their total populations. In all, 5,204 minorities returned to the
Federation (current population 2.3 million) during this period, compared with only 859
minorities to Republika Srpska (current population 1 million).
Since the end of the war, 20,426 minorities moved to Sarajevo, 44 percent of all minorities
(46,294) who moved to areas in the Federation; and 3,078 minorities moved to Republika
Srpska. Taking into account the differential in overall population numbers, the return rate of
minorities to the Federation has been nearly three times the return rate to Republika Srpska.
International Crisis Group, Too Little, Too Late: Implementation of the Sarajevo Declaration,
Part 1, section entitled Paltry Return Figures (Sept. 9, 1998) <http://www.crisisweb.org>
(citations omitted) [hereinafter Too Little, Too Late].
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under separate administrations, making for an enduring threeway division of the country, which renders uncertain prospects
for BiH’s survival as a unified state. 20

The Bosnian war produced extremely high levels of displacement, as well as destruction of property.21 The 1991, prewar population 4.36 million was reduced to perhaps 3.2 million in 1996. 22 As
many as 250,000 people had been killed, and hundreds of thousands
more fled from one side of the country to the other, or to third countries. As of late 1995, when hostilities ended, more than three million people had been displaced from their pre-war residences, and
some two million still do not have “durable solutions.” 23 In Mostar,
for example, more than sixty percent of the population has been
dispossessed of its prewar property. 24 In addition, 200,000 to
300,000 refugees from other parts of former Yugoslavia, mostly
Serbs but also some Muslims, have fled conflicts elsewhere and
now live in Bosnia. 25 Some towns have nearly doubled in population, while large rural areas have been depopulated, particularly in
central Bosnia and Republika Srpska. 26
Remaining minorities in the country had been reduced to insignificant numbers. For example, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 20,000 Muslims and
Croats remained in Republika Srpska as of October 1996, all of
them in the western part of the entity. 27 As of mid-1998, these numbers had changed only slightly, and overall ethnic homogeneity has
20. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Bosnia and Hercegovina/Croatia 199798 (1997), at 5. One journal covering the region noted that in 1998, “OHR and other international agencies decided against putting pressure on the authorities in Republika Srpska to
take back non-Serbs. That policy was designed to avoid undermining the position of Prime
Minister Milorad Dodik and his coalition of pragmatist Serb parties, particularly in the runup to September’s elections. A large-scale return of Bosniaks [sic] and Croats to Republika
Srpska might have provided hard-line Serb nationalists with a popular rallying point.” Partos,
supra note 17, at 43. To the degree that returns represent the core of the international community’s vision for Bosnia’s future, such a policy suggests that the many changes that have
occurred have not significantly changed the disposition of power.
21. “About a tenth of Bosnia’s housing stock was destroyed during the war; another 2530% is uninhabitable.” Brotherhood and Disunity, Economist, supra note 8, at 9.
22. In 1997, the World Bank estimated the two entities’ populations as: 2.3 million in the Federation, 900,000 in Republika Srpska. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 20, at 3, 14.
23. Brotherhood and Disunity, Economist, supra note 8, at 8.
24. Interview with Sefket Hadžihasanović, Federation Ombudsman, in Mostar, Fed. BiH
(Jan. 10, 1997).
25. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 20, at 14.
26. Id. at 15.
27. See UNHCR, supra note 7, at 7. The report refers to “Northern Bosnia,” a designation
that would generally be understood to refer to the half of the Serb entity from Brčko westward; however, the report mentions, in the same paragraph, minority communities in
Zvornik, which is in the half of the Serb entity east (and south) of Brčko, although geographically it is indeed in the north of the country as a whole.
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actually increased since the war. 28 Those who have attempted to
return, or to reclaim lost property, have met with opposition ranging
from administrative obstacles 29 to armed mobs on all sides. 30 Destruction of refugees’ property, including abandoned property, is
common, especially if the houses show any signs of repair that
might suggest an attempt to return.
The great majority of expulsions and expropriations occurred
during the war, governed, if at all, by wartime legislation, though
most often subject to a more immediate and compelling law. At the
end of the war, another layer was added: the international community’s vision of a just and integrated settlement as expressed in the
Dayton Accords, and with it a new posture regarding the role of
law, even in the domestic regimes. Let us now turn to the civilian
provisions of Dayton, with an eye towards those affecting the disposition of property, to see what they promise for Bosnia and its
peoples.

28. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 5, at 48 (“[T]here are now at least 70,000 fewer people living in ethnically mixed areas than when the accord was signed.”); “Bosniacs accounted for
94.5 percent of all people who moved into Sarajevo [in 1997], including 19,623 who had not
previously lived there.” International Crisis Group, Too Little, Too Late, supra note 19, section 5 entitled Abuses in Allocation of Available Housing (noting also that the percentage in
1998 has been lower, though Sarajevo is still overwhelmingly monoethnic).
Figures on the number of returns to predominantly Serbian Banja Luka, situated in the
moderate half of Republika Srpska, give a sense of how little return has occurred. One official of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) estimated that “approximately 200 Bosniaks [sic] and another 100 Croats have returned to the Banja Luka
Municipality, exclusively family reunification (i.e., they have a house, with space waiting for
them—which hasn’t been allocated to Serb DP/Refs. [displaced persons/refugees]). Perhaps a
handful of cases where the original owner returned to his prewar home by arranging some
sort of deal with the Serb DP currently inside.” Private communication with OSCE officer
(Mar. 25, 1998).
29. A UNHCR report notes that “separate legislation and legal systems within each of the
two . . . areas, particularly in property laws, discriminate against minorities and many categories of refugees/returnees.” UNHCR, supra note 7, at 4.
There are other problems as well: unemployment among returning refugees may be as high
as 92%. Brotherhood and Disunity, Economist, supra note 8, at 9. Unemployment outside the
agricultural sector is estimated at more than 40% in the Federation and at almost 70% in
Republika Srpska. Partos, supra note 17, at 44.
30. One report notes
Resettlement of minorities in rural Bosnia is resisted about equally by the majority
groups in the three respective sectors, although Muslim cities such as Sarajevo and
Tuzla, secure in their dominance, are less resistant to minority settlers. Notwithstanding
anecdotal evidence about this or that Croat woman who wants her pre-war Muslim
neighbor to return, there seems to be a clear consensus that the hatred generated by the
war must fade before any real mixing of the groups can take place without resistance.
Boyd, supra note 5, at 47–48.
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III. DAYTON’S PROMISE: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
The first, longest, and most detailed section of the Dayton Accords naturally deals with military stabilization, 31 given the need to
achieve peace and stability before any reconstruction could begin.
The remainder, however, addresses the so-called civilian aspects of
the settlement. These sections include: the constitution of the new
federal government of Bosnia and Herzegovina; provisions dealing
with human rights, refugees, and displaced persons; political participation; the role of various international agencies; and transitional provisions for transferring powers to the various levels of
government over time. Out of these provisions, many of them quite
narrow and technical in nature, emerges a vision of a radically
transformed and internationalized society.
A. General Civilian Provisions
The Dayton Accords acknowledge each of the parties as “sovereign equals,” 32 and recognize two entities, the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, as well as the federal
government at the national level. 33 The new Constitution of Bosnia
and Herzegovina is incorporated as the fourth annex to the Accords.
The preamble to the constitution declares its desire to protect private property, its commitment to “the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with international law,” its inspiration by “the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Civil
and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, as well as other human rights instruments,” and identifies “Bosniacs, Croats, and
Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others) and citizens of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 34
The Constitution commits Bosnia to be a democratic state under
the rule of law. 35 Citizenship is both national and entity-level, each
regulated by its respective level, 36 and neither citizenship can be
revoked due to “language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, prop31.
VI.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

GFAP, supra note 4, Annexes 1A, 1B, & 2, 35 I.L.M. at 92, 109, 112. See infra Part
GFAP, supra note 4, art. I, 35 I.L.M. at 89.
Id. Annex 4, art. I, § 3, 35 I.L.M. at 118.
Id. Annex 4, Preamble, 35 I.L.M. at 118.
Id. Annex 4, art. I, § 2, 35 I.L.M. at 118.
Id. Annex 4, art. I, § 7, 35 I.L.M. at 118.
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erty, birth or other status.” 37 Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina
can hold other citizenships subject to a national parliamentary
agreement with the other state, 38 a provision included to allow
Serbs and Croats dual citizenship.
Elaborate human rights guarantees are incorporated into the constitution. The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), including its Protocols, is directly applicable law and has priority over all other law at
both the national and entity level. 39 An extensive annex of conventions is also incorporated as law. 40 Relevant enumerated rights include:
...
(e) The right to a fair hearing in civil . . . matters.
...
(g) Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.
...
(k) The right to property.
...
37. Id. Annex 4, art. I, § 7, cl. b, 35 I.L.M. at 118.
38. See id. Annex 4, art. I, § 7, cl. d, 35 I.L.M. at 118.
39. See id. Annex 4, art. II, §§ 2 & 6, 35 I.L.M. at 119.
40. The rights enumerated in the following agreements are secured to all persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see id. Annex 4, art. II, § 4, 35 I.L.M. at 119, and the country is to
remain or become a party to all of the same agreements, see id. Annex 4, art. II, § 7, 35
I.L.M. at 119.
1. 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;
2. 1949 Geneva Conventions I-IV on the Protection of the Victims of War, and the
1977 Geneva Protocols I-II thereto;
3. 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1966 Protocol thereto;
4. 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women;
5. 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness;
6. 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
7. 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1966 and 1989 Optional Protocols thereto;
8. 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
9. 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women;
10. 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
11. 1987 European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment;
12. 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child;
13. 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families;
14. 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages;
15. 1994 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
Id. Annex 4, art. I, 35 I.L.M. at 126.
Annex 6 includes an identical list, except that it also includes the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols. See id. Annex
6, Appendix, 35 I.L.M. at 136. This convention is incorporated directly into the text of the
Constitution and thus does not appear on its annexed list.
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(m) The right to liberty of movement and residence. 41

A specific non-discrimination clause guarantees that all enumerated
or annexed human rights “shall be secured to all persons in Bosnia
and Herzegovina without discrimination on any ground such as . . .
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other
status.” 42
B. Constitutional and Political Division of Power
The political system established by the constitution is highly confederal, with a weak central government retaining power over foreign policy, customs, monetary policy, inter-entity transportation
and criminal enforcement, and, more relevant to this paper, immigration and refugee policy. 43 The national executive and legislative
organs are so finely balanced among the three ethnic groups as to
practically ensure effective paralysis at the whim of any of the
three.
The lower levels of government have correspondingly more
power and autonomy. Although few powers are enumerated, all
powers not expressly granted to the national government belong to
the entities, 44 and the effective ethnic paralysis of the national institutions created by the Constitution further ensures that the entities
and cantons will not be checked from above. 45 The entities have
broad police powers 46 and, although not specifically mentioned, the
regulation of property rights is understood to be a power of the entities—or, in the Federation, of the ten cantons into which that entity
is further divided. 47 The entities may also enter into ill-defined
41. Id. Annex 4, art. II, 35 I.L.M. at 119. These rights are repeated in a separate annex
specifically addressing human rights. See id. Annex 6, art. I, 35 I.L.M. at 130.
42. Id. Annex 6, art. II, § 4, 35 I.L.M. at 131.
43. See id. Annex 6, art. III, § 1, 35 I.L.M. at 131.
44. See id. Annex 6, art. III, § 3, cl. a, 35 I.L.M. at 131.
45. The central government has no independent taxing power and is dependent on the entities and international support. See Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 20, at 13.
46. See GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 4, art. III, § 2, cl. c, 35 I.L.M. at 120.
47. The system of cantons was created by the so-called Washington Agreement, which
established a federation between the warring Muslim and Croat communities. The Agreement
reads in pertinent part:
Framework Agreement for the Federation
...
II Division of Responsibilities
...
2. The Central Government and the cantons have responsibility for:
-human rights
...
-infrastructure for communications and transport
...
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“special parallel relationships with neighboring states consistent
with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 48 At the same time, however, any law or act of an entity
inconsistent with the Constitution is superseded. 49
C. The Judicial System
An implicitly ethnically mixed Constitutional Court 50 has exclusive jurisdiction in any dispute arising under the Constitution between the entities or between Bosnia and an entity, including determinations about the constitutionality of entity constitutions and
laws and of any “special parallel relationship with a neighboring
state.” 51
No provision, however, is made for other levels of courts, 52 and
the proceedings of existing courts and administrative agencies are
continued under the transitional provisions annexed to the Constitution, 53 as are “[a]ll laws, regulations, and judicial rules of procedure
. . . to the extent not inconsistent with the Constitution.” 54 The es-

-use of natural resources.
As appropriate, these responsibilities may be exercised jointly or separately, or by the
cantons as coordinated with the central government.
3. The cantons shall have all responsibility not expressly granted to the central government. They shall have, in particular, authority over the following:
...
-housing
...
-local land use (zoning) . . . .
Framework Agreement for the Federation, in Letter Dated 3 March 1994 from the Permanent
Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to the United Nations Addressed to
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/1994/255, Attachment I, 4–5. There are no cantons in
Republika Srpska.
48. GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 4, art. III, § 2, cl. a, 35 I.L.M. at 120.
49. See id. Annex 4, art. III, § 3, cl. b, 35 I.L.M. at 120.
50. Four members are selected by the House of Representatives of the Federation, two by
the Assembly of Republika Srpska and three by the President of the European Court of Human Rights, with these last not being citizens of Bosnia or any neighboring state. See id.
Annex 4, art. VI, § 1, cl. a-b, 35 I.L.M. at 123. This formula ensures that at least the Serbs
and the Muslims can vote in members if they maintain ethnic solidarity in their parliaments.
The implicit deal is that the Federation’s four seats would be divided two and two between
Muslim and Croat candidates. Note that the inclusion of three international members allows
any one ethnicity’s representatives, together with the internationals, to constitute a majority,
or for any two ethnicities’ representatives to constitute a majority with even a single international vote. There are no provisions for an ethnic veto or opt-out, and the court’s decisions
are final and binding. See id. Annex 4, art. VI, § 4, 35 I.L.M. at 123.
51. Such as Republika Srpska has attempted to do with Yugoslavia. See id. Annex 4, art.
VI, § 3, cl. a, 35 I.L.M. at 123.
52. Except to note that the Constitutional Court has appellate jurisdiction over issues under the Constitution arising out of judgments of other courts in Bosnia, however constituted.
See id. Annex 4, art. VI, § 3, cl. b, 35 I.L.M. at 123.
53. See id. Annex 4, art. II, § 3, 35 I.L.M. at 126.
54. Id. Annex 4, art. II, § 2, 35 I.L.M. at 126.
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tablishment of courts is effectively left within the purview of the
entities and cantons.
D. Provisions Relating to Refugees and Property
Because questions of property and returns are so central to the
conflict and to any prospects for its resolution, the Accords give
them extensive attention. The Constitution specifically addresses
the rights of those who fled or were expelled during the war:
They have the right . . . to have restored to them property of
which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since
1991 and to be compensated for any such property that cannot
be restored to them. Any commitments or statements relating to
such property made under duress are null and void. 55
Moreover, an entirely separate Annex deals specifically with the
rights of refugees and displaced persons. All refugees and displaced
persons are guaranteed the right “freely to return to the homes of
origin” and to receive back their property or be compensated for
it. 56 They are free to choose their destination, and the parties must
“facilitate the flow of information necessary for refugees and displaced persons to make informed judgments about local conditions
for return.” 57
The parties acknowledge the importance of “early return” 58 and
undertake to allow return “in safety, without risk of harassment,
intimidation, persecution, or discrimination, particularly on account
of their ethnic origin, religious belief, or political opinion.”59 They
specifically agree to repeal discriminatory legislation, suppress incitement of ethnic or religious hostility and acts of retribution by
public or private individuals or forces, protect minority populations
and provide access to them by international agencies, and prosecute
or dismiss officials responsible for violating human or minority
rights. 60 Dayton gave UNHCR a special role in developing repatriation plans for “an early, peaceful, orderly and phased return of refugees and displaced persons, which may include priorities for certain
areas and categories or returnees.” 61
55. Id. Annex 4, art. II, § 5, 35 I.L.M. at 119.
56. See id. Annex 7, art. I, § 1, 35 I.L.M. at 136.
57. Id. Annex 7, art. I, § 4, 35 I.L.M. at 137.
58. Id. Annex 7, art. I, § 1, 35 I.L.M. at 136.
59. Id. Annex 7, art. I, § 2, 35 I.L.M. at 136.
60. See id. Annex 7, art. I, § 3, cl. a–e, 35 I.L.M. at 136.
61. Id. Annex 7, art. I, § 5, 35 I.L.M. at 136. This provision has sometimes been criticized
as subjecting the ostensibly absolute right of return to conditions, but as it is impossible to
return so many people simultaneously under even ideal political conditions, the practical
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The Accords require deeper levels of social commitment and restructuring because the security necessary to reassure returnees extends beyond mere formal legal guarantees. Accordingly, the parties
“undertake to create in their territories the political, economic, and
social conditions conducive to the voluntary return and harmonious
reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, without preference
for any particular group.” 62
E. The Property Commission
The parties must also establish an independent Commission for
Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees, or Property Commission, to determine “any claims for real property” involving involuntary loss. 63 It aims to create an atmosphere of legality in which returns can proceed: “As the refugees learn that there is
a formal mechanism which offers the possibility of return . . . the
levels of confidence among refugees as to their future in Bosnia and
Herzegovina will gradually increase.” 64
The commission has extensive powers to gain access to records, 65 determine lawful title and value, 66 and dispose of property. 67 Acts of the commission are final. 68 In developing its “rules
and regulations, the Commission shall consider domestic laws on
property rights” 69 and strive to strengthen the local legal system. A
list of its guiding principles states:
The Commission will seek to restore the integrity of the property law system as it stood in 1991. The Commission will disregard any wartime legislation which violates international
human rights standards;
necessity of planning phased returns need not be seen as a limit, but rather as a means of
implementing that right.
62. Id. Annex 7, art. II, § 1, 35 I.L.M. at 138. Responding to a very specific concern, the
same article also bars the parties from discriminating in military conscription and even requires them to “give positive consideration to requests for exemption from military or other
obligatory service based on individual circumstances . . . .” Id. Annex 7, art. II, § 2, 35 I.L.M.
at 138. A subsequent article establishes an amnesty for all crimes unrelated to the conflict
committed since January 1, 1991. See id, Annex 7, art. VI, 35 I.L.M. at 138.
63. Id. Annex 7, art. XI, 35 I.L.M. at 139.
64. Property Commission, The Commission for Real Property Claims, supra note 9.
65. See GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 7, art. XI, § 1, 35 I.L.M. at 139. The commission may
also delegate other agencies to conduct such investigations. See id.
66. See GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 7, art. XI, § 4, 35 I.L.M. at 139.
67. See id. Annex 7, art. XI, § 5, 35 I.L.M. at 139.
68. See id. Annex 7, art. XI, § 7, 35 I.L.M. at 139. However, “Annex 7 . . . contains no detailed provisions regarding the execution and enforcement of such decisions. This may prove
to be a serious obstacle to the work of the Commission, and may undermine not only the
credibility of the Commission, but also the peace process as a whole.” Popović, supra note 8,
at 155.
69. GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 7, art. XV, 35 I.L.M. at 140.
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The Commission will seek to restore rather than replace domestic legal institutions. Wherever possible, the Commission
will seek to have its decisions enforced by domestic institutions, but will co-ordinate with other international institutions
to apply international pressure where these domestic mechanisms fail. 70
F. Summary

The picture that emerges from the Dayton Accords provisions is
of a highly confederal state, with the bare minimum of authority
and sovereignty at the center, and the concomitant maximum of
power and autonomy at the entity and cantonal levels—the very
levels that correspond to the ethnic and military division of the
country. Counterbalancing this, however, are explicit and extensive
guarantees for individual human rights and equally explicit rejections of any exclusion or discrimination on the basis of those very
characteristics by which the population was divided during the war.
One of the most significant features of the Dayton Accords is that
they create institutional monitoring and implementing mechanisms
of considerable scope and power. It is not merely a hortatory document or one that creates a tiny straw commission to deal with a
global problem. The Property Commission, for example, is assigned
a specific and highly intrusive mandate dealing with property. In
addition, the Accords introduce other institutional bodies, such as
the Office of the High Representative (OHR), 71 the Human Rights
Chamber and the Ombudsman, 72 and the International Police Task
Force; 73 intergovernmental organizations such as UNHCR and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are
given specific and broad-reaching mandates to involve themselves
in activities closely related to refugee returns and human rights issues; 74 and the parties themselves are enjoined to create or participate in other independent bodies with important monitoring and
adjudicative functions.
The whole effect is to move radically beyond the demands of
such instruments as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which proclaims more rights than it founds mechanisms.
70. Property Commission, Report to Donors on Operations: 1 April 1996 to 30 November
1996 (information sheet issued by the Property Commission) (undated). See also Property
Commission, Joint Inter-Agency Appeal for the Year Ending 31 December 1997 (information
sheet issued by the Property Commission) (undated).
71. See GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 10, 35 I.L.M. at 146.
72. See id. Annex 6, arts. II-XII, 35 I.L.M. at 131–34.
73. See id. Annex 11, 35 I.L.M. at 149.
74. See, e.g., id. Annex 6, art. XIII, 35 I.L.M. at 135.
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There is perhaps no state in the world more closely linked to the
web of international instruments guaranteeing various human
rights, nor any state required to institutionalize those rights to a
greater degree, nor any that must give greater access to the international community to ensure the realization of those rights.
This is the formal framework, created by the United States 75 and
acceded to by the governments of the various ethnic communities.
It may be fairly understood as a comprehensive and radical vision
for the future of Bosnia as an integral society. It is both a promise
and a blueprint for the realization of that promise. The laws promulgated by those governments, however, and their operation as expressions of ethnically exclusive standards, mean that the reality on
the ground in Bosnia hardly reflects that vision. The promise of
Dayton has been stillborn.
IV. THE ETHNIC COMMUNITIES’ LAWS AND PRACTICE
DEALING WITH ABANDONED PROPERTY
All three communities—Serbs, Croats, and Muslims—
incorporated large parts of the legal structure developed under
Communist Yugoslavia into their new legal systems. Property law,
however, was subject to broad-reaching revision from the very start.
Control of property—of territory—was fundamental to the political
and military aims of all three sides, and consequently all three
sought to solidify their military gains and stabilize their new ethnic
states with reformed property laws that institutionalized ethnic
preference, though in tacit fashion.
One of the unique forms of property that all the sections of the
former Yugoslavia, including all three of the communities in Bosnia, inherited was the occupancy right. This form of property is of
particular importance in contemporary Bosnia. Relatively few principal dwellings in the former Yugoslavia were privately owned; the
majority were owned by state corporations or enterprises, which
granted rights of occupancy and use to employees or members of
certain categories of citizens. 76 In the late Yugoslav period, the pri75. See Pajić, The Dayton Constitution, supra note 5, at 188 (noting the “strong American
influence in drafting the Constitution. . . .”); and Boyd, supra note 5, at 43 (noting that “Dayton [is] the centerpiece of U.S. policy. . . .”).
76. Another report by the OHR describes the right this way:
The occupancy right, which is greater than a tenancy right and less than full ownership
must be considered as a sui generis right: the right to quasi-ownership. There is no
precedent in comparative law or in the practice of international human rights organisations (notably in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights) on which
one could rely in order to determine its legal nature.
In the official ideology and the legal doctrine of the former Yugoslavia, the occupancy right was conceived as a basic right in the field of housing, which was gradually
to replace the private property [sic]. It was also protected as such by the Constitution. As
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vatization of socially owned apartments began, but this process was
largely halted in Bosnia because of the war. Consequently, though
the amount of socially owned housing remains uncertain, 77 it is
likely that most of the housing remains socially owned, especially
in cities. It is unsurprising then that the legal instruments that have
come in for greatest criticism deal with regulating abandoned socially owned property.
During the war, the three ethnic groups each had their own political and legal institutions in place and operated as sovereign governments or as effective appendages of neighboring mother states.
Dayton was supposed to have reorganized those systems, severing
the connections with neighboring states and bringing some functions back under the control of a national government, while requiring changes in other functions that remained under sub-national
institutions. Despite these provisions, the three ethnic groups continued to implement their own laws well after Bosnia’s national
institutions had, in theory, begun to function—and therefore, well
after all authority to pass and implement such laws had been subordinated to the confederated structure.
The two entities’ main property laws purport to solve the practical problems facing each entity in finding housing for hundreds of
thousands of displaced persons, while at the same time protecting
the original owners’ rights. In practice, however, the laws of both
entities make permanent the expropriation of the property of those
who have fled and accelerate the departure of those minorities who
still remain.
During the past two years, the various factions have been under
considerable pressure from the international community to produce
laws conforming to international, or at least European, norms and
standards. Both entities’ abandoned property laws were declared
inconsistent with the principles of the Dayton Accords and were to
be rewritten in a collaborative effort between the Office of the High
Representative and the entities. 78 New legislation dealing with
a consequence, the volume of the privately-owned apartments was negligible when
compared to the quantity of apartments to which the holders had occupancy rights.
OHR, Bosnia and Herzegovina Law on Abandoned Apartments: Compliance with the Provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the European Convention on Human Rights 5–6
[hereinafter Law on Abandoned Apartments: Compliance (RBiH)].
77. See Open Society Institute Forced Migrations Project [hereinafter Open Society Inst.],
Property Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina 14 (Mar. 1996).
78. See OHR, Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative, (concerning the
Law on Abandoned Property of Republika Srpska) (undated) (unofficial translation) (unpaginated) [hereinafter Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative (RS)], see discussion infra Part II.A; OHR, Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative (concerning the Law on Abandoned Apartments of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RBiH))
2 (undated) [hereinafter Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative (RBiH)], see
discussion infra Part II.B. The laws of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna are per se invalid
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abandoned property was to have been submitted by November 1,
1996; the Federation passed a new law in early 1998 and Republika
Srpska in late 1998. 79
Following are discussions of the provisions of the principal property laws in each of the three domestic systems, with commentary
relating to specific important provisions. When these provisions
have been laid out, I will then enumerate the principles found operating through them. As I will demonstrate, while all three domestic
laws are generally neutral on their face, as actually applied in the
context of the Bosnian war and its aftermath, they produce almost
universally consistent results in favor of the dominant ethnic group,
and to such a degree that they must be recognized as evidence of a
constitutional orientation, not merely a pattern of violations.
A. Republika Srpska Property Law
The Law on the Use of Abandoned Property, the principal law
dealing with abandoned property in Republika Srpska, was promulgated on February 27, 1996, 80 several months after the end of the
war and the signing of the Dayton Accords. The stated purpose of
the law is to regulate “the conditions and modes of abandoned
property utilization with the aim of refugees and displaced persons
accommodation . . . as well as the protection and preservation of the
property.” 81 The law covers both real and movable property, 82 as
well as “objects of historical, cultural, artistic, and scientific importance.” 83 It does not distinguish between private and socially owned
property, but seems to apply to both. 84
The definition of abandonment of property is rather circular, declaring that “the real estate and the movable property which had
been left by the owners, which has to be proved in any concrete

as Herceg-Bosna itself was never recognized and in any event ceased to exist legally after the
creation of the Federation. See note 47, supra. In this paper, I consider the law of HercegBosna as well, despite its non-validity in the eyes of the international community, because the
law continues to be applied in fact. See infra part III.B.2, section on the real property law of
Herceg-Bosna.
79. See discussion infra Part IV.A and IV.B.3.
80. Law on the Use of Abandoned Property, reported in Republika Srpska Official Gazette, year V, no. 3 (Feb. 27, 1996).
81. Id. art. 1. The sense of the phrase “refugees and displaced persons” does not refer definitively or exclusively to the same persons who have abandoned the property; it can equally
well refer to other, incoming refugees or displaced persons.
82. See id. art. 2.
83. Id.
84. See OHR, Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance with the Provisions of
the General Framework Agreement for Peace and the International Instruments Referred
Therein (concerning the Republika Srpska Law on the Use of Abandoned Property) 4 (undated) [hereinafter Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance (RS)].
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case by record, during the inventorying and keeping of a file on
abandoned property.” 85 OHR notes that
The abandoned property under this Law is practically undefined. The definition amounts to say that the abandoned property is the property that has been abandoned. No further criteria
or conditions are set in order to determine or to limit the scope
of this definition.
. . . Such an imprecise, even negligent, manner of regulating
an issue such as a loss of a vested right . . . infringes directly
upon one of the most fundamental, generally recognized principles of law—the principle of “legal certainty.” This principle
is an integral part of the legal systems of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities. 86
Subsequent articles do provide some clarification: persons
granted use of property under Article 1 may be assigned commercial properties that have not been used for more than thirty days; 87
residential and agricultural properties may be assigned if they have
been abandoned (or are not in use), without any specified delay. 88
Article 15 lays out the formal list of priorities for the allotment of
abandoned residential property:
Abandoned apartments, houses and other abandoned residential area [sic] shall be handed out exclusively to refugees and
displaced persons, and persons lacking accommodation owing
to combat activities, according to the following priorities:
1. families of the killed soldiers
2. war invalids with physical injuries of category I–IV
3. war invalids with physical injuries of category V–X
4. educated staff of which there is a lack in the Republika
Srpska. 89

85. Law on the Use of Abandoned Property art. 2, reported in Republika Srpska Official
Gazette, year V, no. 3 (Feb. 27, 1996) (English translation improved). Listing the responsibility of two separate offices in each community: the local geodetic records office lists abandoned private property, while the housing and jobs administration lists abandoned property to
which the government holds title. Id. art. 7.
86. See OHR, Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance (RS), supra note 84, at
5.
87. See Law on the Use of Abandoned Property art. 11, reported in Republika Srpska Official Gazette, year V, no. 3 (Feb. 27, 1996).
88. Id. In addition, agricultural lands and open land are subject to additional criteria for
determining abandonment: the commission may ascertain that agricultural land and other
land is abandoned if the owner or user has settled at another place; if he has not farmed the
land; or if he has not paid taxes or fulfilled other unspecified obligations. Id. art. 29.
89. Law on the Use of Abandoned Property art. 15, reported in Republika Srpska Official
Gazette, year V, no. 3 (Feb. 27, 1996). Some other articles add modifications to this list:
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Article 17, dealing with the assignment of space in occupied
dwellings, is the most criticized provision in the Law. It provides
that refugees and displaced persons who cannot be accommodated
in abandoned property be temporarily housed in occupied residences that have extra space. Under this provision, each person in
residence is accorded the right to use of 15 square meters of space;
additional space can be expropriated, without compensation, to
house one additional person for every additional 15 square meters. 90 Article 17 accommodations are temporary, “until provision
of other appropriate accommodation is made.” 91
Article 17 does not simply declare that all extra space shall be
expropriated, however. It employs a priority system that is, if anything, more directed than that in Article 15; it prioritizes the assignment of residences “according to the following order:
—in the apartments and other kinds of accommodations whose
owners or users have not complied with their military duties or
work obligations;
—in the apartments and other kinds of accommodations of
owners or users whose household members have left the Republic; or
—in other kinds of accommodation in which there is free
room.” 92
Why the Law should establish this system of priorities is not difficult to see. Most of the abandoned property in predominantly Serbian territory belongs, by title or use, to non-Serbs, while all the
refugees and displaced persons in that territory are Serbs. As long
as the real title-holders (or any other non-Serb refugees) are kept

Article 13 stipulates that refugees from urban areas be given priority to urban residential
properties; Article 30 lays out a more detailed priority list for allotment of agricultural property which partly follows the priority list for residential property “according to the next priorities:
1. agricultural households of the killed soldiers of the Republika Srpska
2. agricultural households having the status of refugees
3. agricultural households of invalids of the war
4. other agricultural and non-agricultural households which use them temporarily and
can work on the abandoned land which will be given in lease” [also, enterprises which
had rights of usage to presently abandoned residences may receive 30 percent of that
property to be distributed among their staff, “according to article 15 of this law . . . .”]
Id. art. 12.
90. Id. art. 17 (English translation improved). Thus, an 89 square meter house with three
original inhabitants could receive two additional DP residents: the original three get 15
square meters each, for a total of 45; this leaves 44—that is two times 15 square meters, with
14 square meters left over.
91. Id. art. 17 (English translation improved).
92. Id. art. 17 (English translation improved). Refusal to accommodate persons in extra
space can result in fines from 100 to 1000 dinars (roughly 16 to 160 dollars). Id. art. 43.
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out by other means, then a prima facie neutral priority list can be
applied without ethnic complications. That is to say, the law itself
need not be discriminatory or applied in a discriminatory fashion, if
the essential discriminatory act has preceded it or occurs elsewhere
in the political or legal sphere. However, when the issue is the expropriation of housing from residents who are still present—and
there are still a few thousand non-Serb families living in Republika
Srpska—then ensuring that the brunt of expropriation falls most
heavily on those non-Serbs can only be achieved by unequal application, or by a priority list that has a greater impact on those nonSerbs.
The priority list in Article 17 clearly adheres to that latter strategy
(although unequal application is also employed). Among those who
have not “complied with their military duties” are many non-Serbs
who were not allowed to serve in the military as they were deemed
untrustworthy. “Work obligations,” an ambiguous phrase, surely
includes, inter alia, mandatory civilian work details to which many
non-Serbs were subjected, such as trench-digging for military units;
such work was imposed as an intimidation tactic. The second priority category, while including some Serbs, is overwhelmingly composed of non-Serbs who left because of the war and the intimidation and terror tactics by Serb authorities and irregular units.
Articles 39 through 42 deal with the return of the original owner
or occupancy rightholder. Articles 39 and 40 establish “the right of
fair compensation” as an alternative to the restoration of the property; these provisions “are to be applied on the basis of reciprocity,” 93 a term for which no definition is given. Though the text is
obscure, it has been interpreted as meaning that in the case of a socially owned apartment, the user may not move back in if the present occupant is unwilling to move out. 94 OHR notes that

93. Id. art. 42.
94. Human Rights Coordination Centre, OHR [hereinafter Hum. Right Coor. Cen.], Property Issues: Guidelines for Action 3 (undated). OHR notes that Article 40
[S]ubjects the right to return to a set of conditions, on which . . . the owner has no influence. If the real property has been allocated for temporary use, the restoration of the
property to its owner will be subject to both:
-willingness of the temporary occupant to leave the property and return to [his] own
property
-willingness of the Federation of BH or Republic of Croatia to restore or compensate the
property to this temporary user.
These conditions limit substantially the possibility and the right to return and to have
one’s property restored.
OHR, Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance (RS), supra note 84, at 6. Also:
“Articles 39 and 40 prioritize the rights of the temporary occupant over those of the original
owner.” OHR, Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative (RS), supra note 78,
at 1.
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Article 40 further prescribes the conditions for the restoration
of the property to its owner upon his return. If the real property
is not occupied by a temporary use, it will be restored to its
owner within fifteen days. On the other hand, if it has been allocated for temporary use to a person whose property remained
on the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or
the Republic of Croatia, the restoration of the property to its
owner is foreseen in a longer term:
—within 30 days after the temporary user returns to his
property or apartment
—within 60 days from the day of payment to this person of
the compensation for the property he had deserted and the
compensation of possible expenditures he had as a user. 95
The Law also voids all contracts for “renting, using[,] and guarding abandoned apartments, other premises and property concluded
after 6 April 1992 between the owners or users who left the territory
of the Republika Srpska and third parties.” 96 However, contracts for
the exchange of property between the present property-holder and
the original owner of real property dated before the promulgation of
the Law remain valid. 97
The Law closes with a general exemption of veteran invalids,
war widows, and war orphans from its provisions 98 —all categories
adversely affected by the duty of defending the regime.
Following increased pressure that the international community
applied to Republika Srpska throughout 1998, 99 coupled with the
95. OHR, Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance (RS), supra note 84, at 2.
96. Law on the Use of Abandoned Property art. 49, reported in Republika Srpska Official
Gazette, year V, no. 3 (Feb. 27, 1996). Likewise, property placed in the control of proxies
after April 6, 1992 (the beginning of the war in Bosnia) by persons who no longer reside in
the territory of Republika Srpska cannot be alienated (with exceptions for the families of
soldiers who have been killed, persons who are not military conscripts, and citizens of Republika Srpska who are temporarily working abroad and who have fulfilled their obligations
towards Republika Srpska). Id. art. 53. Wills concluded after April 6, 1992 are null and void,
if they transfer property in Republika Srpska to persons not living in Republika Srpska.
However, this Article shall not prejudice persons who inherit because a family member was a
combatant killed in the war, or persons who are “citizens of the Republic who are temporarily
staying abroad as migrant workers and who have fulfilled all their obligations towards the
Republic.” Id. art. 52 (English translation improved).
97. Id. art. 51. The contract must have been for property that the present holder owns and
which was situated on the territory of the Federation or other republics of the former Socialist
Republic of Yugoslavia—that is to say, not in Republika Srpska. Id. art. 51.
98. “The provisions of this law are not to be applied to the families of combatants killed in
the war as well as to the families of war military invalids . . . who had not resolved their
accommodation status before 6 April 1992 and who, until this law enters into force, have
resolved their accommodation matters on some kind of legal basis.” Id. art. 61 (English translation improved).
99. Western efforts came to the fore when the Peace Implementation Council, the body
representing the states overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Accords, issued a statement in Luxembourg in June 1998 requiring that Republika Srpska pass new property legisla-
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increased influence the West exerted through the administrations of
Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, a new property law finally promulgated in December 1998. 100 To date, there is little evidence about
implementation of the new law.
B. Property Law of the Federation Communities
The following three Sections deal with the laws of the two principal communities in the other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. These laws were promulgated during wartime and,
despite being declared invalid by organs of the international community, continued in force during the Dayton period until a new
Federation property law was promulgated in 1998. I will deal first
with the provisions and practice of the wartime laws, and then see
what changes, if any, have come about since the new law was enacted.
1. Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Property Law
For most of the post-Dayton period, a wartime Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina property statute from 1992 was applied in the
Muslim areas of the Federation. The Law on Abandoned Apartments was first promulgated in 1992 and frequently amended, with
a consolidated version being issued on 1 September 1995; 101 thus
the consolidated version appeared before the signing of the Dayton
Accords but after the point at which a settlement, or a major victory
for the Croats and Muslims, seemed likely. That version remained
in force until early 1998.
tion by August 31, 1998. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to
Bosnia and Herzegovina [hereinafter OSCE], Weekly Report, June 1998 22–28, 1998 (internal memo to OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, Austria; on file with author).
100. “The Republika Srpska parliament approved a bill on 2 December that confirms the
right of former occupants to their homes and gives the government 30 days to respond to
demands by Muslims and Croats for the return of their apartments and houses. [Republika
Srpska President Nikola] Poplašen’s Radicals opposed the measure, but legislators belonging
to Karadžić’s Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) voted for it. SDS spokesmen told AFP that
they backed the bill as ‘the lesser of two evils’ because it allows Serbian refugees living in
Muslims’ and Croats’ former homes to appeal their eviction and requires the Bosnian Serb
government to rehouse them if they lose. The SDS officials added that they feared that the
international community’s Carlos Westendorp would impose a ‘far worse’ law if the parliament voted down the draft.” Patrick Moore, Bosnian Serbs Pass Property Laws, Radio Free
Europe/Radio
Liberty
Newsline
(Dec.
3,
1998)
<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/12/031298.html>.
101. Law on Abandoned Apartments, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 6/92, as amended in Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia &
Herzegovina nos. 8/92, 16/92, 13/94, 36/94, 9/95, and 33/95 (volume numbers and dates not
available) (unofficial translation by OSCE Human Rights Department) [hereinafter Law on
Abandoned Apartments, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 6/92].
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The laws promulgated by the Muslim community’s leadership
during the war had a somewhat different status from those of the
Croats or Serbs, as they were the laws of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (RBiH), a government effectively identical to the
internationally recognized country and government. However, although the government purported to be making laws for the entire
country, its effective reach was only over Muslim-populated territories; moreover, its repeated use of exclusionary formulations about
the “aggressor” necessarily limited their beneficial effect mostly to
Muslims.
Article 1 incorporated the occupancy right 102 created under laws
of the Yugoslav period, 103 but added a provision that such rights
would temporarily expire if the holder and his household had abandoned the apartment after April 30, 1991. 104 Article 2’s definition of
an abandoned apartment was just as circular as the Republika
Srpska law’s definition, but also included occupied homes in which
unlicensed weapons were found or illegal activities were being
conducted. 105
Article 3 provided some illuminating clarification: an apartment
is not considered abandoned if the rightholder and his household
“had to leave it due to the aggressor’s compulsion intended to execute the ethnic cleansing of a population from certain areas or in the
course of accomplishing the aggressor’s goals[;]” or “if it was de102. Private property and socially owned property are dealt with in separate laws, though
there is considerable, and ambiguous, overlap. The Decree with the Force of Law on Temporary [sic] Abandoned Real Property under Private Ownership during the State of War or the
State of Immediate War Danger, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia &
Herzegovina no. 11/93 (Apr. 3, 1998) (unofficial translation by OHR), was the principal
regulating agent for private property during the war. However, the Law on Abandoned Apartments extended all its provisions to private property as well. “The provisions of this Law are
also to be accordingly applied to apartments privately owned by citizens.” Law on Abandoned Apartments art. 12, Law on Abandoned Apartments, reported in Official Gazette of the
Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 6/92. In addition, several other laws regulate property
rights in Muslim sections of the country, and there is some inconsistency between the various
enactments. Open Society Inst., supra note 77, at 5.
103. The relevant law is the Law on Housing—Consolidated Version, reported in Official
Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina nos. 14/85 and 12/87 (volume
numbers and dates not available), cited in Law on Abandoned Apartments, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 6/92.
104. Law on Abandoned Apartments art. 1, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of
Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 6/92.
105. Id. art. 2. Presumably, unlicensed weapons and illegal activities would encompass the
actions of any non-Muslim who had attempted to organize for combat or even home defense
prior to fleeing. Also:
Article 2 of the Law further restricts the right to return by failing to designate a fixed
time period during which apartments may be declared abandoned. As a result, even after
the Cessation of the State of War, apartments continued to be declared abandoned, despite the fact that the conflict was the basis of the justification for the determination of
abandonment.
OHR, Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative (RBiH), supra note 78, at 2.
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stroyed, burnt, or in direct jeopardy due to war activities (lifedepriving threat, physical torture, expulsion by the aggressor and
other similar grounds).” 106
These exclusions effectively defined the relevant polity to include first Muslims, and to a less certain degree, patriotic nonMuslims (i.e., those non-Muslims who remained in Sarajevo and
other areas held by the government faction). Many of the military
exigencies that might force a person from his home would have
been equally applicable to Croats and Serbs fleeing before military
operations of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(ABiH—the Muslim forces), but these individuals are perforce excluded from claiming an exemption under Article 3 because only
the aggressor’s military operations or acts of ethnic cleansing establish an exemption, a term presumably not including the ABiH.
Another condition listed in Article 3 garnered the most criticism
from the international community:
An apartment will not be considered as abandoned if the holder
of the occupancy right [ ] is located on the territory of the Republic of BaH [sic] and who, [ ] with members of his/her
household, commences to use the same apartment within seven
days after this Law comes into force; or within fifteen days after this law comes into force, for the holder of the occupancy
right who is located outside the territory of the Republic of
BaH [sic]. 107
Here the rule was framed as an exemption from the rules on
abandonment; in Article 10, however, the exceptional nature of this
exemption was made more positive:
If the holder of an occupancy right cited in Article 1 does not
commence to use his/her apartment again, in the term cited in
Article 3 after the date of the Decree on the Cessation of the
State of War is passed, it is to be considered that he/she has deserted his/her apartment permanently.
On the day of the expiration of the term cited in paragraph 1
of this Article the holder of the apartment occupancy right
loses that right for his/her apartment and that fact will be stated
by the decision of the competent authority. 108

106. Law on Abandoned Apartments art. 3, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of
Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 6/92 (English translation improved).
107. Id. art. 3 (English translation improved).
108. Id. art. 10 (English translation improved).
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The “Cessation of the State of War” was proclaimed on December 22, 1995, meaning that returns had to occur by December 29 for
displaced persons, or January 6, 1996 for refugees. 109 Thus these
provisions, added just before the cessation of the war in Bosnia,
effectively gave several hundred thousand Croat, Serb, and Muslim
refugees who held occupancy rights to apartments on Muslimcontrolled territory just over two weeks to return to the country
from abroad (or one week, if they were living across the cease-fire
line) to reclaim their apartments. At that time, of course, the political and military reality prevented this; almost no one was able to
return in time to claim an occupancy right. 110 No hearings were required; loss of right was automatic and immediate.
Many Muslims were also effectively stripped of their occupancy
rights by these provisions; this might seem to belie any direct ethnic
animus. The argument is more complex, however. First, because the
law—though promulgated for the entirety of Bosnia—had effect
only in Muslim-controlled areas, the great majority of those affected were non-Muslims who had fled. Only Muslims who had
wished to escape the general privations of the war—but not ethnic
cleansing—would have left from areas under Muslim control; their
numbers were far fewer.
More importantly, the beneficiaries of the provision—those displaced persons presently occupying socially owned apartments who
might be forced to vacate if the owner were to return—were almost
exclusively Muslims who had stayed throughout the conflict. Thus
the effect of the provision in Article 3 was to strip almost all Serbs,
Croats, and “non-patriotic” Muslims, of their occupancy rights, and
to transfer those same almost exclusively to patriotic Muslims; a
dual animus—against other ethnicities and against insufficiently
patriotic Muslims—motivated the exclusion, and the two instances
of animus are of a piece. 111

109. OHR, Law on Abandoned Apartments: Compliance (RBiH), supra note 76, at 3.
110. See Hum. Rights Coord. Cen., Information Sheet on the New Federation Property
and Housing Laws (Apr. 3, 1998) <http://www.ohr.int/property/htm>.
111. Consider this interpretation:
Article 10 . . . infringes upon the right of return set forth in Annex 7 (Article I) and Annex 4 (Article II § 5) of the GFAP by imposing an arbitrary and discriminatory time period in which refugees and displaced persons are required to return and reoccupy their
apartments . . . . In addition, given that war is itself a temporary state and that the Law in
question was passed to address the consequences of abandonment in a war-time context,
permanent loss of property rights (including rights regarding socially owned property) is
both unjustified and violates the right to property provided for in Article I of Annex 7
and Articles II(3)(k) and (5) of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex 4).
OHR, Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative (RBiH), supra note 78, at 1.
Elsewhere in the same document, however, this interpretation of the problem as one of arbitrariness is given over in favor of a more directed animus:
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The Law then created a new hierarchy of rightholders. First listed
were “an active combatant against the aggressor as well as . . . a
person who is left without an apartment due to hostilities.” 112 The
article also noted that apartments distributed through the Ministry
of Defense were to be given “for temporary use by members of the
Army of the Republic BiH as well as to members of families of
combatants who lost their lives in combat against the aggressor on
the Republic.” 113
These rights of occupancy were temporary, but their termination
depended on the government’s determination that the threat of war
has ceased. The occupancy right lasted for up to one year after the
formal cessation of the threat of war, 114 which, despite hostilities
having ended in November 1995, still has not been declared. Any
loss to the original owner was final: 115 “According to the Dayton
Agreement . . . where the restoration of property is impossible, a
fair compensation must be provided. The Law on Abandoned
Apartments, however, d[id] not foresee even such a possibility.” 116
2. Herceg-Bosna Property Law
Laws and Decrees passed by the Croatian community are in a
somewhat different position than those of the Serbs and the Muslims. The Serbs’ laws have become the recognized law of Republika Srpska, while the Muslims’ laws have become, for the most
part, the laws of the Bosnian federal government or the Federation,
Under Article 1(3)(a) of Annex 7 [of the GFAP], the parties are required to ‘repeal domestic legislation and administrative practices with discriminatory intent or effect.’ Regardless of the intent which motivated the Law . . . its discriminatory effect in current
circumstances is evident. The administrative and material burdens implicit in order to
comply with the provisions of Article 10 . . . present an almost insurmountable barrier to
return which affects primarily the rights of refugees and displaced persons. In addition,
the law has frequently been applied in a manner which has a disproportionately harsh
impact on non-Bosniaks [sic].
Id. at 2.
112. Law on Abandoned Apartments art. 7, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of
Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 6/92.
113. Id. A similar provision in the same article grants priority for Interior Ministry apartments to its employees and to family members of employees who were killed, presumably in
connection with the war effort, though this is not explicitly stated.
114. Id. at art. 8. It should be noted that this is not the same as the previously mentioned
declaration of the state of war.
115. UNHCR notes
The BiH property laws, in intent, discriminate against refugees and displaced persons
who fled their place of origin for reasons other than ethnic cleansing or direct war damage. More than 80,000 apartments in the Sarajevo area have been declared ‘abandoned.’
These properties have been either systematically allocated by the authorities to displaced
persons, members of the ABiH or their families or illegally seized.
UNHCR, supra note 7, at 5.
116. OHR, Law on Abandoned Apartments: Compliance (RBiH), supra note 76, at 7. Nor,
of course, do the other two communities’ laws.
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though duly ignored on Croatian territory. For their part, the Croats’
laws were not recognized by the international community, because
their entity, the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, is not recognized, having officially dissolved into the American-brokered Federation. 117 Therefore, the nearly identical provisions that the Croat
law shared with the Muslim law on termination of occupancy rights
and on the maintenance of new temporary rights under a regime of
war emergency did not generate the same level of criticism. Indeed,
there has been almost no analysis of Croat legislation by the relevant international institutions. 118 However, the laws and institutions
of Herceg-Bosna continue to be applied in Croat areas. 119
117. See Čuvalo, supra note 6, at xxxiv.
118. And, therefore, the abandoned property legislation of Herceg-Bosna was never reviewed on its own merits by OHR. If it were, it would almost certainly be found to be inconsistent with Dayton. Cf. Popović, supra note 8, at 152 (“Real property regulations of the
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna [sic] represent a flagrant disregard of the GFA inasmuch
as they practically impede the right of displaced persons to return to their homes. As such,
they represent a final act of the policy of ethnic cleansing. . . . [T]hese ‘Herzeg-Bosna’ [sic]
Decrees also violate the ECHR [European Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights].”).
119. “Although formally dissolved, the self-proclaimed Croatian Republic of HerzegBosna [sic] continues its existence and functions, including its self-styled legal system. This
system maintains a comprehensive set of decrees and regulations concerning real property,
and in particular regarding expropriation and confiscation.” Id. at 151. The regime in HercegBosna continues to operate and to control the civil administration of its territory, though
largely as a province of neighboring Croatia. It also maintains its own army, which, on paper,
is integrated into the Federation forces together with the Muslim Army of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH), but in reality is entirely separate. For a brief discussion of
the low level of real integration of the Croat and Muslim sections of the Federation, see Čuvalo, supra note 6, at 48–49 (calling the Muslim-Croat federation one of “the two fundamental post-Dayton problems”); for a thorough overview of the problematic situation in the early
Dayton period, see generally Thomas Ambrosio, The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
A Failure of Implementation, in State and Nation Building in East Central Europe: Contemporary Perspectives 225–41 (John Micgiel ed., 1996) (identifying the critical elements of
disjuncture—the division of Mostar, the essentially separate nature of the two national armed
forces—which remain salient in 1998).
Indeed, the continuing relevance of Herceg-Bosna is best proven by the continuing efforts
of the international community to confirm its non-existence: “William Dale Montgomery, the
U.S. ambassador to Croatia, said in a statement in Zagreb on 16 April [1998] that Croatia
must help dismantle the Herzegovinian quasi-state of Herceg-Bosna, which continues to exist
in contravention of the Dayton agreement. ‘We look to the government of Croatia to use its
influence to see that these parallel institutions are dismantled and that responsibility is ceded
to the joint Croatian and Muslim federal government in Sarajevo.’” Patrick Moore, U.S.
Demands End to ‘Herceg-Bosna,’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (Apr. 17,
1998) <http://www.rferl.org/ newsline/1998/04/170498.html>.
Compare also this interview with Jacques Klein, Senior Deputy High Representative:
[Interviewer]. . . . What do you think about the mistake that the Croats did not get their
own entity in Dayton?
[Klein] Croatia joined the Federation of B&H before Dayton. That is why they do not
have the right to an entity. They probably are now looking toward Banja Luka asking
themselves why the Serbs can have their own symbols, flag, etc. I have to point out that
it would probably have been much easier to work with the Croatian residents in Bosnia
if they had their own entity and culture. This could even be achieved within the Federa-

34

Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 40

The Decree on Abandoned Apartments was first promulgated
when the de facto separate Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna
was still formally a constituent element of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 120 It was very similar to the Muslim law discussed above, employing identical language for several articles. These similarities
nicely highlight the parallel purposes of the two bodies of law,
which aimed to exclude the return of members of other ethnic
groups. The generic language can be the same; only the identification of “the aggressor” need be changed to create the desired effect.
Article 1 was nearly identical with that in the Muslim law, extinguishing the occupancy right of anyone who abandons his apartment. 121 Article 2 gave the same criteria for defining an abandoned
apartment as the Muslim version: failure of the rightholder or his
family to use the property; discovery of unlicensed weapons or
ammunition; or, use of the apartment for illegal activities. It also
added one criterion not found in the Muslim version: an apartment
left vacant, without the occupancy right having been acquired or a
rental contract signed. 122
In any event, the list of exemptions was considerably shorter than
the comparable list in the Muslim law, and notably did not make
reference to “the aggressor”: “An apartment is not to be considered
as abandoned if the holder of the occupancy right and members of
his/her household had to leave due to physical force intended to
execute ethnic cleansing of a population from certain areas or to
accomplish other goals[,]” 123 or if the property was damaged or the
tion of B&H. Croats in Bosnia & Herzegovina have to embrace the international community and closely cooperate with us because we can influence the necessary changes,
all in their protection. However, this can only be achieved through cooperation with the
international community.
[Interviewer] In that sense, have there been any positive moves made in that direction?
[Klein] I think we are on our way. From my talks in Zagreb I have the impression that
the political leadership is interested in an open and constructive dialogue and cooperation of the B&H Croats with the international community.”
Jožo Pavović, Lakše bi bilo da su Hrvati dobili svoj entitet (It Would Have Been Easier if the
Croats Had Been Given Their Own Entity), in VEČERNJI LIST, Jan. 27, 1999, at 7 (author
trans.).
120. Decree on Deserted Apartments, reported in National Gazette of the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna no. 13/93, as amended in National Gazette of the Croat Republic of
Herceg-Bosna no. 5/95 (volume numbers and dates not available) (unofficial translation by
OHR) [hereinafter Decree on Deserted Apartments, reported in National Gazette of the Croat
Republic of Herceg-Bosna no. 5/95]. The Herceg-Bosna “para-state” was declared in July
1992. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 20, at 6. By the time the decree was amended,
the community styled itself the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna.
121. Decree on Deserted Apartments art. 3, reported in National Gazette of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna no. 5/95.
122. Id. at art. 2. This effectively requires non-Croats to have transferred their property to
a Croat who remains in the area to ensure any chance of reclaiming it later.
123. Id.
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rightholder threatened by the war. 124 And, in a variant of the most
severe restriction in the Muslim law, “[a]n apartment will not be
considered as deserted if the holder of the occupancy right or members of his/her household who live with him/her commence[ ] to
use the same apartment/reoccupies [it] within 7 days after this Decree enter[s] into force.” 125 As in areas under Muslim control, almost no one was able to return in time to reclaim an occupancy
right; the immediate beneficiaries of that failure to return were almost all Croats.
Article 7 laid out a limited hierarchy of new recipients: Member
of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO), the ethnic Croat military
forces, or “other participant in combat against [the] enemy as well
as to person[ ] who was left without [an] apartment[ ] due to the
war activities (refugee, expelled person, or displaced person).”126
As in the Muslim law, new occupancy rights were temporary—but,
as noted above, most former rightholders have been stripped of
their rights, so there is no party to raise a claim against the new occupant. 127
3. 1998 Federation Law
In early 1998, following the successful installation of a new,
more pro-Dayton leadership in Republika Srpska, the international
community encouraged the Muslim and Croatian leaderships to
produce new property laws. 128 Negotiations on a new draft had
been underway for over two years, a process one participant compared to “hitting your head against a wall.” 129 Though evidently the
product of compromises, 130 the new Law on the Cessation of the
Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments seems to com124. Id. at art. 3. Because the words “the aggressor” are missing here, it is theoretically
possible that an expelled Muslim or Serb could successfully argue that his occupancy right
had not been extinguished because he had fled to avoid “physical force intended to execute
ethnic cleansing of a population from certain areas or to accomplish other goals,” or even
more compellingly because his house had been destroyed due to war activities of the HVO.
In practice, of course, this interpretation has not won out.
125. Id.
126. Id. at art. 7.
127. Id. at art. 8.
128. See Patrick Moore, Bosnian Merry-Go-Round, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Newsline (Feb. 27, 1998) <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/02/270298.html>.
129. Interview with UNHCR official, in Sarajevo, Fed. BiH (Jan. 1997) (Name and precise date withheld to protect anonymity of source.).
130. The International Crisis Group noted
In response to threatened sanctions in the Sarajevo Declaration, Federation authorities
did eventually amend the entity’s property legislation in line with the demands of the
Office of the High Representative (OHR). Although the amendments remove most legal
obstacles to return, Federation authorities refused to make further reforms, citing the
failure of Republika Srpska authorities to amend their property laws.
International Crisis Group, Too Little, Too Late, supra note 19, at Executive Summary.
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port with the requirements of the international community concerning opportunities for refugees to return and reclaim property rights.
Although it establishes elaborate claiming procedures, tolerates
long delays, and allows the ultimate extinction of occupancy rights,
the Law—together with a law addressing private property and other
new legislation—does represent, on paper, a significant improvement for members of other ethnic groups trying to reclaim their
property in hostile territory.
The new Law, relating to abandoned socially owned property,
specifically voids both the Muslim Law on Abandoned Apartments
and the Croat Decree on Abandoned Apartments and bars, in general terms, any Federation authorities from making any further declarations of abandonment. 131 All decisions taken under those laws
to terminate occupancy rights are likewise declared void, and any
new occupancy rights created under those laws are continued only
until canceled in accordance with the new Law. 132
Anyone who abandoned his property after April 30, 1991 is presumptively held to have the right to return under Annex 7 of the
GFAP, absent a showing that they abandoned the property for reasons unrelated to the war. 133 If the rightholder’s apartment is presently unoccupied, he may reoccupy it immediately. If it is occupied
illegally—that is, without color of any of the pre-existing law—he
may seek an immediate eviction. 134 Otherwise, the returning
rightholder “shall be entitled to claim the repossession of an apartment,” 135 and must file a claim for repossession within six months
of the entry into force of the new Law, or lose his prior right permanently. 136 Thus, any Annex 7 claimants who fail to file by Octo131. Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments art. 1,
reported in Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina 11/98 (Apr. 3, 1998)
(unofficial translation by OHR).
132. Id. at art. 2.
133. Id. at art. 3.
134. Also, the authorities are not obliged to provide emergency accommodation for the
evicted squatter. Id. Such provisions have long been a pretextual justification for local authorities’ refusals to evict squatters in favor of rightholders.
135. Id. at art. 4.
136. Id. at art. 5. Furthermore, the claimant must plan to reoccupy the apartment within
one year, Id. at arts. 4, 12, unless he has good cause, defined to include, inter alia, “wellfounded fear of persecution,” continuing occupation of the apartment following a request for
eviction by the rightholder, or if “security measures are being applied to the occupancy right
holder.” Id. at art. 12.
In parallel fashion, the Law on Taking Over the Law on Housing Relations art. 3, reported
in Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 11/98 (Apr. 3, 1998) (volume number not available) (unofficial translation by OHR), amends the Communist-era Law
on Housing Relations, reported in Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia &
herzegovina, 14/84, 12/87, and 36/89 (volume number and dates not available), which allowed social housing to be reallocated if it is not used for six months; this new law exempts
property abandoned during the war from this six-month rule, so long as the rightholder is a
refugee or displaced person covered under Annex 7.
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ber 4, 1998 lose their occupancy right. 137 This deadline was later
extended by the High Representative until April 1999. 138
Claimants must present documentary evidence to support their
claim to an occupancy right, such as contracts for exchange, court
or administrative decisions, 139 or “other evidence,” such as utility
bills or witnesses’ statements. 140 In any event, the municipal authorities “shall accept claims whether or not the necessary documentation is supplied,” confirming the claim through their own independent records searches. 141
Municipal authorities have to issue a decision within thirty days
of receiving a claim, 142 after which any temporary occupant must
vacate the apartment within ninety days. 143 In “exceptional circumstances,” the temporary occupant may stay up to one year, but only
on presentation of “detailed documentation” of a lack of available
housing, as determined by the cantonal authorities in accordance
with the European Convention on Human Rights “and its Protocols.” 144 If necessary, eviction of the temporary occupant shall be
carried out at the request of the rightholder. 145 Appeals to the cantonal authorities are possible, 146 as are appeals to the Property
Commission. 147 Finally, rightholders have the right to purchase
their apartments, subject to certain residency requirements and limits on alienation. 148
The Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Temporarily Abandoned Real Property Owned by Citizens, promulgated
the same day, applies to private property, and likewise voids the
previously applicable law. 149 This law contains similar provisions,
save that private property owners may file claims for return at any
137. Hum. Rights Coord. Ctr., Property Information Sheet No. 2: How to Claim Repossession of Your Apartment (May 11, 1998) <http://www.ohr.int/property/htm>.
138. See Patrick Moore, Westendorp Extends Deadline on Apartments, Radio Free
Europe/Radio
Liberty
Newsline
(Sept.
16,
1998)
<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/09/160998.html>.
139. Instruction on the Application of Article 4 of the Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments, Doc. D/02-021-1139/98, § 7 (Federation Ministry for Urbanism and Environment, Apr. 30, 1998) <http://www.ohr.int/property.htm>.
140. Id. § 8.
141. Id. § 9.
142. Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments art. 6,
reported in Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina 11/98 (Apr. 3, 1998).
143. Id. at art. 7.
144. Id.
145. Id. at art. 11.
146. Id. at art. 8.
147. Id. at art. 14.
148. Id. at art. 15.
149. Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Temporary [sic] Abandoned
Real Property Owned by Citizens art. 1, reported in Official Gazette of the Federation of
Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 11/98 (Apr. 3, 1998).
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time, without restriction or loss of right; 150 procedures for claiming,
appealing, seeking the eviction of the present occupant, as well as
for delaying the return of the apartment for up to one year are
largely the same as in the law on socially owned property. 151
In addition to promulgating the provisions themselves, the Federation authorities are called upon to take full measures for their
implementation, including “a broad public information campaign”
and “[e]ffective monitoring of the implementation of the laws.” 152
C. Conclusion
In all, though these laws contain different provisions and different political emphasis, they are surprisingly consistent in their
scope and style. All three laws hew to a formalistically neutral
drafting, but are rife with provisions revealing their pragmatic project, which is to entrench and enforce the ethnic division and hierarchy that violence engendered. All three are indirect, relying on
law’s neutrality to maintain distinctions already established by other
means. And all three act to seal and solemnify, lifting up law’s
atemporal, universal hand to smooth the rough ground ripped open
by war.
V. PRACTICES OF COURTS, MINISTERIAL AND MUNICIPAL
AUTHORITIES, AND POLICE
The rhetorical and legislative thrust of the principal property laws
is compelling enough as evidence of the true constitutional nature
of the extant regimes; more compelling still is the evidence of how
the rules of property are actually implemented through the courts,
administrative organs, and police. The picture that emerges is of a
legal system still surviving and operating, though reduced in scope
and replaced by a web of fiat and ethnocentric adjudication; but
withal, one that consistently comports with an integral legal and
social vision, however unpalatable, of an ethno-majoritarian state.
A. The Courts
One of the most important practical changes that occurred during
the war with respect to many property cases was the large-scale
150. Id. at arts. 4, 11.
151. Compare Law on the Cessation of the Application of the Law on Temporary [sic]
Abandoned Real Property Owned by Citizens arts. 7-16, reported in Official Gazette of the
Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 11/98 (Apr. 3, 1998), with Law on the Cessation of
the Application of the Law on Abandoned Apartments arts. 3, 4, 7, 8–11, 14, reported in
Official Gazette of the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 11/98 (Apr. 3, 1998).
152. Hum. Rights Coord. Ctr., Information Sheet on the New Federation Property and
Housing Laws (Apr. 9, 1998) <http://www.ohr.int/property/htm>.
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transference of authority from the judiciary to ministry and municipal administrative boards. In all sectors, the judiciary was stripped
of jurisdiction over abandoned property by legislative acts enacted
early in the war, with that authority vesting instead in administrative boards. 153
There is nonetheless a tentative sense that the courts, having been
almost totally eclipsed in the war years, are again a source of
independent (if still ineffective) justice, as evidenced by the
frequency with which recourse to the courts is sought. For example,
in the northern Serbian areas, over 4000 cases were filed before the
Banja Luka court in 1996, far more than in the preceding years; an
official of the OSCE dealing with property issues estimated that the
great majority of these are property-related cases. 154
It is still possible to seek restoration of property or clarification
of title through the courts by relying on older Yugoslav laws or
other legislation. In predominantly Muslim Vareš, for example,
some Croats approached the local court seeking restoration of their
property, after their application was rejected by the local administrative board, and received favorable judgments. 155
The courts, however compromised and delimited in their jurisdiction and practical scope of operation by the prevailing ethnic orthodoxy, are probably the one area of official action that has maintained some independent base of operation and a philosophical posture not entirely bent to the ethnic will. 156 Those seeking evidence
of the principles underlying the civilian half of Dayton will find
proof, however weak, in the courts. 157 As I will describe below, the
153. See infra Part V.B.
154. Interview with OSCE human rights official, in Banja Luka, RS (Jan. 1997) (Name
and precise date withheld to protect anonymity of source.). Popović states that 70% of all
cases pending in Banja Luka in 1996 concerned property. Popović, supra note 8, at 142.
155. In three such cases, dating from late 1996, Croat owners returned to their houses,
refurbished them, and then were evicted under auspices of the abandoned property act. The
Croats brought complaints under the Law on Owners’ Relations, a Yugoslav-era law which
had been confirmed as valid law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The court decided in favor of
the Croat plaintiffs, ordering the return of their privately owned apartments to them. The
Croats actually received their former homes. This process had already begun before the cases
reached the court, and the judge did not believe that the court decisions had affected that
process one way or the other. In an interview, the judge characterized this development as an
agreement among politicians to respect private property rights, and noted that other Croats
had received their property back without approaching the court, because the municipality had
extra flats available. Interview with judge, in Vareš, Fed. BiH (Jan. 1997); Interview with
OSCE official, in Vareš, Fed. BiH (Jan. 1997) (Names and precise dates withheld to protect
anonymity of sources.).
156. “The courts are more than puppet theater—there was a highly developed legal system
here, and people don’t want to be considered as barbarians.” Interview with UNHCR officer,
supra note 129. “The problem isn’t with what comes into this court, but what doesn’t come
in. I am a judge, but I can’t do anything about bringing a complaint . . . When there is a complaint, I apply the law.” Interview with judge in Vareš, Fed. BiH, supra note 155.
157. That is, proof of the underlying principles, not the formal rhetoric and rights guaran-
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other principal organs—the municipalities and the police—have not
demonstrated any reserve at all. Indeed, as the organs most responsible for restricting the courts’ remaining independence to act effectively on non-ethnic principles, they have shown themselves to be
fully and completely instruments of the new states and the new order.
B. Ministry and Municipal Officials
With the near eclipse of the courts, ministries and municipal
agencies have acquired almost exclusive authority over abandoned
property. Various commissions are responsible for finding housing,
for determining the status of property, and for distributing it to displaced persons. In addition, there are numerous ad hoc formations
to respond to various property-related initiatives from the international community. The responsible agencies—most commonly municipal-level branches of ministries—are constituted in a variety of
fashions, and there is no consistency even within ethnic sectors. 158
Indeed, these are the institutions about which the least information
is available. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that in Republika Srpska, the commissions have targeted the homes of remaining
minorities in their search for excess housing space, 159 while in the
Federation, the extremely short timeline for returns has likewise
been used to target minorities. 160
teed under Dayton itself. The Human Rights Chamber established by the Dayton Accords
does take cognizance of the European Convention on Human Rights and other international
conventions in its decisions. Interview with former Human Rights Chamber official, in Cambridge, Mass. (Sept. 1998) (Name and precise date withheld to protect anonymity of source.).
Nevertheless, I know of no domestic court that is applying the various conventions which are
made supreme law in Bosnia, and many judges have only the most rudimentary awareness, if
any, of the human rights or property provisions of Dayton. Interview with judge, in Banja
Luka, RS (Dec. 1996); Interview with judge, in Doboj, RS (Dec. 1996); Interview with judge
in Uskoplje/Gornji Vakuf, Fed. BiH (Jan. 1997) (Names and precise dates withheld to protect
anonymity of sources.); Interview with judge, in Vareš, Fed. BiH, supra note 155.
158. Each municipality in Republika Srpska, for example, has a Commission for the Resettlement of Refugees and the Administration of Abandoned Property, attached to the entitylevel Ministry of Refugees. In the Banja Luka region, property abandonment is determined
by one of two municipal departments of Republic (entity)-level ministries: the Ministry of
Urban Planning for socially owned property, and the Republic Administration for Geodetic
Issues, Cadaster, and Legal and Compensation Issues Concerning Property.
159. See, e.g., OSCE Doboj Field Office, Weekly Report, Nov. 14, 1996 (internal memo;
on file with author.) (describing the use of “creeping evictions” employing Article 17 against
remaining non-Serbs in Doboj and Prnjavor, as well as lack of access to files of the Ministry
for Refugees and Displaced Persons); OHR, Human Rights Report, May 4–5, 1997 (OHR
occasional bulletin) (unpaginated) (reporting harassment of Muslims in Teslić by local Serbs
quartered in their homes under Article 17, with apparent complicity of the local Commission
on Abandoned Property).
160. BiH Ombudsman Reports on Vareš Property Case, in OHR, Human Rights Report,
Apr. 11–12, 1997 (OHR occasional bulletin) (unpaginated) (noting the use of the time limit
provisions in Article 3 to evict or terminate the occupancy rights of Croats from Muslim-
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The authorities responsible for questions of property do not
merely utilize existing legal regulations to further an ethnic agenda;
they also subvert internationally sponsored procedures to which
they are a party. 161
controlled Vareš).
161. See, e.g., OSCE Field Office Doboj, Weekly Report, Nov. 21, 1996 (internal memo;
on file with author). The memo notes that five Muslim-owned houses in the Doboj region of
Republika Srpska which were destroyed in night-time explosions in a single weekend had all
been on a list of applicants for return under a program to resettle displaced persons in their
original homes. The list had been made available to local officials earlier that day. In fact, the
level of destruction became so extreme, and the targeting of houses so clearly linked to the
application process to which local officials had access, that the program was canceled after
only a few weeks. Id. Similar problems occur in other parts of the country as well:
Arson Attacks against Serb Homes in Drvar: International monitors report that 25 Serb
homes were damaged by fire in a village outside of Drvar [in Croatian-held territory]
during the night of 2-3 May, and an additional 25 homes were vandalized (roofs, doors,
and windows removed). This destruction directly followed a meeting concerning returns
to Drvar held by Federation Mediator Christian Schwarz-Schilling on 2 May, in which
local authorities agreed to permit returns on a case-by-case basis.
OHR, Human Rights Report, May 3-4, 1997 (OHR occasional bulletin) (unpaginated).
There have also been instances of Croat-owned houses being destroyed in Muslimcontrolled Bugojno and Serb-controlled Prijedor following attempts by the owners to repair
their houses, and in many other communities throughout the country.
The following excerpt describes a series of returns to a predominantly Croat area. It is
typical of situations in which “success” has been claimed by the international community.
Note, however, how that “success” is minimal, and achieved despite the efforts of local officials—all the supporting officials in this instance belong to canton- or entity-level offices
controlled by Muslims, while the local officials are all Croats:
In Prozor-Rama, despite the fact that opposition to minority returns remains strong, the
pace of returns has been increasing since the beginning of the year. UNHCR estimates
that, between January and May 1998, 89 Bosniacs returned to Prozor-Rama, and that
since then more than 50 Bosniac heads of household have returned.
In March 1998, the Prozor-Rama authorities came under heavy international pressure
to submit a list of villages to which return could begin immediately as part of the cantonal plan for return. Reluctantly, the municipality complied . . . .
Bosniac returns began in April 1998 from Bugojno and Konjić to the village of Here
. . . The Prozor-Rama municipal authorities called the return “illegal,” arguing, wrongly,
that each individual returnee had to be accepted for return in advance by the Municipal
Returns Office (MRO).
Despite these objections, some 40 Bosniac heads of family returned. SFOR units in
the area report that reconstruction is proceeding slowly and that most Bosniac families
are not living in the village full-time. Returnees have encountered occasional harassment, but there have been no serious incidents.
On 28 May, more than 170 Bosniacs from Bugojno, Konjić and Jablanica visited Prozor-Rama town. 40 heads of families remained in their homes overnight. The return,
which proceeded without obstruction, was supported by the Federal Ministry for Social
Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons, which brought in 12 trucks of building materials, food, and basic supplies for the returnees.
In June there were also returns outside the return plan to the village of Borovnica,
where 50 people were working on their houses on a daily basis. While ten stayed overnight in three houses to do repairs, the rest commuted from Bugojno. Bosniac returns
will likely continue throughout the summer as families join heads of household who
have already returned. Bosniac returnees are well-organised and supported by Bosniac
officials at local, cantonal and federal levels.
International Crisis Group, The Western Gate of Central Bosnia: The Politics of Return in
Bugojno and Prozor-Rama, section entitled Prozor-Rama (July 31, 1998)
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These commissions demonstrate considerably less respect for the
notion of the rule of law than do the courts. 162 There is little opportunity for review or for transparency in the decision-making process. 163 Most importantly, the anecdotal evidence suggests that their
<http://www.crisisweb.org>. Note also how low a threshold is required in order for a “return”
to be counted as such, which suggests that the “real” level of returns is in fact far lower than
even present estimates acknowledge.
162. The following is an extract from a complaint filed with an OSCE office by a Croat
couple seeking to have their house restored to their use (names have been omitted or replaced
with letters), which demonstrates the practical operations of municipal authorities in cases
involving remaining minorities and displaced persons; it also suggests the limited role of the
courts:
Summary: . . . The Xs own a house in Doboj and some property nearby. In July 1994 a
refugee couple S began to use the upper floor of the house, apparently per a decision issued by the municipality.
On 11 September 1995, a second refugee family T occupied part of the first floor; the
Xs retained use of 1 1/2 rooms, including a 9 meter2 room and part of a 16 meter2 room.
On the following day, the Ts forbade further use of the larger room; T threatened the Xs
with a gun. T also asked that they sell him their car for 200 DM; the Xs gave the car as a
gift, and signed a contract to that effect. That same evening, a soldier, R, came into their
room and forced them to sit down. The husband was called out of the room . . . and in
his absence, the soldier mistreated and raped Mrs. X. After the rape, the Xs left the
house, and have not returned since. They have been living in one room at the husband’s
sister’s apartment since 15 September 1995.
. . . The S family living upstairs had a certificate authorizing them to share the upper
floor—the Xs say they saw this certificate, but were not given a copy or any other
documentation. They also report that, after they left their apartment, the Ss got a new
certificate to have exclusive use of the upper floor as abandoned property.
The T family showed some form of document on 11 September 1995, but the Xs received no copy; they believe that the document authorized the Ts to use one room, but
added that they saw it for too short a time and were in shock at the arrival of the Ts, who
came accompanied by six other people, including soldiers.
The Xs have twice requested some form of documentation from the Geodetic Ministry and the MRDP [Ministry for Refugees and Displaced Persons] regarding the status
of their house and of the refugees living in it. At the end of October 1995, the Xs asked
orally, and on 23 November in writing. On 24 November 1995 they received an answer
to their oral request, showing that five members of the Ts had been awarded use of another house on 15 March 1995 (document [number deleted]). However, in May 1996,
they were given, from an anonymous source, a copy of another decision which gave the
Ts use of their house as abandoned property and dated 4 October 1995. This second
document is apparently forged and backdated, as it bears the exact same document ID
([number deleted]) as the original decision from March 1995, and is dated one week before T, the husband, died at the front.
The Xs applied to the court on 1 December 1995 . . . and had their first hearing on 29
December . . . . A second hearing was scheduled for 31 May 1996, but was also postponed until 5 July 1996. At that hearing, the court decided to ask for a report from the
MRDP regarding the house. The next hearing, on 15 August 1995, was also postponed,
and no new date has been set.
OSCE, Doboj—Prnjavor Field Office Complaint Log (internal memo, undated, probably
December 1996).
163. Consider this comment on the RS procedures for determining abandonment of property:
No standards are articulated for the determination of abandonment; Article 2 of the Law
provides for this determination on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, the Law does not
specify parameters for adjudication of decisions, nor identifies a competent authority.
The lack of clarity on the procedures for implementation of the Law leaves significant
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decisions are far more consistent in their ethnic alignment than are
the courts’. 164 This hardly seems surprising, given the more recent
provenance of these commissions, created as they were during the
war crisis with the specific purpose of dealing with property problems, which reflect the state of ethnic relations.
C. The Police Forces
Of all the government organs involved in civilian affairs, the
most severely and consistently ethno-national in focus and practice
are the police forces. Their role in the disposition of property, while
theoretically only to implement other institutions’ decisions, is in
practice the most decisive, since they are the engine by which further cleansing occurs, through evictions, and also the principal barrier to implementation of decisions that would comply with the
provisions of Dayton. 165
room for arbitrary or discriminatory interpretation; we have received reports that the law
has been applied in a manner which has a disproportionately harsh impact on non-Serbs.
OHR, Opinion of the Legal Adviser to the High Representative (RS), supra note 78.
164. Consider, for example, the following reports.
Laws passed in both the Federation and Republika Srpska during the war to deal with
abandoned property have been amended and enforced in a way that seems to deny people the ability to return to the homes they lived in before the war. Local authorities
sometimes wrongfully enforce the laws and other regulations in a discriminatory or arbitrary way—often deciding in favor of a particular group, based on ethnicity or legal
status (e.g., war veteran, displaced person, etc.). As a result, many returning refugees
find themselves unable to re-enter their pre-war homes, and other persons are under
threat of eviction.
Hum. Rights Coord. Cen., Property Issues: Guidelines for Action, supra note 94, at 1.
Senior Officials in Republika Srpska publicly state that there can not be return and there
will be no return of Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats to their territory. There can be no return because of the large number of displaced persons occupying every available dwelling. There will be no return until Serbs from the Krajina can return to Croatia. These
sentiments are echoed by most local officials.
UNHCR, supra note 7, at 1.
Evictions of Bosniaks [sic] from their apartments continue in [Croat] West Mostar, even
for some who have legal proof of ownership, and there is no legal redress. ‘I have never
heard of an expelled person going to the court,’ said an EU housing official. ‘People are
simply too afraid to make complaints. The legal system does not exist here. We hoped to
find a judge or lawyer to work with us but no one wanted the job.’ Croats with money or
political power, or those designated as war heroes, are awarded temporary permits for
flats that they are not even living in, effectively preventing the return of Bosniaks [sic].
Diane Paul, High Noon: The Good Sheriff has Been Run Out of Town, War Report (May
1996), at 7. The picture is somewhat more mixed in Muslim areas; see, e.g., UNHCR, supra
note 7, at 2 (“In Bosniac (ABiH) controlled territory there is more tolerance for return in
certain municipalities; in others, there is resistance.”); see also infra notes 168–172 and accompanying text.
165. Local police frequently stand by passively when orchestrated mob violence intimidates returnees. This report from predominantly Croat Jajce in 1997 is atypical only in that it
occurred in the context of what international officials have claimed as a “successful” return
operation:
Returns accelerated . . . as returnees heard that the security situation was stable and
that SFOR was registering returnees . . . . On 1 August 1997, the illusion of security was
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The police in each entity 166 are the sole recognized enforcement
arm for both the municipality and the judiciary. In practice, the police operate largely independently of the judiciary, neither carrying
out court-ordered evictions nor actively protecting minorities in the
their homes. 167 There are also many instances of policemen illegally evicting individuals, as well as evictions by paramilitaries, or
secretive groupings within the police and military. 168 According to
one estimate, seventy percent of human rights violations in Bosnia
are committed by the various police forces. 169
With a few internationally enforced exceptions, 170 the various police forces are monoethnic: “[in the Federation] recruitment into
shattered. Crowds, witnessed passively by Croat police, gathered at several road junctions. Over the next several days, mobs threatened Bosniac villages, attacked several returnees, and intimidated the rest, almost all of whom were evacuated.
International agencies were quick to respond to the violence . . . A month after the
August violence, IPTF published a report that described the police response as “wholly
inadequate and in some instances deliberately negligent”. The report also found that:
“Bosnian Croat officials themselves acknowledged that the demonstrations were being
directed by the local Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] party organisation . . . .
Nonetheless, the response to the Jajce evictions provides an important model for future such incidents. The combination of high-level and immediate political intervention,
active military steps to recreate a secure environment, and a definitive investigation by
IPTF, succeeded in restarting the return process. The high-level attention devoted to
central Bosnia after the evictions contributed to broader progress in the Middle Bosnia
Canton.
International Crisis Group, A Tale of Two Cities: Return of Displaced Persons to Jajce and
Travnik, sections 2.1.1. entitled Uncertain Return, and 2.1.2. entitled Responding to Violence
(June 3, 1998) <http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh34main.htm> (citations
omitted). This was, as noted, a “successful” instance—indeed, one quarter of all cross-ethnic
returns have occurred in this one municipality alone. Id. In most cases attempted returns are
generally reversed by such violent action.
166. Control of the police is at the entity, not municipal, level.
167. One human rights officer with OSCE noted that while the process in court works in a
fairly correct fashion; it is during the execution of evictions, by the police, that the system
fails to work according to its stated goals. Interview with OSCE human rights officer, supra
note 154.
OHR reports similar problems:
Minority Reinstatements Blocked in Banja Luka: International organisations have been
intervening with the RS authorities concerning their failure to enforce court decisions
providing for the reinstatement of some 11 minority families to their homes in Banja
Luka in the past week. Twenty-nine of the approximately 300 minority families that had
been forcibly evicted from their homes during the war but have remained in the Banja
Luka area have received favourable decisions from the court to be reinstated into their
homes. However, the reinstatements of the first 11 families that were scheduled for this
month could not be carried out due to the police’s failure to show up. International observers note that in a number of these cases, the current occupants of the properties are
RS police officers and their families.
OHR, Human Rights Report, Apr. 11–12, 1997, supra note 160.
168. For an example of the influence of paramilitary cells in Republika Srpska, see Human Rights Watch, The Continuing Influence of Bosnia’s Warlords (Dec. 1996).
169. A Precarious Peace, in Survey of the Balkans: A Ghost of a Chance (special section),
Economist, Jan. 24, 1998, at 8.
170. The strategically located town of Brčko, the most contested piece of territory in the
post-Dayton environment, is under a special international administration and has an inte-

1999 / The Dayton Accords and Bosnian Property Disputes

45

local police forces is along ethnic, or majority, lines: Croat police
constitute the vast majority of units in HVO controlled areas and
Bosniacs in ABiH controlled areas.” 171 Although corruption and a
praetorian sensibility are widespread among the police forces, affecting both minority and majority peoples alike, there is a layer of
ethnic animus to the actions of the police that transcends, or at least
operates independently from, other ethnically neutral principles.
The Mostar-based Ombudsman, while noting the problem of extreme corruption, nonetheless feels that the police treat two parties
to a conflict who are of the same ethnicity normally, and does not
consider such cases as matters for his office. The problems his office deals with concern Croat property in the East, and Muslim
property in the West—that is to say, inter-ethnic property disputes.
Intra-ethnic disputes “are something the court takes care of; this
office perhaps just asks them to speed it up.” 172
D. Practice under the New Federation Property Laws
There is less evidence of judicial and administrative practice under the new Federation laws. However, one report from June 1998
noted that “adherence to the [new property] laws is problematic
throughout the Federation,” and cited illegal summoning of claimants to administrative hearings, the charging of fees, delays in issuing decisions, and “problems with getting the authorities to accept
and process claims,” as well as a “[l]ack of awareness of the laws
[being] reported from various areas of the country.” 173
The example of Sarajevo canton is instructive. Despite being the
recipient of tremendous amounts of money and the focus of most
international efforts this year, Sarajevo remains an almost wholly
Muslim city (though it is at the same time one of the most integrated cities in the country). In February 1998, the international
community had called for 20,000 minority returns to Sarajevo in
grated police force; a similar regime operates to some degree in Mostar, which spent several
years under European Union administration.
171. UNHCR, supra note 7, at 4.
172. Interview with Sefket Hadžihasanović, Federation Ombudsman, supra note 24.
173. OSCE, Weekly Report, June 22–28, 1998, supra note 99; see also International Crisis
Group, Too Little, Too Late, section 4.2 entitled Refusal to Accept Proper Claims, supra note
19:
Claim forms were printed in newspapers, for wider distribution, at the expense of the
OHR and in co-operation with UNHCR and other organisations, yet some housing officials have illegally refused to accept these copies. Some have, incorrectly, required that
occupancy-rights holders reclaim their property in person, rejecting claims submitted on
behalf of others. Some housing officials have also refused claims unless accompanied
by certain documents, even though none are required by law, and potential returnees
from Republika Srpska have been required to submit documentation to which they do
not have access.
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1998, but by July, “[Sarajevo] city authorities ha[d] processed only
600 out of 7,000 requests by former residents of Sarajevo to return
to their old homes . . . [,]” 174 and only 859 had actually returned; 175
by the end of the year, the United States and the European Union
even suspended their aid to Sarajevo’s municipal government because it had “failed to even approach the target of 20,000 minority
returns in 1998.” 176 Observers placed the blame on the shoulders of
recalcitrant domestic officials. 177
Elsewhere in the Federation, the situation has been, if anything,
less favorable to refugee returns. Local officials often openly refuse
to initiate evictions of illegal occupants, making it difficult for returnees to reoccupy their homes; 178 in so doing, they continue to
raise issues of reciprocity in returns. 179 As for Republika Srpska: it
174. Patrick Moore, Westendorp Decrees Privatization Law, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Newsline (July 23, 1998) <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/07/230798.html>.
175. See 16 July 1998, Bosnia: EU, US Aid to Sarajevo Suspended over Delay in NonMuslims Return, BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, BBC Monitoring Service:
Central Europe and Balkans (July 16, 1998) (reporting Deputy High Representative Hanns
Schumacher’s July statement that “so far only 365 Croats, 447 Serbs, and 47 ‘others’ had
returned”).
176. Partos, supra note 17, at 43–44.
177. See, e.g., International Crisis Group, Too Little, Too Late, supra note 19, at Executive
Summary, (“Sarajevo officials have applied the laws regarding socially owned apartments so
as to favour Bosniacs who remained in Sarajevo over minorities and even over Bosniacs
displaced from elsewhere in the country.”).
178. One report says
The mayors of some municipalities also bear some responsibility for obstructing evictions. In July 1998, according to international observers, the mayors of Novo Sarajevo,
Stari Grad, and Novi Grad (all of which are split, with some territory in Republika
Srpska) declared that illegal occupants would not be evicted unless alternate accommodation could be found. Such a policy flies in the face of the current law which provides
that pre-war home owners and occupancy right holders have the right to reclaim their
homes immediately if illegally occupied; they are required to wait for the occupants to
find alternate accommodation only if the occupants had been lawfully granted occupancy rights.
Id. at section 5.3, entitled Bodies Responsible for Housing Matters in Sarajevo.
179. Muslim-majority Konjić is a UNHCR “model city”: one that is ostensibly more willing to receive returning minorities than other municipalities. Despite that status, returns are
effectively stalled due to municipal officials’ opposition:
Of the 101 cases of double occupancy UNHCR presented to the housing department,
54 could be resolved immediately and would allow for the return of minorities. Housing
authorities claimed that by the end of May 1998 there had been 31 evictions but, according to UNHCR, as of 30 April 1998, there had been only one eviction. By the end of
May 1998, the housing department could provide UNHCR with written confirmation of
only ten evictions.
The secretary of the housing department has stated that he fears a negative reaction if
he enforces evictions, and has claimed that he is already viewed as not defending Bosniacs . . . .
International monitors note that housing officials have raised the bogus issue of reciprocal returns, stating that minorities can return to Konjić when Bosniacs displaced in
Konjić can return to their homes in Croat- and Serb-controlled areas.
International Crisis Group, The Konjić Conundrum: Why Minorities Have Failed To Return
To Model Open City, section 2.2.1., entitled Obstruction by the Housing Department and
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does not have a new property law, and its practice has remained
consistent.
VI. THE IMPLIED CONSTITUTION: RULE OF LAW AND
RULES OF DECISION IN BOSNIA
There is no question that the legal systems existing in Bosnia today do not operate according to norms generally recognized in
other industrialized countries, or even in other post-communist
countries of Eastern Europe. The social dislocation and high levels
of criminalization that accompanied the war have co-opted or marginalized much of the former legal system. Nonetheless, the current
legal systems in Bosnia are informed by norms. These internal legal
systems, in turn, function far more effectively than the still moribund organs of the international legal system in Bosnia. Bosnia is
far from being a Rechtsstaat, 180 and if one were forced to choose a
single phrase to describe the state of property rights there, it would
hardly be “ruled by law.” However, one is not limited to a single
phrase. The state of property rights in Bosnia is far more nuanced,
though not necessarily more positive.
Bosnia is not ruleless. The country has been at peace, however
uneasily, since late 1995. What is lacking in Bosnia is not the rule
of law 181 , but the rule of a particular kind of law that enshrines the
rights of the individual.
Definitions of the rule of law vary widely, but most involve procedural notions of fair, consistent treatment and predictability. 182 In
addition, several definitions share an emphasis on the importance of
the individual and his or her rights. 183 Indeed, many observers conDelays by Other Authorities—Double-Occupancy Cases (June 19, 1998)
<http://www.crisisweb.org>.
180. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1/2 EJIL/JEDI 4 (1990)
(defining Rechtsstaat as a “Rule of Law state”).
181. The rule of law encompasses norms of fair and equal treatment, not simply correct
promulgation. I am not referring simply to a “legal enactment” standard, according to which
the bare fact of procedurally correct enactment of regulations satisfies the requirements of the
rule of law. Cf. J. Dugard, Human Rights and the South African Legal Order 43 (1978), discussed in James L. Gibson & Amanda Gouws, Support for the Rule of Law in Emerging
South African Democracy, 152 Int’l Soc. Sci. J. 173, 176 (1997).
182. One scholar has argued that
[s]ome have traced the modern ideal to Aristotle, who equated the Rule of Law with the
rule of reason; . . . In another famous account—perhaps the most influential of the past
half-century—Lon L. Fuller argued that the Rule of Law requires publicly promulgated
rules, laid down in advance, and adherence to at least some natural-law values.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1997) (citation omitted).
183. “Within the Anglo-American tradition, perhaps the most famous exposition [of the
rule of law] came from a turn-of-the-century British lawyer, A.V. Dicey, who associated the
Rule of Law with rights-based liberalism and judicial review of governmental action.”
Fallon, supra note 182, at 1 (citation omitted); id., at 1–2, n.4 (noting scholars who have
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sider a notion of rule of law that incorporates individual rights
fairly uncritically as a good and an end in itself. 184 Certainly it is
both appealing and reassuring to make that linkage, and if that is
what is meant by rule of law, then it is most assuredly absent in
Bosnia. “Collectivizing, ethnically based group law” better characterizes the legislation passed during and since the war, although
almost never is it so explicitly stated.
In fact, however, what has come to be understood as the rule of
law in Western academic discourse includes both legal process and
legal content, 185 but the two aspects are analytically unrelated.
Some elements of the common conception—consistent and neutral
application, coherence, and transparency—are probably universal
attributes of any meaningful conception of the rule of law. 186 How-

“identified the rule of law with natural law or respect for transcendental rights”).
184. See, e.g., Ellen S. Cohn & Susan O. White, Legal Socialization Effect on Democratization, in 152 Int’l Soc. Sci. J. 151, 153 (1997) (linking liberal democracy to the rule of law
ideal, and noting the “rigidity of Western liberal legality” and that “the predominantly AngloAmerican/Western model of law under liberal democracy may be too narrow or restrictive to
be adapted easily to less individualistic, more authoritarian, and more ethnically divided
traditions”); see also Louis Henkin, Elements of Constitutionalism, in 60 The Review: The
International Commission of Jurists 11 (1998).
185. See Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in The Authority of Law: Essays on
Law and Morality 210, 224 (1979) (distinguishing substantive and formalist conceptions of
the rule of law).
Some authors . . . make a distinction between the formal and the material Rechtsstaat. In
the former the authorities are bound by the rules of positive law, in the latter they . . . are
also bound by the dictates of justice. In a material Rechtsstaat the rulers must not only
act according to the law, but the law itself must respect the rules of justice. . . . Unfortunately the notion of the material Rechtsstaat is difficult to apply in practice.
R.C. van Caenegem, An Historical Introduction to Western Constitutional Law 15 (1995)
186. See Gibson & Gouws, supra note 181, at 174.
[L]aw is sovereign over all authority . . . law must be clear and certain in its content and
accessible and predictable . . . law must be general in its application . . . there exists an
independent judiciary charged with the interpretation and application of the law to
which every aggrieved citizen must have a right to access . . . the law must have procedural and ethical content.
Id.
Richard Fallon lays out a proposed core description of the rule of law which is mostly procedural in nature; it identifies
[T]hree . . . purposes—against which competing definitions or conceptions can be
tested—[which] appear central. First, the Rule of Law should protect against anarchy
and the Hobbesian war of all against all. Second, the Rule of Law should allow people
to plan their affairs with reasonable confidence that they can know in advance the legal
consequences of various actions. Third, the Rule of Law should guarantee against at
least some types of official arbitrariness.
Against the background of these purposes, leading modern accounts generally emphasize five elements that constitute the Rule of Law. To the extent that these elements exist, the Rule of Law is realized.
(1) The first element is the capacity of legal rules, standards, or principles to guide
people in the conduct of their affairs. People must be able to understand the law and
comply with it.
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ever, many go beyond these procedural aspects to explicitly incorporate substantive values, such as respect for individual rights, into
the rule of law. 187
This willingness to incorporate substantive values into the procedural ideal of the rule of law is part of a larger conceptual and ideological trend. This trend is a move “away from the Rechtsstaat . . .
into a society in which social conflict is increasingly met with
flexible, contextually determined standards and compromises . . .
[a] turn away from general principles and formal rules into contextually determined equity.” 188 This urge is understandable. Valued
moral and ideological aims can be strengthened and secured by entrenching them in legal institutions with their “solemnity of effects.” 189 Critiques based only on procedural grounds risk missing
strategic opportunities to confront substantive abuses. 190 For this
(2) The second element of the Rule of Law is efficacy. The law should actually guide
people, at least for the most part. In Joseph Raz’s phrase, “people should be ruled by the
law and obey it.”
(3) The third element is stability. The law should be reasonably stable, in order to facilitate planning and coordinated action over time.
(4) The fourth element of the Rule of Law is the supremacy of legal authority. The
law should rule officials, including judges, as well as ordinary citizens.
(5) The final element involves instrumentalities of impartial justice. Courts should be
available to enforce the law and should employ fair procedures.
Fallon, supra note 182, 7–9 (citation omitted). The purposes and elements Fallon proposes as
a core definition may suggest certain substantive values, but they are generally procedural in
nature.
187. See Gibson & Gouws, supra note 181, at 173–75 (discussing scholarly efforts to distinguish South Africa’s legal system as not based on the rule of law because it violated individual human rights).
188. Koskenniemi, supra note 180, at 56.
189. Stanley Hoffman comments that
[l]aw has a distinct solemnity of effects: it is a normative instrument that creates rights
and duties. Consequently, it has a function that is both symbolic and conservative; it enshrines, elevates, consecrates the interests or ideas it embodies. We understand, thus,
why law is an important stake in the contests of nations. What makes international law
so special a tool for states is this solemnity of effects, rather than the fact that its norms
express common interests; for this is far too simple: some legal instruments such as
peace treaties reflect merely the temporary, forced convergence of deeply antagonistic
policies. A situation of dependence or of superiority that is just a fact of life can be reversed through political action, but once it is solemnly cast in legal form, the risks of action designed to change the situation are much higher: law is a form of policy that
changes the stakes, and often “escalates” the intensity, of political contests; it is a constraint comparable to force in its effects.
Stanley Hoffman, The Study of International Law and the Theory of International Relations
57 Proc. Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 26 (1963).
190. See Koskenniemi, supra note 180, at 57.
[I]ssues of contextual justice cannot be solved by the application of ready-made rules or
principles. Their solution requires venturing into fields such as politics, social and economic casuistry which were formally delimited beyond the point at which legal argument was supposed to stop in order to remain ‘legal.’ . . . Resolutions based on political
acceptability cannot be made with the kind of certainty post-Enlightenment lawyers
once hoped to attain. And yet, it is only by their remaining so which will prevent their
use as apologies for tyranny.
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reason, the core procedural conception of the rule of law has expanded to include substantive values concerning the dignity of all
human beings and the maintenance of specific human rights—to the
point where many commentators take such values to be the very
core of the rule of law.
While the incorporation of substantive values into the ideal of the
rule of law may be attractive, individual values should not be included in the core definition of the ideal. 191 An application of the
core procedural attributes of the rule of law to the individual as opposed to some other subject is no more necessary to a functioning
and internally fair legal system than a jury of one’s peers is to a fair
trial. It is one expression—perhaps the one the Western community
wishes to favor—but by no means the only possible, logical, or
even reasonable one. Other forms of legal content—by which I
mean the subject matter of the law as opposed to its processes—can
well be envisioned: the state, the nation, 192 class or caste, membership in an occupation or guild, religion, race, gender, 193 age,
alienage, or category of sexual orientation. 194
Id. See also note 187, supra, concerning scholars’ efforts to condemn Apartheid-era South
Africa on explicit “rule of law” grounds incorporating individual rights analysis.
191. In making this assertion, I obviously identify with conceptions of the rule of law that
are formalist and procedural, rather than substantive and material. As I have suggested above,
the procedural aspects of the rule of law are most closely identified with its core definition,
while substantive aspects, though commonly included, are peripheral to and analytically
separate from that core definition. Fallon, for example, in attempting a synthesis of various
conceptions of the rule of law, nonetheless prioritizes the procedural: of his four ideal types
of the rule of law, three are principally procedural or formalist in essence, and only one substantive; moreover, his synthesis purposefully places these four in a hierarchy with the substantive ideal in the last position:
For at least two reasons, the substantive commitments of a theory of the Rule of Law
ought to be minimized. First, in light of the persistent fact of moral disagreement, the
Rule of Law requires a considerable willingness of public officials to “enforce the [positive] law even when it is in [their] confident opinion unjust, morally wrong, or misguided as a matter of policy.” . . . Second, a pervasively substantive conception of the
Rule of Law would risk obliteration of the analytically and politically useful distinction
between the Rule of Law, on the one hand, and a full theory of substantive justice, on
the other.
Fallon, supra note 182, at 53–54 (citation omitted). But see id. at 55 (“But a sound theory of
the Rule of Law, although emphasizing formal over substantive requirements, could not
wholly exclude substantive content.”).
192. See Hitler, supra note 2.
193. American “suspect class” and “quasi-suspect class” analysis, though it does not go to
core political rights, nonetheless accords meaningfully different legal status to individuals
wholly based on their membership in racial or gender groups. Likewise, the distinctions made
between citizens and aliens in American law do not seem understandable solely within the
context of law focused on the individual—though again, the differences do not extend as
deeply into the realm of core rights as do the differences in Bosnia.
194. Even theories of the rule of law that incorporate substantive values, as does Fallon’s,
do not necessarily require an application to all individuals. Fallon argues
Perfectly realized, the Rule of Law would be rule (i) in accordance with the originally
intended and understood meaning of the directives of legitimate, democraticallyaccountable lawmaking authorities, (ii) cast in the form of intelligible rules binding on
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A state under the rule of law is not always an admirable thing,
nor is it always a benefit to its populace. 195 More to the point, a
state need not accord equal recognition to every individual within
its ambit to comport with the rule of law. The British judicial tradition continued to operate throughout the apartheid era in South Africa, generally applying transparent, predictable rule-based law to
its white citizens, even while its black citizens received wholly different treatment. 196 Even Nazi Germany exhibited the essential elements of a Rechtsstaat, by any reasonable definition of the term. 197
It had clear and codified laws, derived from declared and elaborated
principles (the Führerprinzip, racial biology, the inherent inferiority
and threatening nature of the Jew, the distinction between the
Staatsangehörigen and Reichsbürger, 198 the subordination of the
individual to the Volk) that, in general, were consistently applied.199
What matters in a system bound by the rule of law is that its subcitizens, governmental officials, and judges alike, (iii) as identified and elucidated in an
interpretive process guided by publicly accessible norms and characterized by reasongiving, and (iv) consistent with legitimate public purposes and sound, shared principles
of political morality. When law, in the positivist sense, fails to satisfy any of these elements, the Rule of Law is less than completely realized, but still may (or may not) be
more nearly approximated than it is scorned or abandoned.
Fallon, supra note 182, at 38. Here the substantive values are revealed in the requirement of
democratic process and in the “shared principles of public morality.” However, democracy
may be realized internally, within the confines of a group defined by other, restrictive means.
Likewise, a requirement concerning “public morality” is silent as to the content of that morality, requiring only that it be public, or shared.
195. See Gibson & Gouws, supra note 181, at 173 (“[L]aw can serve repression just as it
can serve freedom.”); id. at 175 (noting that authoritarianism is not incompatible with the
rule of law).
196. Many scholars deny that South Africa exhibited any traces of the rule of law. Attempts to distinguish South Africa’s legal system rely, however on the importation of individual rights analysis. See Gibson & Gouws, supra note 181, at 177 (outlining the extensive
efforts by scholars to distinguish South Africa’s legal system).
[M]ost scholars are in agreement that the apartheid regime in South Africa had little legitimate claim to rule by law. Even where laws were adopted in a procedurally correct
fashion, they either violated fundamental rights, including the right to be treated equally
by one’s government, or they extended so much discretion to authorities that power
could not be exercised in a universal fashion. . . . [O]nly in the most perverse sense
could the old regime be seen as being constrained by the rule of law.
Id. (emphasis added). Certainly grants of discretion tend to violate core conceptions of the
rule of law, but the criticism that the government denied individuals “fundamental rights” or
failed to “treat equally” simply begs the questions: Who is an individual? Who is a subject of
the law?
197. See Gibson & Gouws, supra note 181, at 175 (noting the existence of a “Nazi jurisprudence”); see generally Bullock, supra note 2 (discussing Nazi legal and political organization). But see van Caenegem, supra note 185, at 247 (noting that both the Soviet and Nazi
regimes “rejected the Rechtsstaat, or rule of law, as no individual could possibly have the
right to stand up to the state and its ideology . . . .”).
198. Id. at 289–90.
199. It might be objected that the Gestapo, the SS, and the Wehrmacht committed many
horrible acts that not even German law of the time sanctioned. Yet, even if those acts are
discounted, the deeds executed in full accordance with Nazi law were among the most horrible imaginable. Nor is it a valid objection to say that because international law and norms
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that its subjects—however they are constituted or selected—be
treated equally and fairly. The rule of law, as a conceptual ideal, is
silent as to how to choose those subjects. 200
If, then, rule of law is taken to mean a coherent, rational, and
consistent set of laws equally applied to whoever is a subject before
the law, then there is at least the core of a Rechtsstaat—however
twisted, unappealing, and cynical—in all three parts of Bosnia.
Those who would criticize the human rights records of the regimes
there have to find a different register in which to lift their voices, a
different rhetoric with which to lay bare the rotting flesh beneath
the thin but opaque robes of law.

proscribe much of what the Nazis codified, their system cannot be considered one of the rule
of law. These norms were in part developed (or retroactively discovered) as a response to the
actions of the Nazi regime, and to its self-evidently successful codification of its actions in
national law. The international legal order may be treated as universal, but that does not make
it the sole possessor of any attribute that may be deemed desirable in or necessary to a legal
order. Indeed, this only proves that what is really meant by “rule of law” is “rule of one kind
of law”—a humanistic law of and for the individual. The uncomfortable reality is that the
principles of Nuremberg, and of the post-war human rights regime, only came to have “universal” authority following the military destruction of the principal opposing ideology. However noble their aspirations, they remain the fruits of the victors: they are spoils of war.
200. The example of the antebellum United States shows this point: the United States had
well developed judicial systems dispensing substantively and procedurally fair justice to
those citizens included in the polity, while effectively excluding others. It would be inapt to
say that there was no “rule of law” in that society, imbued as it was with the deepest traditions of the Anglo-American legal system. When, for example, slavery was abolished, and
later segregation dismantled, blacks were accorded the same rights that whites already had. It
was not the case that those rights needed to be created anew because some segment of the
population had not until that time enjoyed them. The language of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 is illuminating in this regard. Section I provides: “[a]ll citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982. Thus the Act assumed the existence of these rights in some perfected form and extended these rights to another group, without making any changes in them. (The Civil Rights
Act of 1866 was “passed pursuant to the thirteenth amendment and reenacted in 1870 after
passage of the fourteenth amendment.” Joseph William Singer, Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices 1002 (2d ed. 1997)). A critique of such a system must be formulated on
substantive, not procedural, grounds.
An excellent example of this principle is found in a different sphere in contemporary
America: in the abortion debate. Anti-abortion advocates believe that the fetus is a human
being and therefore entitled to the rights and protections afforded to all human beings by the
Constitution. Pro-abortion advocates believe that the fetus is not a human being, and therefore not entitled to rights that trump those of women who are indisputably human beings
protected by the Constitution. See Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes 113–
38 (1990). One strand of pro-abortion thought, however, acknowledges the humanity of the
fetus but still maintains the social necessity and legal right to abort. This view is more difficult to reconcile with basic fairness requirements of the rule of law, but seems to operate on a
principle that balances the rights of one human being—the woman—against those of another—the fetus, and essentially adopts a position similar to the traditional rule of no duty to
assist. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 47.

1999 / The Dayton Accords and Bosnian Property Disputes

53

A. Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law
If the subjects of law, including individual human beings and
their rights, cannot be conceptualized on the level of the rule of law,
where can they be conceptualized? Judgments about whom the law
shall recognize as its subject are properly made at the constitutional
level. “Constitutions are often battle grounds for the very societies
whose most fundamental values they seek to embody. Questions of
inclusion, exclusion, and legitimacy provide the skirmishes and
encounters from which the transcendent virtues of identity, liberty,
and democracy emerge.” 201
There is a strong conceptual connection between the idea of a
constitution—defined as the “fundamental law” of a country “regulating the system of government” 202 —and the idea of the rule of
law. 203 Both privilege law over politics and commit their subjects to
continue their social relations within a pre-established framework
rather than as an open-ended contest. 204 Their roles, too, are intertwined and complementary: the choice of a system ruled by law is
surely a constitutional choice, while a constitution itself can be a
commitment to law’s rule. Yet the two are distinct as well, and one
may understand the distinction as one of substance and process: a
201. Eric Harrold Wunderman, Book Note, 21 Yale J. Int’l L. 243 (1996) (reviewing Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference and Legitimacy (Michael Rosenfeld ed., 1994)).
202. Stanley de Smith & Rodney Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law 4
(1998). A constitution may not necessarily literally regulate government: “[P]ossibly in all
. . . constitutions, there exists a wide difference between the actual state of government and
the theory. The one results from the other; but still they are different.” William Paley, Moral
Philosophy, Book VI, ch. vii, in A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution 9 n.1 (1924). Obviously, the actual constitution must be addressed, not the paper
one.
203. See Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, Comment on Relationships Between the Human
Rights Movement and Democratic Government, in International Human Rights in Context
658, 660 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 1996) (noting the linkages between constitutionalism, democratic governance, and the rule of law); Henkin, supra note 184, at 11
(“[M]odern prescriptive constitutions reflect and give rise to . . . ‘the rule of law.’”); Louis
Henkin, The Origins and the Present Interest of the United States Constitution, in The New
Constitutional Law (International Association of Constitutional Law, Second World Congress
1991) at 296. Henkin cites a Professor Sokolewicz’s list of
basic values reflected in the [U.S.] Constitution [which he] commends . . . even to Socialist states . . . includ[ing]: The rule of law, not of men; limitations on government,
and of democracy, even at the expense of efficiency; the separation if not of powers then
of competence and responsibility; judicial and quasi-judicial implementation of constitutional guarantees; the need to reconcile the permanence and stability of a constitutional
text with juridical precision in its formulation; and making constitutional amendment
difficult.
Id. Fallon, supra note 182, at 24–26 (analyzing the use of various conceptions of the rule of
law in American constitutional debate).
204. Consider, for example, Fuller’s assertion that the failure of rule of law in the procedural incarnation he espoused leads to the collapse of the whole legal system and to the dissolution of the “bond of reciprocity” between government and citizen: a constitutional consequence. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 33–41 (1964).
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constitution defines the subjects of a system, while the rule of law
establishes procedures by which that system treats its subjects. In a
sense, while the rule of law informs the “how,” only the constitution
can establish the “who.”
Constitutions are therefore by their nature politically substantive
instruments, yet the idea of a constitution does not presume any
particular political formulation. Instead a constitution can establish
any form of relation between its choice of subjects. Nonetheless,
given their close conceptual relationship, it is hardly surprising that
scholars have also sought to imbue the idea of a constitution with
particular substantive values analytically distinct from its core conceptions, just as they have done with the rule of law: 205
[I]n general, modern prescriptive constitutions reflect and give
rise to “constitutionalism” and “the rule of law.” Constitutionalism is nowhere authoritatively defined, but, as commonly
used, a constitution designed to reflect constitutionalism will
have common elements, with variations. It declares the sovereignty of the people and derives its authority from the will of
the people. 206
Evidently, constitutionalism, whether commonly or authoritatively defined, has taken on distinct qualities derived from a particular liberal and humanistic tradition. 207 There is no necessary
analytical connection, however, between these liberal and democratic values and the idea of a constitution. 208
205. See Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, Comment on Constitutions and Constitutionalism, in International Human Rights in Context supra note 203 at 710, 711.
Scholars frequently use the term ‘constitutionalism’ to describe a particular genus of
constitutional system. This fluid term is put to many different uses; there is no consensus over exact content, although most of the scholarly discourse would agree on the core
meaning. Constitutionalism . . . refers to a constitutional system that falls within the liberal tradition . . . and possesses many characteristics of the democratic state.
Id.; see also Radhika Coomaraswamy, Uses and Usurpation of Constitutional Ideology, in
Constitutionalism and Democracy 159, 160 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993) (“[T]he
term ‘constitutionalism’ will be used broadly, both in its ideological sense and to imply a
process and style of decision making specific to the genre of constitutions drafted in the
Anglo-American tradition of jurisprudence.”).
206. Henkin, supra note 184, at 11–12 (noting also periodic elections and bills of individual rights as elements of a constitution).
207. See The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen art. 16 (France 1789), in
Henkin, supra note 184, at 13 (“[A]ny society in which rights are not guaranteed, or in which
the separation of powers is not defined, has no constitution.”); id. at 14–19; id. at 21 (identifying respect for individual human rights as integral to constitutionalism); Steiner & Alston,
supra note 203, at 711 (identifying linkages between constitutionalism and human rights).
208. Steiner and Alston explain:
A ‘constitution’ . . . need not follow any particular structure, impose or reflect any particular political or economic system or ideology, or prescribe any particular form of
government. It may be democratic or authoritarian, oriented to private property and
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The use of constitutionalism to refer solely to the liberal constitutional tradition does not necessarily encumber alternative constitutional forms with any negative connotations. If the term constitutionalism is used, however, to implicitly critique or exclude other
forms as non-constitutional because they do not demonstrate the
qualities of constitutionalism so defined, it must be recognized as
an ideologically motivated definitional hijacking. 209 Just as with
their treatment of the rule of law, when scholars include particular
substantive values deriving from the liberal tradition in the core
definition of constitutionalism, they “solemnize” those values and
give to them the imprimatur of neutral truth. At the same time, these
scholars attain a position from which they can “neutrally” critique
legal systems that in fact comport with all the procedural elements
of constitutionalism, but not with the scholars’ own substantive values.
Just as with the rule of law, such an approach—whatever advantages it yields in seizing the debate—takes one far from the core
conception of what is, indeed what can be, encompassed within the
idea of constitutionalism. If, then, a set of understandings, rules,
procedures, and practices can be identified that serve to order a society in much the same way as a classical, written constitution, then
those understandings, rules, procedures, and practices should be
engaged on their own terms. They should be acknowledged for
what they are: an effective, though unwritten, constitution. 210
B. Bosnia’s Rules of Decision
In this section, I outline the practical norms of Bosnian property
dispute resolution as evidence of unstated, normative constitutional
assumptions informing the domestic systems. I refer to these features as “rules of decision;” they are descriptive of the extant (legal)
system of property decision, even in those aspects where they depart from comfortably familiar legal principles.

markets or to collective ownership and central direction, multi-party or one-party, attentive or not to individual rights, and so on.
Steiner & Alston, supra note 203, at 710–11.
209. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 182, at 23 (noting objections to a “substantive ideal” of
the rule of law that this conception turns the rule of law into a “partisan” ideal).
210. This is exactly what scholars do in regard to “the exception”—the United Kingdom,
which has no written constitution. See, e.g., Coomaraswamy, supra note 205.
There is no document or group of documents called the British constitution. But since
Britain has a regular system of government, with a complex of rules defining the composition, function and interrelationship of the institutions of government, and delineating the rights and duties of the governed, Britain does have a constitution and a body of
constitutional law, if these terms are used in a broader sense.
de Smith & Brazier, supra note 202, at 6.
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I argue that, taken as a whole, they constitute a kind of legal system that, however unpalatable in its substance, does embody the
necessary elements that the name requires: systematized, rational,
understandable, predictable, and, to an unfortunate degree, workable, survivable and able to replicate itself. These are terms to describe separate societies, separate states; though human rights
norms are meant to apply universally, a state’s sovereignty has
never been reduced to a nullity in the calculation, and consequently
the empirical recognition that some entity is effectively sovereign
cannot be simply ignored or assumed away. 211 It is an open question whether, and how, such systems can readily absorb the added

211. Cf. Donnelly, supra note 13. It might well be appropriate to discuss theories relating
state sovereignty and human rights at this juncture, but I will only note them in passing. Even
if one establishes the elements of an illiberal constitution in Bosnia, it might still be objected
that international law and human rights have precedence.
Classical theories of the state system emphasized each state’s autonomy. In the post-war
period, however, various theories have posited a universal obligation for states to comport
with international law, in effect limiting their sovereignty. See generally R.B.J. Walker &
Saul Mendlovitz, Interrogating State Sovereignty, in Contending Sovereignties: Redefining
Political Community 1 (Walker & Mendlovitz eds., 1990). Most specifically, the modern
human rights regime is generally acknowledged to trump claims to absolute state sovereignty.
See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 Am. J. Int’l L. 866, 869 (1990) quoting the United Nations Charter (“[N]o
serious scholar still supports the contention that internal human rights are ‘essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state’ and hence insulated from international law.”)
In the present world there is no doubt that the few rules of generally recognized international law must have supremacy over national law. The generally recognized rules of international law must have supremacy over national law not only in regard to a new
world order but also in regard to the modern relationship of states if this relationship
should be a legal one.
Felix Ermacora, General Problems of Relations between Constitutional Law and International Law, in The New Constitutional Law, at 270 (International Association of Constitutional Law, Second World Congress, 1991).
As a matter of theory, this seems indisputable. However, as I shall show, I am posing a
more practical question: Given that, whatever the preeminence of international legal norms in
theory, the states that in fact exist are not constitutionally inclined to accept those norms, how
does one formulate a criticism of and an opposition to those states? Does it make sense to
formulate one’s criticism within the theoretical framework—that is, to call the state into
compliance—or outside of it—that is, to oppose the state’s very existence as being antithetical to the theoretical framework itself? Such an approach does not rely on arguments about
law and sovereignty, but rather locates its essential critique on the plane of politics and morality—in much the same way that commentators have suggested that law-based critiques or
responses to the Nazi regime are completely inapposite.
In 1948, the British prosecutor at Nuremberg, Sir Hartley Shawcross, dismissed UN deliberations on the adoption of the Genocide Convention as a “complete delusion,” stressing that “nobody believed that the existence of a convention . . . would have deterred the
Nazis or Fascists from committing the atrocious crimes of which they had been guilty.”
He was of the view that “genocide committed by States was punishable only by war.”
Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on
the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 Hum. Rts. Q. 737, 743 (1998) citing Official
Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly Part I Legal Questions, Summary
Records of Meetings 21 Sept.–10 Dec. 1948, U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d Sess., 64th mtg.,
at 17 (1948).
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terms of Dayton’s human rights regime, or why, in the aftermath of
their wars of liberation, they would be willing to do so. 212
1. Ethno-Patriotic Status
The Law recognizes not only the legal merits of a case but also
the legal status of the parties; ethnicity above all else, but also
patriotic participation in the defense of the State, are defining
factors in weighing the case.
The merits of the parties to a dispute shall be considered as much
as the merits of their cases. This is the core constitutional principle
of the new ethno-territorial statelets.
This military and group-oriented preference has conceptual
antecedents in the antebellum regime. 213 Consider the nature of
socially owned property in the former regime: it was controlled by
the state or municipality, and distributed to individual members for
their long-term use, based on their needs and their merit. A baseline
political acceptability was a prerequisite for getting an apartment,
just as it was for a job or a position in university. 214 It is hardly
surprising that the successor regimes, only a few years later, operate
along very much the same lines in distributing property. It is only a
very small jump to extend those rules to administratively and
judicially reviewable questions of restoration and compensation,
and to include ethnicity as a criterion—something the old regime
only did when it was seeking to ensure political stability and to
stabilize the ethnic balance. 215
The regulations governing distribution of abandoned property in
all three zones specifically favor veterans and wartime invalids, or
212. “How anyone can expect the participants of a vicious, genocidal war to consent to
and participate in the creation and maintenance of a supposedly civic state is a mystery.”
George Schöpflin, Yugoslavia and the West: Getting It Wrong, 58 War Report (Feb.-Mar.
1998), at 19.
213. See Williams, supra note 13, at 64–66 (discussing the use of the “ethnic key” in distributing high government positions); Pajić, The Dayton Constitution, supra note 5, at 192
(“Preoccupation with the rights of ethnic groups reflects the transition from communist to
nationalist collectivism, where the despotism of the ‘one and only’ ruling party is replaced by
the despotism of presupposed (ethnic) interests.”).
214. Interview with attorney, in Doboj, RS, BiH (Dec. 1996) (Name and precise date withheld to protect anonymity of source.).
215. Ethnicity was obviously never far from the minds of Yugoslavia’s former leadership,
as evidenced by its efforts to maintain ethnic parity in the political and industrial leadership.
These efforts did not affect the common citizenry nearly so much, and at any rate, the goal of
nationalities policy under Tito was to contain and ultimately deracinate the ethnic issue, at
least to the degree that it might represent an alternate source of social or political legitimacy
or authority. See, e.g., Separating History from Myth: An Interview with Ivo Banac, in Why
Bosnia?, supra note 11, at 142–44. Under the present regimes, contrariwise, the aim is to
accentuate and give primacy to ethnicity as the ruling principle.
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their families. 216 This might be compared to the discounted loan
programs available to U.S. veterans, though not favorably; here, the
stakes are considerably higher, and include advantages in the resolution of disputes before a court—a judicial advantage, not simply
an administrative benefit or financial incentive.
The Muslim and Croat governments in particular effectively incorporated this mixed ethno-patriotic posture into its legislation.
Their use of participation in the “patriotic defense” or “the aggressor’s army” as criteria for full political membership, during and
immediately after a war mobilizing populations around ideals of
ethnic solidarity, is tantamount to determining the polity along ethnic lines; the few exceptions 217 only prove the rule. The Serb legislation, being the most consistently ethnic in formulation, is consequently also the least generous to patriotic citizens of other ethnicities.
The practice of local officials, even in the absence of statutory
authorization, sometimes reflects the ethno-patriotic sensibility; in
Odžak, a Croat-controlled territory, for example, “Local authorities
will permit the return of Bosniacs if they were original inhabitants
216. Law on the Use of Abandoned Property art. 15, 30, 52, 61, reported in Republika
Srpska Official Gazette, year V, no. 3 (Feb. 27, 1996); Law on Abandoned Apartments
(RBiH), art. 7; Decree on Abandoned Apartments (H-B), art. 8, 11; Decision on Establishment of Basic Criteria for Assignment of Apartments for Use (H-B), art. 1.
217. The most prominent example is perhaps Dražen Erdemović, an ethnic Croat who
fought with the Serb forces which occupied Srebrenica and participated in the subsequent
mass killings. Erdemović was later tried and convicted before the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. See Prosecutor v. Erdemović, International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-96-22 (Trial Chamber Judgment Nov. 19,
1996, Appeals Chamber Judgment remitting for re-sentencing Oct. 7, 1997, Trial Chamber
Judgment on re-sentencing Mar. 5, 1998) <http://www.un.org/icty/cases.htm>. See also Akhavan, supra note 211 at 791.
In any event, the rule as stated includes the concept of “patriotism,” and indeed each of the
three laws includes preferences for veterans, which may—and in the case of the Muslims
actually did on occasion—include members of other ethnic groups. (“The system is designed
to favor those who remained and defended the country. Criteria include: looking after those
who stayed and soldiers’ families. Ethnicity is the basis; yet, if you are a Serb who stayed,
and you walk into the right court, you might do okay. It comes down to who you know . . . .
If you’re a vet, you’ll do well.” Interview with UNHCR official, in Sarajevo, Fed BiH (Jan.
1997) (Name and precise date withheld to protect anonymity of source.). This may be seen as
a partial abrogation of the ethnic thesis; on the other hand, since the “exception” for fighters
involves an immediate and tangible contribution to the survival of the country, which in turn
serves the general ethnic good, it is not inconsistent in the larger context. Cf. Boyd, supra
note 5, at 48 (“Even refugees who return to majority areas are unwelcome, branded as cowards who fled in time of danger.”).
Nonetheless, even the value of veteran status is limited in the face of consistent application
of the ethnic logic of the regimes. Even the most multi-ethnic of the three statelets has not
allowed patriotic service to trump the ethnic hierarchy where it matters most: “the Sarajevo
government retired most of its top Serbian and Croatian officers following the signing of the
Dayton agreements at the end of 1995.” Patrick Moore, Bosnian General Says Army Will Be
Multi-Ethnic, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline (Nov. 3, 1997)
<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1997/ 11/031197.html>.
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and particularly if they fought with HVO forces during the conflict.” 218
There are limits, perhaps most evident in the disposition in court
of suits for eviction brought by Muslims against Serb tenants in
Banja Luka, where the court, in the cases it has decided, almost always rules in favor of the (Muslim) owner. 219 Here the less activist
role of civil law judges comes into play. Existing law is ethnically
ambiguous on its surface, but clear enough about the path of ownership rights; barring a new law that overtly states this ethno-patriotic
rule for evictions, judges applying existing law have little choice
but to conclude in favor of the title owner, regardless of ethnicity.
When there is no ethnic factor, the courts are much freer to decide according to the written law. The organs of the international
community, or its fruits, also recognize that the crucial locus of law
and policy is ethnicity in their formulation of the problems they
confront. In an interview, for example, the Federation Ombudsman
in Mostar noted that “when [two disputants] are both Croat or both
Muslim, it’s a normal process—the police treat them normally . . .
the court takes care of it [such cases] . . . . This office just perhaps
asks to expedite the process.” 220
2. Reciprocity
No member of another ethnic group or entity may receive back
property presently held by a member of the dominant ethnic
group, unless that member receives back his own property or
its equivalent value.
In general, members of another ethnic group or entity shall not
receive back property presently held by members of the dominant
ethnic group until property taken from members of the dominant
ethnic group in areas held by the other group is returned; this principle is not personal, but general.
This formula, if adopted by all sides, obviously excludes any
state-sanctioned transactions at all, except perhaps simultaneous
218. UNHCR, supra note 7, at 3. This case is mostly unusual for the surprisingly moderate position regarding the return of other ethnic groups; usually, citing “original residence”
would hardly improve one’s case, as that was the basis for the initial expulsion. In another
respect, however, the example is not singular: many Muslims and Croats fought alongside
each other early in the conflict, especially before hostilities broke out between the HVO and
the ABiH in 1993.
219. Records of cases followed by the OSCE in the northern half of Republika Srpska
show that in 43 cases involving Muslim owner-plaintiffs decided in 1996, all but one was
decided in favor of the owner. Interview with OSCE human rights official, supra note 154.
220. Interview with Sefket Hadžihasanović, Federation Ombudsman, supra note 24.
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exchanges. It is certainly at least in part an intellectual ruse, a principle adopted simply for the sake of its practical result in forestalling any reform. Indeed, it is valid to ask how meaningful any of
the parties’ “commitment” to the principle of reciprocity is. Do they
not in fact merely speak of reciprocity as a way of forestalling any
returns in practice—that is, do they not really mean, “no returns,
ever”?
Perhaps that is true for some politicians—though that would only
strengthen the finding that there is a core ethno-patriotic logic in
operation—but there is evidence that many political actors do not in
fact mean “never,” that, while operating very much in the perceived
interest of their own ethnic groups, they also conceive of the dispute in terms of equal treatment and reciprocity. 221 The degree to
which administrators and legal professionals really adhere to this
principle cannot be dismissed; alongside its cynical efficacy, the
principle of reciprocity carries clear moral weight for many people,
including many people in power.
Reciprocity as a legal principle 222 is an excellent example of the
distinction between procedural and substantive rule of law. Nothing
in the principle of reciprocity offends notions of the rule of law,
once the substantive focus of rule of law is shifted from the individual to the group. In application, reciprocity in a judicial (or administrative) setting yields predictable, stable results; contesting
parties from the same given group will receive equal treatment before the court. This tends to support the proposition that the reciprocity can be a constitutional principle, and not necessarily just the
name for a set of convenience policies. 223

221. One set of local Serb officials dealing with (Serb) refugee resettlement demonstrated
the range of reactions: several of the men acknowledged that they would be prepared to allow
Muslims to return to their homes if and when Serb refugees were all able to return to their
homes in Croatia, thus freeing up housing stock. Note that the housing in question is already
“assigned,” and there is no sense that a Muslim/enemy’s claims are actionable until morally
prior claimants are otherwise satisfied. Another official—the director—declared angrily that
he would not allow their return, even then. Interviews with local refugee housing officials, in
Teslić, RS (Dec. 1996) (Names and dates withheld to protect anonymity of source.). The
largest group of Serb refugees in Bosnia and Yugoslavia were displaced from the Krajina
region of Croatia in 1995.
222. “Mutuality. The term is used to denote the relation existing between two states when
each of them gives the subjects of the other certain privileges, on condition that its own subjects shall enjoy similar privileges at the hands of the latter state. . . .” From Reciprocity, in
Black’s Law Dictionary 2170 (6th ed. 1990). See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (4th
ed. 1997) (noting the use of reciprocity in international law and relations.).
223. See id. (noting the pragmatic application of the principal of reciprocity in discouraging states from always seeking short-term gains, as it acts as “an inducement to states to act
reasonably and moderate demands in the expectation that this will similarly encourage other
states to act reasonably and so avoid confrontations”).
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Reciprocity is declared overtly as a principle of Republika Srpska
legislation: 224
Article 42 conditions the return of the property to its owners,
on the existence of similar legislation and practice in the other
entity and in the Republic of Croatia—that is, in the places
from which Serbs have fled. Accordingly, even if an individual
Muslim or Croat fulfills all the conditions for reclaiming his
property, the general rule of reciprocity from Art. 42 can prevent the former owner from repossessing his property. 225
The Muslim legislation does not state a principle of reciprocity as
such, though its practical effect has been much the same. Moreover,
the ongoing return of several hundred thousand refugees to the
Muslim sector will surely increase pressure on the government to
use all available property to house its own core constituency, rather
than to support the return of any Serbs or Croats until Muslims can
return to areas under those groups’ control. In their dealings with
the international community, both the Serb and Muslim authorities
have consistently argued for a reciprocal approach to returns. 226
224. Law on the Use of Abandoned Property art. 42, reported in Republika Srpska Official Gazette, year V, no. 3 (Feb. 27, 1996).
225. OHR, Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance (RS), supra note 84, at 7.
226. A letter to UNHCR from the Republika Srpska Ministry for Refugees and Displaced
Persons states:
During the past period, the Republika Srpska has insisted that the parties do not interfere
in the free and voluntary choice of return locations on the part of refugees and displaced
persons.
The Republika Srpska has been against the practice to force refugees to stay in areas
of instability and existential uncertainty.
The Republika Srpska is against pressures exerted on refugees and displaced persons
to move to areas which do not provide the basic conditions for a normal life.
Therefore, the Republika Srpska and this Ministry have been persistent in the past period in the protection of those principles which originate from the general declaration on
human rights and Annexes 6 and 7 of the Dayton Agreement:
Rights cannot be given and realized in the case of one person or one family, if that
jeopardizes the rights of another person or family.
Analysis of Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement: Agreement on refugees and displaced persons
(Letter no. 01-05-3120/96 from Ljubiša Bladušić, Minister, Republika Srpska Ministry for
Refugees and Displaced Persons 2 (Oct. 8, 1996) and Letter no. 01-05-3120-1/96 from Ljubiša Bladušić, Minister, Republika Srpska Ministry for Refugees and Displaced Persons 2
(Oct. 8, 1996) in UNHCR, supra note 7, attachment). Cf. The Federation’s response on the
same issue: Noting what it sees as UNHCR’s and other implementing organizations’ failure
to apply the “same, objective, persistent, even inexorable approach towards the Administration of the Serb side as they have had towards the Administration of the Federation,” the
Federation cautions in a letter that these organizations risk “impeding the positive trend of
returns in the federation of B&H, thus contributing to even greater unbalance in the resolution of the problems of displaced persons and refugees in the whole territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.” The Ministry then calls for
[b]alance in the organization of return [which] has to be built up by synchronized action
of the Republic [i.e. Republika Srpska] and Federation Governments . . . The Republic
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Commenting on Republika Srpska legislation, OHR notes that
[The i]ntroduction of the principle of reciprocity violates the
foundations of the GFAP. Firstly, this is a principle known in
the international law, in application among different states. It is
unacceptable that two entities of one sovereign state base their
relations on the principle of reciprocity. 227
While it may be true, this statement merely shows that the leadership of Republika Srpska, to the degree that it is thinking in legal
and not purely instrumental terms, probably does consider itself to
represent exactly the kind of entity that the OHR acknowledges
does employ reciprocity: a state. To reply that Republika Srpska,
Herceg-Bosna, or the Muslim sector standing alone are not states is
simply to adopt a stance on a politically contested question; it is not
a position that can be derived from principle alone.

and Federation Governments have to agree with UNHCR . . . on the strategy and a strict
sequence of activities in the procedure of repatriation.
[This] implementation . . . implies:
Resume:
-A Programme of return of displaced persons and refugees needs . . . to be implemented
simultaneously in an equal manner in the entire territory of B&H.
-The return of displaced persons and refugees should be scheduled in such chronological
sequence in which they became refugees and the displaced.
...
-To stop the phenomenon of unbalanced practice and approach of various international
organizations and host countries to the return of displaced persons and refugees by establishing of a joint strategy.
Comments and suggestions of compliance/non-compliance with Annex 7 (Letter no. 013559/96 from Ferid Alić, Minister, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Federal Ministry
for Social Welfare, Displaced Persons and Refugees), Sept. 24, 1996, at 2, in UNHCR, supra
note 7, attachment.
Similarly,
Carlos Westendorp, the international community’s chief representative in Bosnia, rejected Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović’s attempt to attach conditions to the [Sarajevo]
[D]eclaration [calling for the return of 20,000 non-Muslims to Sarajevo]. Izetbegović
argued that if the Muslims must accept returnees, the Serbs must allow refugees to return to Banja Luka and the Croats must permit Serbs to come back to Knin. U.S. envoy
Robert Gelbard threatened to cut off financial aid to Sarajevo if property rights are not
clarified within two weeks.
Patrick Moore, Izetbegović Balks at Refugee Returns, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline
(Feb. 4, 1998) <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1998/02/040298.html>.
Even positive comments of return are routinely framed in terms of reciprocity:
Milorad Dodik and Edhem Bićakčić, prime ministers of Republika Srpska and the Federation respectively, welcomed the idea of the simultaneous return of refugees. “Only in
that way can we avoid risks of individual returns, which may be abused by those who
are ready to exploit people’s misfortunes for their particular political aims,” said Dodik.
Breaking Bosnia’s Refugee Circle, 5 Transitions 14 (June 1998).
227. OHR, Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance (RS), supra note 84, at 7.
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3. Retroactivity
Core property rights may be retroactively voided, created, or
redefined.
The right to property, defined by the state and devolved to individuals in the name of the people, exists to advance the welfare of
the whole society and may therefore be altered to ensure that it continues to serve that overriding function.
All of the principal laws affected property rights retroactively. 228
Commenting on the Republika Srpska law, the OHR notes that
The annulment of contracts has a retroactive effect, depriving
therefore the persons of their vested rights, acquired under
existing laws. Once again, this is in obvious contradiction with
[sic] the generally accepted principle of legal certainty.
Furthermore, the retroactive effect of these provisions does
not only affect the rights of the owner, but equally of the persons who entered the contract with him . . . . [T]he person who
has taken possession of abandoned real or movable property
without a decision on the allocation of the property for use will
be evicted . . . . 229
The post hoc nullification of occupancy rights in the Croat and
Muslim laws has much the same effect. 230
Retroactivity, though generally disfavored, 231 exists in at least
some forms, most notably in international law, where it has been
invoked to defend the validity of the Nuremberg trials; indeed, in

228. “‘Retroactive’ or ‘retrospective’ laws are generally defined from a legal viewpoint as
those which take away or impair vested rights acquired under existing laws, create new obligations, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in respect to the transactions or considerations already past . . . .” From Retroactive law, in Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 222,
at 1317.
A retrospective law has been defined as
[a] law which looks backward or contemplates the past; one which is made to affect acts
or facts occurring, or rights accruing, before it came into force. Every statute which
takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or
considerations already past. One that relates back to a previous transaction and gives it a
different legal effect from that which it had under the law when it occurred.
From Retrospective law, in Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 222, at 1317–18.
229. OHR, Law on the Use of Abandoned Property: Compliance (RS), supra note 84, at 8.
230. Law on Abandoned Apartments art. 1, reported in Official Gazette of the Republic of
Bosnia & Herzegovina no. 6/92; Decree on Deserted Apartments art. 1, reported in National
Gazette of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna no. 5/95.
231. “[Retroactive] laws may be unenforceable because violative of the ex post facto
clause of the U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 9, Cl. 3.” Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 184, at
1317.
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domestic legal systems, any change in law affects existing rights to
some degree. Its application is not fundamentally inconsistent with
the rule of law, although it does offend some favored aspects, such
as transparency and predictability.
More to the point, any project of constitutional reform, though
generally thought of as a prospective exercise, is necessarily a substantively retrospective intrusion as well. While retroactivity itself
is not inherently ethnic in focus, it is a necessary adjunct to a constitutional project that seeks to convert a system from an ethnically
neutral focus 232 to an ethnocentric focus.
4. State Urgency
Laws concerning a property transaction are not construed in a
manner that would jeopardize the defense and well-being of the
State. The definition of “defense and well-being of the State” is
broadly constructed.
The present property problems in Bosnia are not only a product
of the war; they are in part its cause. The parties, and especially the
Croats and Serbs, having recently conducted a punishing ethnoterritorial war, are not inclined to see their positions eroded from
within by court decisions ceding territory to their former adversaries; 233 moreover, there is no evidence that the judges themselves are
otherwise inclined. The principle of judicial deference in matters of
foreign policy and national defense is therefore quite strong, and
extends to what is normally thought of as a largely domestic matter—property rights—which in the context of this conflict has been
thoroughly “internationalized” (at least as between the parties) and
“militarized.”
The “States” referred to are not, of course, proper or recognized
states (except to the degree that the Republic of Bosnia and Herze232. Such a formulation does not describe Yugoslavia under Tito with any accuracy except by contrast to the present regimes.
233. Failing, or refusing, to take the domestic perspective into account produces pathways
of analysis that diverge meaningfully from their internally consistent logic. Consider this
comment on the Muslim legislation:
The existence of legislation such as the Law on Abandoned Apartments may only be
justified by a need to temporarily regulate the direct consequences of the war—to place
displaced persons in temporarily abandoned apartments, until their resettlement is possible. There is no need nor ground to permanently deprive a person, whose departure has
been caused by the war, of the only property right he could acquire under the former regime. In the absence of any legal justification for permanent loss of such property rights,
the Law is in violation of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR.
OHR, Law on Abandoned Apartments: Compliance (RBiH), supra note 76, at 7. Presumably
the actual justification, in the eyes of the legislation’s drafters, was a compelling state interest, or perhaps a compelling national interest.
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govina 234 and the Muslim regime were synonymous during the war
and remain largely so in the Dayton period): Republika Srpska is an
officially designated entity of the federal state, while Herceg-Bosna
is not recognized at all. Nonetheless, it is the domestic perception
that counts, and these entities definitely consider themselves to be
states, if only until such time as they can become provinces of their
neighboring mother countries. Any assessment of their internal dynamics and legitimation, including their view of judicial deference
to the “foreign policy” and defense apparatus, must take account of
this deeply held domestic perspective. That is, they are de facto
states.
Even granted this realistic view of their state-like nature, however, the notion of judicial deference should not be pushed too far:
unlike, say, a U.S. court that feels political and moral pressure to
defer, courts in Bosnia may often feel more direct pressure to refrain from perceived involvement in security interests. 235
5. Closed Consistency
As between members of the dominant ethnic group, where there
are no issues of political loyalty, the courts generally apply the
law as written and without interference. In these cases, execution is generally as prescribed in the law.
This might at first seem a specious formulation: to say that something is a certain way whenever it is not another way is tautological;
so too, here, to say that the court shall follow the principle of legality whenever it is not told not to, seems to be nothing more than to
say that the principle of legality is not honored. But that is exactly
the value of this distinction, for the issue is: How often, and how
much, is it dishonored? Are there clearly identifiable, predictable
and coherent realms in which the principle will be upheld, and in
which it will not? Here, the answer is mixed. The ethnic outer limit
is a clear one: the principle of consistency does not seem to be applied outside the ethnic group, except by the judiciary in narrow
234. Now only “Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
235. Most reports question the ultimate political independence of the judiciary, and, while
I have tried to suggest that the judiciary retains more independence than other organs of the
government, I agree with the consensus view that that independence is deeply compromised.
One example will suffice: OSCE organized a conference for judges in January 1997, in the
Muslim town of Tuzla. Not a single Serb or Croat judge attended; the invited Serb judges—
perhaps 50 people—all canceled on the morning of the conference. Reports at the time made
it clear that the judges had been instructed to decline the invitation. Interview with OSCE
democratization officer, in Tuzla, RS (Jan. 1997) (name and precise date withheld to protect
anonymity of source).
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circumstances. Within the ethnic limit, however—that is to say, in
disputes between two or more members of the ethnic majority—it is
entirely possible that the law as written will be applied without
prejudice. Rule of law cannot be conceptualized with respect to the
decisions about who shall be its subject; rule of law only applies a
posteriori to those who, by some other external and pre-existing
process, have been selected as subjects of the law. 236 This closed
consistency is a proof of the constitutional nature of the ethnoterritorial principle, not an exception to the rule of law.
6. Division of Legal and Executive Results
Except as noted above, execution of judicial judgments is a
discretionary matter of State policy.
Despite these various rules and limitations, judges do nonetheless
apply the written law, much of it inherited from or modeled on the
former Yugoslav system. Where compelling their findings to conform with state policy would be embarrassing or insupportable, the
preferred policy is simply to delay or refuse execution of the judgment.
As with the previous rule, it must be asked whether this can possibly be worked into a framework of legality: Can a government’s
refusal to heed or carry out its own judiciary’s decisions be called a
legal rule, or is it not instead the denial of the principle of legality?
Of course, it is precisely the latter; it seems to be the very definition of the absence of legal principles. And yet, the courts are not
entirely subordinated or suppressed; they continue to render judgments. Court judgments retain their declaratory effect, and may be
given effect at some future date. The independence of the judiciary—in the sense that it is at least independent enough to issue decisions that are not craven to political power, even if inefficacious—is one of the classic elements of the rule of law. 237 It is a
particular feature of the legal regime in Bosnia that the courts con-

236. The ombudsman in Mostar, speaking of the system in Croat West Mostar, noted that
“it’s a Croat system; it’s good only for the people who are Croats; it was born while the HDZ
was fighting[;]” he added that the parallel situation obtained in Muslim East Mostar, where
Croats cannot reclaim property. Interview with Sefket Hadžihasanović, Federation Ombudsman, supra note 24.
237. See Geoff Budlender, Law and Lawlessness in South Africa, in 4 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts.
139, 140 (1988) (identifying an independent judiciary as the key element distinguishing rule
of law from the unrestrained and arbitrary exercise of power); Gibson & Gouws, supra note
181, at 174 (noting that in a state of law “there exists an independent judiciary charged with
interpretation and application of the law to which every aggrieved citizen may have a right of
access . . . ”).
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tinue to operate, isolated from and alongside the political and executive processes. As one judge in Vareš, a predominantly Muslim
town, noted, “[b]efore the war, the procedure was the same, but the
practice different. There is no difference in regulation, only in
will.” 238
C. Constructing the Implied Constitution
The various factions in Bosnia have been under sustained pressure from the international community to produce legal structures
that conform to international, or at least European, norms and standards. Yet this pressure is misguided: the international community
needs to understand its work as constitutional creation with an
avowedly political agenda opposed to the present regimes by its
very nature, and not merely the more effective implementation of
human rights within the existing order, the nature of which is nearly
universally contested.
In fact, the three domestic systems evince a deep, thorough-going
and consistent commitment to ethno-majoritarian constitutional
principles; the volatile political situation—specifically the threat of
forceful intervention by quasi-occupying powers—prevents a tooopen expression of these underlying principles, but they operate
whenever possible. Thrown into the balance on the other side are
Annex 4, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Annex
6, the Agreement on Human Rights. Their combined weight hardly
shudders the scales. The point is that the operation of these systems
does not merely violate certain articles of the Dayton Accords’ human rights principles; these systems, at their core, constitutionally
contradict those principles. 239 Do they then contradict all of Dayton?
VII. DAYTON’S COMPROMISE: ETHNIC PARTITION IN
EXCHANGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Although the civilian aspects of Dayton remain moribund and
contradicted by the continued power and internal legitimacy of the
domestic systems, the military aspects of the Accords have been
strictly implemented. These provisions have had a two-fold effect:
they have internationalized the military situation on the ground, and
they have vetted and stabilized the practical ethnic partition of the
238. Interview with judge, in Vareš, Fed. BiH, supra note 155.
239. Cf. Popović, supra note 8, at 156. (“[The war-time property regulations] provide a
quasi-legal frame for deprivation of property. As these regulations and their application are
discriminatory, they represent a final act of ethnic cleansing. Therefore, they not only violate
the rules and principles of international law, but the basic notions of morality and justice as
well.”).
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country that had already been effected by the war. 240 The conventional understanding is that the military provisions were given priority in order to create a stable environment in which the elaborate
civilian and human rights mechanisms could begin to operate.
However, in so doing, they also have given meaningful support,
recognition, and legitimation to the very groupings whose existence
poses the gravest constitutional questions about the ultimate efficacy of the other, civilian, half of Dayton.
The central dilemma confronting any observer of the Dayton
process then is this: How can one reconcile Dayton’s apparent partition of the country with its firm commitments to renewed integration? Within this question lies another, more particular to our exploration: How can one reconcile Dayton’s ethno-territorial partition of
the country with its commitments to human and minority rights?
The answer seems to be that the two parts can be conceived of, not
as contradicting each other, but as forming two halves of a compromise, a quid pro quo: first, ethno-territorial partition and the
creation of illiberal ethnic states is guaranteed, and then (only then)
human rights standards are introduced and institutionalized. However, it is a compromise that, I argue, will ultimately founder, and,
even if it succeeds, presents a profound conceptual and strategic
challenge to human rights advocates.
By far the largest part of the Dayton Accords addresses the
phased separation and scale-back of military forces along the confrontation line and throughout the country, as well as the introduction of IFOR. Much of the material is technical and detailed in nature, however, and the military provisions relevant to the constitutional structure of the country may be summarized briefly. Each of
the three groups retain their basic military structures, with the Muslim and Croat forces eventually scheduled to operate under a unified command. 241 The military forces of either entity 242 are barred
240. The most obvious example of this is the effective military turnabout that has occurred
since 1995, when the Serbs first were put on the defensive. Instead of working to defeat the
Serbs militarily, the actual effective role of international troops is now safeguarding the Serb
entity from an increasingly powerful Muslim military. See Economist Intelligence Unit,
supra note 20, at 10. This suggests, of course, that the present political state of affairs is not
merely one that the West must tolerate, but rather one that it, at least in part, has structured
and maintains.
241. In effect, there has been almost no integration of the Muslim and Croat militaries.
The joint federation forces are supposed to number 45,000, with three Muslim and one Croat
corps. There is also a joint rapid reaction brigade, but its Muslim and Croat battalions have
separate bases. The federation defense law (from August 1996) requires full integration of the
armies only after three years. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 20, at 10.
242. Each of the three communities retains its own armed forces. Although the Muslim
and Croat militaries formally compose two halves of an allied, joint fighting force, and do in
fact receive weapons and training under the American “train and equip” program, they remain separated from and suspicious of each other. “The recently passed Federation defence
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from entering the territory of the other without the consent of that
entity and the federal presidency. 243 A “zone of separation” is created between the two entities’ military forces, 244 which must be
withdrawn into barracks and reduced in size. 245 Large, heavily
armed NATO-led forces are introduced into the country, with extensive powers to patrol, monitor, and control the activities of the
combatant forces. 246 In addition, Western, principally American,
military hardware and technical assistance is to be provided to the
joint Muslim and Croat military forces. 247
The boundary between the two entities, the Inter-Entity Boundary Line 248 (IEBL), basically tracks the 1995 cease-fire line, with
some significant adjustments in favor of the Muslims near Sarajevo,
and in favor of the Serbs in western Bosnia. The IEBL cannot be
adjusted without mutual consent, 249 except in the area around the
strategic town of Brčko, whose status is to be decided by arbitration. 250 The internationally recognized borders of the state—that is,
of the former Yugoslav republic—are to continue, with only its internal structure being modified, 251 but within that structure, two
(and effectively three) ethnic territorial entities continue to operate
under the security umbrella of a heavily armed international force.
The overarching principle of the Dayton Accords is that an internationally sanctioned regime replaces ethnically exclusive, domestic regimes. Where the two contradict, Dayton is authoritative and
controlling; where Dayton is silent, the domestic regimes’ rules
continue to have valid force. However, if one recognizes that the
first, principal, and most successful part of Dayton is actually enlaw has fully confirmed the ethnic separation of HVO and ABiH forces.” UNHCR, supra
note 7, at 4.
243. GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 1A, art. I, § 2, cl. a, 35 I.L.M. at 92. The same clause also
requires that “[a]ll armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall operate consistently with
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
244. See id. Annex 1A, art. IV, § 2, cl. a-b, 35 I.L.M. at 93.
245. See id. Annex 1A, art. IV, § 5, and Annex 1B, art. IV, 35 I.L.M. at 110.
246. See id. Annex 1A, art. VI, 35 I.L.M. at 97.
247. The aim of the so-called “Train and Equip” program is “to create a force strong
enough to counter the RS army, which inherited arms from the JNA [Yugoslav National
Army]. However, the integration of the federation’s forces has been limited in practice.”
Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 20, at 10. See also Boyd, supra note 5, at 48–49
(“The Train and Equip program was developed for the stated purpose of enabling the Federation, in particular the Muslims, to defend against potential Serb offensives should the peace
process fail.”).
248. GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 2, art. I, 35 I.L.M. at 112.
249. See id. Annex 2, art. II, 35 I.L.M. at 112.
250. See id. Annex 2, art. V, 35 I.L.M. at 113. The decision was to have been made within
one year, but has been postponed three times and is still outstanding. Brčko is in Serb hands,
although an international administration has responsibility for the territory, and has adopted a
much more assertive set of policies than has the international community elsewhere in the
country.
251. GFAP, supra note 4, Annex 4, art. I, § 1, 35 I.L.M. at 118.

70

Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 40

tirely in accord with the purposes of the domestic regimes (whether
or not its architects themselves share those sentiments 252 ), then it
becomes more difficult to see those domestic systems as being
overridden. Rather, they were, in a basic sense, reinforced by the
Dayton Accords. On the legal plane, Dayton created the entities:
Republika Srpska received official recognition for the first time, 253
and the presence of NATO-led troops is now its greatest guarantee
of continued existence against Muslim revanchism. 254 Despite the
rhetoric to the contrary, Dayton very much “rewarded aggression;”
it is the imprimatur of a status quo achieved through four years of
conflict. If, then, the implicitly ethnic character of these regimes
contradicts, rather than complements, individual human rights
norms, it is in part the international community’s own doing. How
then can the international community both construct an illiberal
regime and simultaneously impose upon it liberal institutions?
The structure of the Dayton Accords therefore appears internally
contradictory, since, while assuming and requiring rule of law institutions, it also vets—indeed, legally establishes—the military and
political divisions created by the war and ethnic cleansing campaigns. 255 In demanding a liberally motivated, humanistic regime
while acceding to the maintenance of territorial divisions that are
252. Certainly, this view of the process is not one that the principal players themselves acknowledge. Richard Holbrooke has denied that there was any intention to allow a partition, in
part or in whole, at the time of the Dayton Accords’ negotiation, and described the negotiating team’s goals for the entities as follows:
The interentity boundary line was designed to be similar to, say, a boundary between
two American states or Canadian provinces, or, for that matter, two of the republics of
the former Yugoslavia, but everyone knew that the Serbs would not voluntarily accept
such a concept. As expected, they are trying to turn the interentity boundary line into a
partition line, which they would later try to turn into complete separation . . . .
At Dayton, the warring parties agreed to accept a single state. The parties, including
the Bosnian Serbs, went further than vague rhetoric. They also accepted the key elements of a sovereign state: a single, clearly defined international border; an internationally recognized central government and United Nations membership; a three-person
presidency chosen by direct, free, and internationally supervised elections; a freely
elected national assembly; a central bank and a single currency; compliance with the International War Crimes Tribunal; a “Supreme Court”; and joint commissions for such
matters as railroads, national monuments, and even human rights.
These were, I stress, only paper agreements, but they were quite clear. Furthermore,
some critically important parts of Dayton were carried out rapidly and successfully on
the ground. Sarajevo was united under Federation control, the contending military forces
separated, and, above all, the war ended.
Richard Holbrooke, Letter to the Editor, 76 Foreign Aff. 170, 170–71 (1997).
253. Cf. Paola Gaeta, The Dayton Agreements and International Law, 7 EJIL/JEDI 147,
158–60 (1996) (noting the creation and termination of an international legal personality for
Republika Srpska and the Federation through the negotiations and signature of the Accords).
254. See Boyd, supra note 5, at 48–49.
255. I do not mean to suggest that the historical incident of borders determines, for all
time, the nature of the polity and state those borders contain; but I do assert that these borders, for the foreseeable future, serve as a reasonable proxy for a political vision fundamentally at odds with Dayton’s stated humanistic provisions and vision.
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justifiable, even understandable, only on the most illiberal grounds,
Dayton sets itself an impossible task: it seeks to justify both the rule
of law and the “law of rule.”
Although it is true that the lines drawn in the Accord would effectively ensure the maintenance of a Serb majority in Republika
Srpska, a Croat majority in the Croat cantons, and a Muslim majority in the Muslim cantons 256 even if all refugees went home, large
portions of the population would still be living as minorities in each
of those parts. They would be dependent for their livelihoods and
their very lives on the local ethnic majority’s goodwill and on the
receptivity of that majority’s social, political, and legal institutions.
This is in fact what Dayton assumes must happen and will happen.
Yet, if that is to be the case, it is difficult to understand exactly what
the war was fought for—at least as the parties themselves see it. It
is equally difficult to see the purpose of what was created, or at
least vetted, at Dayton. It is difficult, that is, to see why there are
entities and cantons except to affirm and allow the ethnic division
of the country, and to ensure the political supremacy—and thus the
security—of each ethnic group on some territory of its own. To say
that equal protection for minorities is the price of that security is to
add a political term, not to restate an integral part of the argument.
The state-creating aspects of Dayton are clearly and unambiguously
ethno-territorial; protections for human and minority rights, however salutary, are adjunct, not essential, to that core project.
A constitutional, state-creating enterprise has been, in reality, the
West’s core practical goal. 257 Despite the familiar rhetoric about
saving multiethnic Bosnia, by 1995 there was no longer any Bosnia
to be saved; today, it would have to be created, not maintained,
supported, or “saved.” However, the international community’s
rights-oriented rhetoric masks the fundamentally political act that
the promulgation of any constitution really is: the substantive political phase that precedes the period of law. 258

256. The cantons do not form a perfect ethnic fit; some of them, in central Bosnia, are
“mixed,” with effectively separate Muslim and Croat sections, but administratively and juridically there is no distinction.
257. One analyst comments:
There are many ways in which one can read and interpret Dayton. I read it as a textbook
of state-building from top to bottom. Everything is programmed to start from the tip of
the pyramid. Making the central institutions function and affirming their role is crucial
for the whole structure to work and by implication to encourage other, lower level institutions to operate according to the principles of Dayton.
Pajić, Protectorates Lost, supra note 18, at 26. If, as in Bosnia, those “lower level institutions” are the vessels of all domestic legitimacy and power, however, this formula is backwards indeed.
258. Cf., on this point, Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs (1998).
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For the local ethno-political communities, however, there is a
continuity between their systems and their laws, which are under
assault from the international community. Their systems, however
substantively and morally reprehensible, are consistent on their own
terms. They have, in however substantively perverted a fashion, a
system and a rule of law: an effective constitutional order. 259 What
appears to the outsider as a disjuncture violative of the human
rights—the exclusion of minorities—is properly understood within
the country as a constituent element of the social and political order.
It is a constitutional provision; the only question is whether or not
that internally consistent system can be made to work with, and to
incorporate, the rights and guarantees that constitute the other half
of Dayton.
Some scholars speak with hope about the internal contradictions
within authoritarian societies, saying that they will eventually bring
down their repressive structures. 260 I am sympathetic to such hopes,
but I suppose too that the theories must be applied consistently: internal contradictions weaken and ultimately destroy any political
enterprise, authoritarian or democratic, benevolent or despotic. In
Bosnia today, the contradictions are in Dayton itself, and not in its
enemies. The choices the international community has made have
not been consistent. Simple partition or a full-scale “de-ethnicizing”
occupation would have been consistent; so would a full military
occupation, the much-discussed protectorate. But Dayton, because
it seeks to graft liberal constitutionalism and humanistic equal protection onto ethnicized, territorialized polities, is neither of those
things. Its ultimate failure to achieve its civilian goals—quite apart
from the obvious problems of “lack of political will”—is a consequence of those inconsistencies and contradictions. Indeed, its apparent contradictions may be understood as partly underlying that
lack of will, because states—already timid enough about undertaking even simple international adventures that may leave some of
their soldiers dead 261 —have no appetite at all to undertake the impossible.
259. In discussing Israel, Gad Barzilai provides a definition of the rule of law that includes human rights as an integral element, yet implicitly concedes the effectively constitutional nature of that determination: “A rule of law should be founded on greater appreciation
of human rights and civil rights preserved unconditionally for the benefit of individuals,
groups and nations who choose to coexist.” (emphasis added) Gad Barzilai, Between the Rule
of Law and the Law of the Ruler: The Supreme Court in Israeli Legal Culture, 152 Int’l Soc.
Sci. J. 193, 206 (1997).
260. See, e.g., Akhavan, supra note 211, at 810. (“Authoritarian power structures are often
the best architects of their own demise through the internal contradictions and zero-sum
power struggles that they generate.”).
261. See id. at 803 (“Ambassador Sacirbey recalled a comment by an American general at
the time to the effect that ‘[i]t is not worth risking the life of one American soldier to arrest
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VIII. CLOAKED IN ETHNICITY’S ROBE: THE NEED TO
SUBORDINATE HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Human Rights’ (Illusory) Rhetorical Moment
Consider a simple thought experiment: if basic human rights protections were both adequate in themselves and the real core of the
project, why not have simply drafted principles and created institutions ensuring human and minority rights throughout the territory of
Bosnia, without any subdivisions, entities, or cantons? There is, of
course, probably not a single observer who imagines that would
work, even if the international community were to arrest, prosecute,
and punish all those guilty of atrocities. The arguments against doing so—irreversible ethnic mobilization, rational choice in conditions of fear and uncertainty, the economic incentives of continued
obfuscation, ancient hatreds and cycles of revenge—are well rehearsed, and, though themselves contested as to their details and
moral qualities, they surely amount to a firm refutation of the notion that rights alone can patch up the damage already done.
Why, then, would an analogous formula work within each ethnic
territory? The answer—partial, partially contradictory, and almost
wholly unsatisfactory—must be that it has a better chance of working because it contains an implicit trade-off, an ethnic quid pro quo:
if the rights and safety of the majority are secured, it must in return
ensure the rights and safety of the minorities living among it. It is a
formula that does not require any promises or protections of the
other until the safety of the self has been secured. It is political, not
principled.
This is the calculus of Dayton, if there is any. But what guarantee
is there that this trade-off will produce the results the international
community desires in the long-term? There is certainly no good will
in the formula, so it must rely on continuing external pressure, institutionalization, or the exhaustion of alternatives to operate.
It is here that the rhetoric of rights had its moment. If ever there
was an opportunity to create the kind of human rights regime that
activists and scholars want, it was in Bosnia. At the least, the opportunity was there to take an uncompromising, principled rhetorical
stance. Although the domestic parties drove hard bargains, they ultimately signed on to extraordinarily invasive and intrusive measures and institutions; there is no country on earth more beholden to
the principles of the international human rights movement, on paper, than Bosnia and Herzegovina today. 262 That would seem to be a
[Radovan] Karadžić . . . .’”).
262. See Michael O’Flaherty & Gregory Gisvold, Introduction, in Post-War Protection of
Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 8, at ix (noting the “unprecedented and
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victory for the rhetoric, but that rhetoric is contradicted by and
premised upon a substratum of political division and security guarantees that makes the principles and the promises conditional in a
way that is not at all conventionally comfortable. 263
In practice, the domestic legal regimes continue to operate, and
have a considerable degree of internal acceptance and legitimacy.264
The international mechanisms, in contrast, barely function. A domestic observer, considering the bifurcated Dayton Accords and his
own ethno-territorial regime, could easily conclude that the odd
man out is not his system, but rather the paper guarantees of human
rights and cross-IEBL institutions. As an empirical matter, he would
be right indeed.

highly elaborate provisions” in the Accords, which “comprise one of the most complex regimes for the protection of human rights by law ever devised.”).
263. Here is one institutional expression of the felt contradiction between the ethnic constitutions and the human rights norms:
On 5 May [1997] the Human Rights Ombudsperson for BiH, Gret Haller, issued her
first annual report at a press conference in Sarajevo (Fed). She stressed that the concept
of ethnically clean states or ethnically clean areas is completely incompatible with the
concept of human rights. “As long as there are still politicians that promote the idea of
creating ethnically clean states . . . this country can not become a country based on human rights, and so it will not be able to join the family of European states,” she added.
Dr. Haller underlined the importance of progress in human rights and freedom of
movement before Bosnia can become a member of the Council of Europe. “A society in
which people do not want to have neighbors belonging to other ethnic groups is one that
can never be based on human rights, democracy, and rule of law—the three pillars of the
member states of the Council of Europe. The Ombudsperson then explained that the
governments of BiH, Republika Srpska, and the Federation are not living up to their
commitments vis-à-vis her office. For instance, the governments of the Federation and
state BiH level rarely respond to her requests for observations on cases. The Office of
the BiH Ombudsperson provides an important avenue for individuals to lodge complaints, especially in the current environment characterized by a lack of confidence in
the authorities and the ability of the judicial system.
OHR, Human Rights Report, May 6-7, 1997. (OHR occasional bulletin) (unpaginated).
264. More to the point, to the degree they are viewed by the populace as illegitimate, it is
more a recognition of the corruption of the domestic political powers, rather than any acceptance of the overarching authority of Dayton, which acts to undermine faith in their legitimacy. Biljana Plavšić successfully campaigned for president of Republika Srpska on an anticorruption platform, not a pro-Dayton or anti-Serb platform. Knowing that one’s leaders are
corrupt in no way need vitiate one’s commitment to the ideal project—here, the protection of
the nation and its individuals. Other analysts, however, disagree:
The battle for power in Srpska between President Plavšić and former President Karadžić
is not central to the long-term peace in Bosnia, although the United States is treating it
as if it were. Rather, it is a symptom of the central problem: the uncertainty of the minorities about their right to national identity and self-determination.
Everything we know about Plavšić points to the conclusion that she is as extreme in
her nationalism as Karadžić but is skillfully playing the Dayton card to gain U.S. support against him.
Boyd, supra note 5, at 51.
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B. The Choice of a Constitutional or a Rhetorical Critique
As a consequence, the international community has failed to apprehend—or, despite apprehending, has failed to address—the real
conceptual challenge facing it: that this is a project of formation,
not reform; that it is constitutional, and not legal, in nature, and in
so being, it is fundamentally political in a way that does not easily
admit of a rhetorical posture of rights and legality. 265 Yet this is precisely the mode in which the international community has proceeded. Most obviously, because it wishes there to be a single unified country called Bosnia, it has proceeded as if that country already existed, when in fact it has been complicit in the constitutional formation of illiberal states opposed by the terms of their
creation to the civilian requirements of Dayton.
The international community has not acknowledged to itself, nor
even recognized, that the disparate elements in the Dayton settlement—the ethno-territorial partition and the demand for human
rights—can only be realized either as contradictions or as compromises. If realized as the former, they are doomed to failure or irrelevance; if realized as the latter, their success can only come at
the price of accepting, legitimating, and cooperating with regimes
whose very constitution and nature is opposed to the operation of
those principles.
The international community has had its greatest successes when
it has followed one of two strategies: first, when it has presented
clear political demands backed by swift military intervention, and
second, when, as with the military aspects of Dayton, its preferred
outcomes actually comported with the core interests of the domestic
parties. 266 There is no reason to expect that the civilian aspects of
the conflict and settlement—and the central issue of property in
particular—occupy a different position in this basic formula. This
means a choice between active intervention and a recognition,
whether de facto or de jure, that the extant regimes are the effective
actors. Yet the international community, despite having massive
military formations in the country, has consistently refused to
shoulder the burden of occupation that the real constitutional transformation of the country would require. 267 In refusing, it has left
265. Cf. Ken Jowitt, Dizzy with Democracy, 40 Problems of Post-Communism 3, 3–7
(1996) (offering similar arguments in its critique of institutionalist and path dependency
thinking concerning the post-socialist states).
266. See Boyd, supra note 5, at 44 (“Military aspects of the accord are being implemented
successfully partly because a robust Stabilization Force (SFOR) demands and gets compliance from all parties on matters for which it is responsible, but also because the coalition’s
mission of separating the antagonists reflects the desires of the antagonists themselves.”).
267. See Haselock Dismisses Protectorate, Odraz B92 Open Serbia (J. Ellis-Mrdjenović et
al. eds., 14:00 CET, Oct. 30, 1997) <http://www.b92.net/vesti/>.
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itself only the leverage of half-measures and a rhetoric empirically
at odds with the state of affairs on the ground.
The publicly recognized legal order notwithstanding, it is surely
more accurate empirically to say that members of the various ethnic
groups are now in effect citizens of their ethno-political territorial
states within the former Bosnia, and not citizens of that defunct
country as a whole. The rhetoric of the international community
rebels at such a suggestion, but sense and experience confirm that it
is so. The rhetoric is just as rousing, and the substantive moral critique retains all its vigor, but they are weak weapons indeed against
the acknowledgment that these are states with a very different
agenda, a very different reason for being.
Yet surely there is real value in adopting and maintaining a rhetorical commitment to legal standards that comport with one’s substantive political values. If consistently and broadly applied, such
rhetoric might limit other actors’ ability or willingness to openly
assert standards or values to the contrary, and might, it is sometimes
hoped, ultimately contribute to a change in perceptions and attitudes that will translate into real political change as well. 268
There are two principal objections to this view, which serve at
the least to temper its native optimism. One is that actors are remarkably capable of persisting in behavior contrary to their own
public pronouncements, and thus there is little evidence that a conversion effect, or a political version of cognitive dissonance theory,
actually obtains. Second, and more interestingly, there is a cost, as
well as a benefit, to choosing a legal rhetorical mode: such a choice
tends to change the chooser’s own perceptions and attitudes, and to
bias them towards the very kinds of postures he is advocating. This
may seem at first a highly positive thing: advocating commitment
to legal standards may in fact increase one’s own commitment to
those standards, as well as that of one’s target. As a matter of effecSpokesman for the international community’s High Representative in Bosnia Simon
Haselock on Wednesday rejected claims that the High Representative was considering
the possibility of introducing a protectorate over Bosnia-Herzegovina if the Bosnian
Ministerial Council continued to block the adoption of important laws. Haselock said
that if the obstruction continued High Representative Carlos Westendorp would need
more authority to ensure that these laws are passed. Haselock denied that the suggestion
of a protectorate was ever considered.
Id.
Likewise, NATO adamantly refuses to use the word “occupation” to discuss its role in
Bosnia.
268. Indeed, I have argued this optimistic view myself. See Timothy Waters & Rachel
Guglielmo, “Two Souls to Struggle With . . . .”: The Failing Implementation of Hungary’s
New Minorities Law and Discrimination against Gypsies, in State and Nation Building in
East Central Europe: Contemporary Perspectives, supra note 119, at 190–91 (arguing for the
transformative potential of human rights rhetoric when adopted by state actors currently
engaged in human rights abuses).
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tiveness, however, it may be that a commitment to legal standards is
not as effective as political engagement or advocacy. The rhetoric
of legal standards compels the rhetorician to abstain from both
overly political postures, and from becoming too clearly an advocate for substantive change. 269 If, however, the core problem is political, and not legal—if, in other words, the very terms of a dualistic deal preclude the realization of one of those terms, which is the
provisions on minority rights—then that rhetorician has handicapped his own effectiveness. Such is the case in Bosnia.
C. The Illusion of Complementarity
Given that the international community is patently unprepared to
shoulder the burden of a truly substantive transformation, and has
instead effectively provided military guarantees to the ethnic regimes, some scholars have sought to identify the conceptual common ground on which human rights and minority-based autonomies
can coexist and reinforce each other. They rightly recognize the
challenge that minority regimes pose to the universal voice of human rights, but they seek to join the two, or to find the underlying
universal purposes in a particularistic program of autonomy. 270
There is also a moderate position, which outlines how autonomies
and group-based power-sharing can complement and advance individual human rights, and notes that, inasmuch as such schemes may
sometimes be the only practical way of preventing bloodshed, they
may represent “a ‘least worst’ solution to threats of ongoing violence and systemic denials of human rights.” 271

269. One way to understand the reticence of the international community to act is to ascribe to it a belief that more intrusive action is not politically possible, either because it
would provoke a counterproductive reaction, or because there is insufficient political will on
the home front to bear the costs of stronger intervention, an argument which implicitly includes the former variant. Another way to understand that reticence, however, is to observe
that it is an implicit part of the Dayton deal that there be some level of baseline support from
the international community for the ethno-territorial division of the country represented by
the entities and cantons, and that this minimum level of support translates into a posture of
greater neutrality than is necessary to realize the human and minority rights provisions of
Dayton.
270. See, e.g., Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of SelfDetermination, in Modern Law of Self-Determination 101–38 (Christian Tomuschat ed.,
1993); cf. Asbjørn Eide, In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession, in id., at 139–
76. See also Henry J. Steiner, Freedom of Settlement in Ethnically Divided States: A Human
Rights Analysis, in The Thatched Patio (Nov.-Dec. 1993), at 49 [hereinafter Freedom of Settlement] (noting that many human rights have “an implicit and complementary group character”); Henry Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for
Minorities, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1539 (1991) [hereinafter Ideals and Counter-Ideals]
(summarizing similar views, without necessarily concurring with them).
271. Steiner, Freedom of Settlement, supra note 270, at 48–51; cf. Steiner, Ideals and
Counter-Ideals, supra note 270, at 1557.

78

Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 40

In ensuring the reduction of bloodshed, such regimes allow for
other rights to flourish. There is, however, little in the canon of individual human rights beyond the universal goods of peace and stability that such regimes offer. They cloak their people in the embracing robes of ethnicity; their benefit is to the community, and to
the individual as a member of that community, but the rights expressed in the UDHR or the ICCPR are cut of a different cloth.
I do not mean to suggest that every form of autonomy, even if
ethnically based, presents so stark a choice. Power-sharing 272 and
personal autonomy all can operate well below the threshold of ultimate contradiction. 273 But all autonomies contain the germ of this
contradiction, ethnic ones more so, and some cases—like Bosnia or
Cyprus—rise to the level of presenting an ultimate challenge to the
ideal of individual rights. In those cases, to try to reconcile ethnic
autonomy to the canon of human rights is clearly a pointless rhetorical exercise; when an ethnically based autonomy is the only politically feasible way to ensure peace and safety for the populace,
then it must be embraced whether or not it contradicts any or all of
the rights enumerated in the ICCPR or any other canonical text.
Indeed, on the contrary, it is the text that must reconciled to the
autonomy.
It is an argument, in its essence, of lowered expectations: if you
will have peace, you may not have rights. The main path to peace,
for communities rife with ethnic strife, may be an illiberal constitution that is fundamentally at odds with universalizing individual
liberalism; yet, it may provide the only practical means to end violence. It is not “the least worst,” but “the only possible.” If that
characterization is accurate, it may be that a rhetorical strategy relying on a quid pro quo is doomed to failure from the start—doomed,
at least, to achieve far less than the flourishing of rights.
I see the Bosnian conflict, in its slow and fatal dénouement, as a
challenge—indeed, a harsh rebuke—to the hopes of the project that
seeks to find an uncontradicted complementarity between ethnic
autonomy and individual human rights. Bosnia has been a jeremiad
on our limitations, our practical and philosophical inability to ensure both peace and justice. 274 Shameful as the West’s inaction was
272. See Arend Lijphart, The Power-Sharing Approach in Conflict and Peacemaking, in
Multiethnic Societies 491–509 (Joseph V. Montville ed., 1991).
273. See Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights 474–77 (1996). See also Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals,
supra note 270, at 1540–43.
274. Cf. Steiner, Freedom of Settlement, supra note 270, at 63 (“Human rights norms,
while emphasizing freedom of residence, say little about the route to be followed in bringing
two hostile communities together. The seriousness of the problems in reunifying ethnically
divided countries cautions against dogmatic assertions about how and when these human
rights can be fully realized.”).
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throughout much of the war, its inability to acknowledge, in war’s
twilight, that it has no better doctrines or answers to offer, deserves
as great an indictment.
Moreover, where some scholars see the contradiction as a temporal one, trusting to time and the possibility of a “negotiated schedule” for realizing human rights, 275 I see a more serious challenge:
that the day of realization will never come, because it is not in the
nature of the system called upon to realize those rights to do so, nor
in its fundamental interest. Denial of the right to return is not some
temporary derogation of human rights to be “regretted” by a commission: it is the purpose for which these state have come into being.
I do not suggest that reform of such a constitutionally illiberal
society is impossible, or that gross violations of individual human
rights can never be eradicated or ameliorated. What I do argue is
that it will involve fundamental changes: in effect, the transformation of the present system, and not its mere incremental improvement. So long as the fundamentals of the present system abide, the
tension between the purposes of that system’s being and the aspirations of universal human rights rhetoric is untenable. One must
give. In the Balkans today, can anyone doubt which one will?
IX. CONCLUSION
There is another path for Bosnia, though it is no more palatable
to those who seek to vindicate the rhetoric of human rights. Bosnia’s best hope for a stable, peaceful future with respect for human
rights may lie precisely in following the present process of ethnic
exclusion to its conclusion. Although it is uncomfortable to perceive it in such terms, the Yugoslav conflict has had the effect of
creating nation-state polities with demographic characteristics much
like the states of Western Europe, which had the good fortune to
conduct their own great phase of “ethnic cleansing” before these
modern, much-photographed, times. There is nothing in the history
of the Bosnian communities, in the conduct of the war, or in the
social, political, or economic fundamentals of the communities today to suggest that reconvergence—a “new Yugoslavia”—is more
likely than consolidation of separate national states that will reach
out to each other only as sovereign equals whose identity and purpose is to house and protect the nation. 276 Stabilization, democrati275. Id. at 65.
276. Though I have not addressed it directly, it seems clear that a defense of the ultimate
complementarity of autonomies and human rights on the basis of arguments for diversity
(see, e.g., Asbjørn Eide, In Search of Constructive Alternatives to Secession, supra note 270,
at 166; cf. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals, supra note 270, at 1547–48) ultimately fails in
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zation, and a willingness to tolerate the remaining “others” among
them may be more possible once each group has its own secure territory. 277 This has been the history of modern Western Europe,
which is only now engaging in an historical convergence after having secured for each nation its state. Therein lies, perhaps, the only
path of hope for the former Yugoslavia, but it is a different path indeed from the one envisioned in the civilian provisions of Dayton,
though very much in accord with the real lay of the land.
The observer who perceives things in this way—who understands this to be the actual situation, as opposed to the morally
preferable outcome—will then have to decide if he supports the
rhetoric of rights, at the price of destabilization and the miseries of
war, or partition and peace, at the price of abandoning, perhaps for
a very long time, the claim to rights. 278 Ethnic autonomy is only
rarely and incompletely a true complement to individual human
rights; in many ways, it is their antithesis—and yet it may be the
only possible, the necessary, even the morally right solution to
many conflicts. For the sake of peace, it may be a solution that must
be embraced, not to achieve human rights, but despite its denial of
them.
I see no options for Bosnia that do not, in some more or less radical form, build upon ethnic autonomy as the basis for the social
peace that must precede the realization of any human rights. I do
the case of Bosnia, since there has been at least as much threat and real damage to other
cultural traditions (including “multi-ethnicity” and “Yugoslavism”) as there has been protection of endangered ethnic groups. Protection of diversity and political responses to the security dilemma simply do not collapse one into the other. As Steiner notes, “[s]uch a normative
arrangement raises obvious, serious issues. The ideal in the human rights movement of preserving difference cannot so readily be bent to support the creation of autonom[ous] regimes.
To the contrary, a further elaboration of that ideal prompts a deep criticism of such regimes
and their fragmenting effects.” Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals, supra note 270, at 1551. It
is, in any event, a perversion of the word to suppose that what is occurring in Bosnia today is
the protection of diversity, without more.
277. “Zagreb professor Žarko Puhovski argues controversially that ‘after ethnic cleansing,
democracy is going to have a better chance.’ Certainly, the ethnicisation of territory in the
Balkans is nearly complete, and there is no point in denying reality. Within the security of the
tribes . . . a kind of plurality may yet emerge.” Anthony Borden, The Lesson Unlearned, War
Report 58, at 8. Boyd foresees a somewhat different end result, but identifies roughly the
same path there:
At least for now, people feel secure only when surrounded by their own kind. But as
economic opportunity invites interaction, these same people will gradually become confident that they can live again in a mixed society. Bosnia can survive as a state in a loose
confederation if the international community, led by the United States, explicitly acknowledges the right of the ethnic factions to live among their own and govern themselves. Once people’s sense of national identity is secured, the appeal of radical nationalist politicians will evaporate and a reasonable politics and economics can emerge.
Boyd, supra note 5, at 52–53.
278. See Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals, supra note 270, at 1559 (noting that when
elaborating a claim for autonomy, “the rhetoric of rights may here be inappropriate, even
misleading.”).
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not think there are any voices proposing the contrary anymore. But
I assert further that these options—unavoidable, necessary, and the
least worst hope for that torn country—are not compatible with
what most scholars, optimistic as they are, imagine will come next.
I do not think that the foundations of Bosnia’s regimes can be reconciled with a universal vision of human rights for all the former
citizens of their territories; yet, nor do I see an alternative that
would provide social peace and respite from war—and are not these
last, in their way, the highest rights and the greatest gifts? They are
the only values still clothed in robes of high regard, in that shattered, naked land.

